Security Review
SentryOfficialPublished by Sentry
- Skill
- Review and audit
- Security
- CC-BY-SA-4.0
- Medium risk
AutoGineer summary
Written by AutoGineer from the skill’s own files, not by the author
The Security Review skill provides a structured approach to auditing code for security vulnerabilities. It emphasizes deep research into data flow and context to distinguish between theoretical risks and truly exploitable issues. By focusing on attacker-controlled inputs and framework-specific mitigations, it reduces false positives and ensures that reported findings are actionable and high-confidence.
What it does
- Performs systematic security audits on provided code snippets or files.
- Traces data flow to confirm if inputs are attacker-controlled or server-controlled.
- Evaluates code against common vulnerability patterns like injection, XSS, and authentication flaws.
- Filters out false positives by checking for framework-level protections and sanitization.
- Categorizes findings by severity and confidence levels.
- Provides a standardized reporting format for identified vulnerabilities.
When to use it
- When you need to audit code for potential security vulnerabilities.
- When performing an OWASP-based security review.
- When you need to verify if a specific code pattern is exploitable.
- When checking for common security issues like SQL injection, XSS, or insecure authentication.
Advantages
- Reduces noise by filtering out theoretical issues and server-controlled configurations.
- Ensures high-confidence reporting by requiring codebase research before flagging.
- Provides clear, actionable remediation advice for identified vulnerabilities.
- Standardizes the security review process across different codebases.
Usage examples
- “Perform a security review on this file: [code snippet]”
- The agent will analyze the code, trace the data flow of inputs, and provide a report of any high-confidence vulnerabilities found, or state that none were identified.
- “Check this API endpoint for potential injection vulnerabilities.”
- The agent will examine the endpoint's input handling and database queries to determine if user input is properly parameterized or sanitized.
- “Audit this authentication logic for security issues.”
- The agent will review the authentication implementation against best practices, such as password storage algorithms and brute-force protections.
Install
Download the skill as a ZIP:
https://autogineer.com/agent-skills/getsentry/security-review/downloadUnzip it into the cross-client skills folder of your project:
mkdir -p .agents/skills && unzip security-review.zip -d .agents/skills
Documentation by Sentry
<!-- Reference material based on OWASP Cheat Sheet Series (CC BY-SA 4.0) https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/ -->
Security Review Skill
Identify exploitable security vulnerabilities in code. Report only HIGH CONFIDENCE findings—clear vulnerable patterns with attacker-controlled input.
Scope: Research vs. Reporting
CRITICAL DISTINCTION:
Report on: Only the specific file, diff, or code provided by the user
Research: The ENTIRE codebase to build confidence before reporting
Before flagging any issue, you MUST research the codebase to understand:
Where does this input actually come from? (Trace data flow)
Is there validation/sanitization elsewhere?
How is this configured? (Check settings, config files, middleware)
What framework protections exist?
Do NOT report issues based solely on pattern matching. Investigate first, then report only what you're confident is exploitable.
Confidence Levels
| Level | Criteria | Action |
|---|---|---|
| HIGH | Vulnerable pattern + attacker-controlled input confirmed | Report with severity |
| MEDIUM | Vulnerable pattern, input source unclear | Note as "Needs verification" |
| LOW | Theoretical, best practice, defense-in-depth | Do not report |
Do Not Flag
General Rules
Test files (unless explicitly reviewing test security)
Dead code, commented code, documentation strings
Patterns using constants or server-controlled configuration
Code paths that require prior authentication to reach (note the auth requirement instead)
Server-Controlled Values (NOT Attacker-Controlled)
These are configured by operators, not controlled by attackers:
| Source | Example | Why It's Safe |
|---|---|---|
| Django settings | settings.API_URL, settings.ALLOWED_HOSTS | Set via config/env at deployment |
| Environment variables | os.environ.get('DATABASE_URL') | Deployment configuration |
| Config files | config.yaml, app.config['KEY'] | Server-side files |
| Framework constants | django.conf.settings.* | Not user-modifiable |
| Hardcoded values | BASE_URL = "https://api.internal" | Compile-time constants |
SSRF Example - NOT a vulnerability:
# SAFE: URL comes from Django settings (server-controlled)
response = requests.get(f"{settings.SEER_AUTOFIX_URL}{path}")SSRF Example - IS a vulnerability:
# VULNERABLE: URL comes from request (attacker-controlled)
response = requests.get(request.GET.get('url'))Framework-Mitigated Patterns
Check language guides before flagging. Common false positives:
| Pattern | Why It's Usually Safe |
|---|---|
Django {{ variable }} | Auto-escaped by default |
React {variable} | Auto-escaped by default |
Vue {{ variable }} | Auto-escaped by default |
User.objects.filter(id=input) | ORM parameterizes queries |
cursor.execute("...%s", (input,)) | Parameterized query |
innerHTML = "<b>Loading...</b>" | Constant string, no user input |
Only flag these when:
Django:
{{ var|safe }},{% autoescape off %},mark_safe(user_input)React:
dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{__html: userInput}}Vue:
v-html="userInput"ORM:
.raw(),.extra(),RawSQL()with string interpolation
Review Process
1. Detect Context
What type of code am I reviewing?
| Code Type | Load These References |
|---|---|
| API endpoints, routes | authorization.md, authentication.md, injection.md |
| Django/DRF views, permission classes, object-level access | Use the django-access-review skill if available for access control; otherwise authorization.md |
| Frontend, templates | xss.md, csrf.md, modern-threats.md (DOM clobbering, prototype pollution) |
| File handling, uploads | file-security.md |
| Crypto, secrets, tokens | cryptography.md, data-protection.md |
| Data serialization | deserialization.md |
| External requests | ssrf.md |
| Business workflows | business-logic.md |
| GraphQL, REST design | api-security.md |
| Config, headers, CORS | misconfiguration.md |
| CI/CD, dependencies | supply-chain.md |
| Error handling | error-handling.md |
| Audit, logging | logging.md |
Object merging/cloning, __proto__, DOM id/name lookups, WebSocket handlers, LLM prompt construction | modern-threats.md |
2. Load Language Guide
Based on file extension or imports:
| Indicators | Guide |
|---|---|
.py, django, flask, fastapi | languages/python.md |
.js, .ts, express, react, vue, next | languages/javascript.md |
For other languages there is no dedicated guide; rely on the references/ files and verify framework protections directly in the codebase.
3. Load Infrastructure Guide (if applicable)
| File Type | Guide |
|---|---|
Dockerfile, .dockerignore | infrastructure/docker.md |
| GitHub Actions workflows | Use the gha-security-review skill if available; otherwise references/supply-chain.md |
| Other CI/CD pipelines, lockfiles, package manifests | references/supply-chain.md |
4. Research Before Flagging
For each potential issue, research the codebase to build confidence:
Where does this value actually come from? Trace the data flow.
Is it configured at deployment (settings, env vars) or from user input?
Is there validation, sanitization, or allowlisting elsewhere?
What framework protections apply?
Only report issues where you have HIGH confidence after understanding the broader context.
5. Verify Exploitability
For each potential finding, confirm:
Is the input attacker-controlled?
| Attacker-Controlled (Investigate) | Server-Controlled (Usually Safe) |
|---|---|
request.GET, request.POST, request.args | settings.X, app.config['X'] |
request.json, request.data, request.body | os.environ.get('X') |
request.headers (most headers) | Hardcoded constants |
request.cookies (unsigned) | Internal service URLs from config |
URL path segments: /users/<id>/ | Database content from admin/system |
| File uploads (content and names) | Signed session data |
| Database content from other users | Framework settings |
| WebSocket messages |
Does the framework mitigate this?
Check language guide for auto-escaping, parameterization
Check for middleware/decorators that sanitize
Is there validation upstream?
Input validation before this code
Sanitization libraries (DOMPurify, bleach, etc.)
6. Report HIGH Confidence Only
Skip theoretical issues. Report only what you've confirmed is exploitable after research.
Severity Classification
| Severity | Impact | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | Direct exploit, severe impact, no auth required | RCE, SQL injection to data, auth bypass, hardcoded secrets |
| High | Exploitable with conditions, significant impact | Stored XSS, SSRF to metadata, IDOR to sensitive data |
| Medium | Specific conditions required, moderate impact | Reflected XSS, CSRF on state-changing actions, path traversal |
| Low | Defense-in-depth, minimal direct impact | Missing headers, verbose errors, weak algorithms in non-critical context |
Quick Patterns Reference
Always Flag (Critical)
eval(user_input) # Any language
exec(user_input) # Any language
pickle.loads(user_data) # Python
yaml.load(user_data) # Python (not safe_load)
unserialize($user_data) # PHP
deserialize(user_data) # Java ObjectInputStream
shell=True + user_input # Python subprocess
child_process.exec(user) # Node.jsAlways Flag (High)
innerHTML = userInput # DOM XSS
dangerouslySetInnerHTML={user} # React XSS
v-html="userInput" # Vue XSS
f"SELECT * FROM x WHERE {user}" # SQL injection
`SELECT * FROM x WHERE ${user}` # SQL injection
os.system(f"cmd {user_input}") # Command injectionAlways Flag (Secrets)
password = "hardcoded"
api_key = "sk-..."
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY = "..."
private_key = "-----BEGIN"Check Context First (MUST Investigate Before Flagging)
# SSRF - ONLY if URL is from user input, NOT from settings/config
requests.get(request.GET['url']) # FLAG: User-controlled URL
requests.get(settings.API_URL) # SAFE: Server-controlled config
requests.get(f"{settings.BASE}/{x}") # CHECK: Is 'x' user input?
# Path traversal - ONLY if path is from user input
open(request.GET['file']) # FLAG: User-controlled path
open(settings.LOG_PATH) # SAFE: Server-controlled config
open(f"{BASE_DIR}/{filename}") # CHECK: Is 'filename' user input?
# Open redirect - ONLY if URL is from user input
redirect(request.GET['next']) # FLAG: User-controlled redirect
redirect(settings.LOGIN_URL) # SAFE: Server-controlled config
# Weak crypto - ONLY if used for security purposes
hashlib.md5(file_content) # SAFE: File checksums, caching
hashlib.md5(password) # FLAG: Password hashing
random.random() # SAFE: Non-security uses (UI, sampling)
random.random() for token # FLAG: Security tokens need secrets moduleOutput Format
## Security Review: [File/Component Name]
### Summary
- **Findings**: X (Y Critical, Z High, ...)
- **Risk Level**: Critical/High/Medium/Low
- **Confidence**: High/Mixed
### Findings
#### [VULN-001] [Vulnerability Type] (Severity)
- **Location**: `file.py:123`
- **Confidence**: High
- **Issue**: [What the vulnerability is]
- **Impact**: [What an attacker could do]
- **Evidence**:
```python
[Vulnerable code snippet]Fix: [How to remediate]
Needs Verification
[VERIFY-001] [Potential Issue]
Location:
file.py:456Question: [What needs to be verified]
If no vulnerabilities found, state: "No high-confidence vulnerabilities identified."
---
## Reference Files
### Core Vulnerabilities (`references/`)
| File | Covers |
|------|--------|
| `injection.md` | SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP, template injection |
| `xss.md` | Reflected, stored, DOM-based XSS |
| `authorization.md` | Authorization, IDOR, privilege escalation |
| `authentication.md` | Sessions, credentials, password storage |
| `cryptography.md` | Algorithms, key management, randomness |
| `deserialization.md` | Pickle, YAML, Java, PHP deserialization |
| `file-security.md` | Path traversal, uploads, XXE |
| `ssrf.md` | Server-side request forgery |
| `csrf.md` | Cross-site request forgery |
| `data-protection.md` | Secrets exposure, PII, logging |
| `api-security.md` | REST, GraphQL, mass assignment |
| `business-logic.md` | Race conditions, workflow bypass |
| `modern-threats.md` | Prototype pollution, LLM injection, WebSocket |
| `misconfiguration.md` | Headers, CORS, debug mode, defaults |
| `error-handling.md` | Fail-open, information disclosure |
| `supply-chain.md` | Dependencies, build security |
| `logging.md` | Audit failures, log injection |
### Language Guides (`languages/`)
- `python.md` - Django, Flask, FastAPI patterns
- `javascript.md` - Node, Express, React, Vue, Next.js
### Infrastructure (`infrastructure/`)
- `docker.md` - Container securityFiles
- ATTRIBUTION.mdAdded by AutoGineer902 B
- LICENSE884 B
- SKILL.md11.5 KiB
- SPEC.md8.8 KiB
- infrastructure/docker.md9.2 KiB
- languages/javascript.md9.8 KiB
- languages/python.md9.3 KiB
- references/api-security.md12.4 KiB
- references/authentication.md8.9 KiB
- references/authorization.md9.8 KiB
- references/business-logic.md12.4 KiB
- references/cryptography.md8.5 KiB
- references/csrf.md9.7 KiB
- references/data-protection.md9.3 KiB
- references/deserialization.md10.0 KiB
- references/error-handling.md11.4 KiB
- references/file-security.md12.1 KiB
- references/injection.md6.7 KiB
- references/logging.md11.7 KiB
- references/misconfiguration.md10.1 KiB
- references/modern-threats.md13.0 KiB
- references/ssrf.md10.5 KiB
- references/supply-chain.md8.9 KiB
- references/xss.md7.4 KiB
references/error-handling.md
Error Handling Security Reference
Overview
Improper error handling can lead to information disclosure, denial of service, or security bypasses. This includes verbose error messages exposing internals, fail-open patterns that skip security checks on errors, and unhandled exceptions that crash services or leave systems in insecure states.
Information Disclosure
Stack Traces in Responses
# VULNERABLE: Stack trace exposed to users
@app.errorhandler(Exception)
def handle_error(e):
return f"Error: {traceback.format_exc()}", 500
# VULNERABLE: Detailed exception info
@app.route('/api/user/<id>')
def get_user(id):
try:
return User.query.get(id).to_dict()
except Exception as e:
return jsonify({
'error': str(e),
'type': type(e).__name__,
'args': e.args
}), 500Secure Error Handling
# SAFE: Generic messages, detailed logging
import logging
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@app.errorhandler(Exception)
def handle_error(e):
# Log full details server-side
logger.error(f"Unhandled exception: {e}", exc_info=True)
# Return generic message to client
return jsonify({'error': 'An internal error occurred'}), 500
# SAFE: Custom exceptions with safe messages
class UserNotFoundError(Exception):
pass
@app.route('/api/user/<id>')
def get_user(id):
try:
user = User.query.get(id)
if not user:
raise UserNotFoundError()
return user.to_dict()
except UserNotFoundError:
return jsonify({'error': 'User not found'}), 404
except Exception:
logger.exception("Error fetching user")
return jsonify({'error': 'Internal error'}), 500Fail-Open Patterns
Authentication Bypass on Error
# VULNERABLE: Fail-open authentication
def authenticate(token):
try:
user = verify_token(token)
return user
except Exception:
return None # Returns None, might be treated as valid
# VULNERABLE: Exception allows bypass
def check_permission(user, resource):
try:
return permission_service.check(user, resource)
except ServiceUnavailable:
return True # DANGEROUS: Allows access on service failure
# VULNERABLE: Default to authorized on error
@app.route('/admin')
def admin():
try:
if not is_admin(current_user):
abort(403)
except Exception:
pass # Silently continues to admin page
return render_admin_panel()Secure Fail-Closed Patterns
# SAFE: Fail-closed authentication
def authenticate(token):
try:
user = verify_token(token)
if user is None:
raise AuthenticationError("Invalid token")
return user
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Auth error: {e}")
raise AuthenticationError("Authentication failed")
# SAFE: Deny on service unavailable
def check_permission(user, resource):
try:
return permission_service.check(user, resource)
except ServiceUnavailable:
logger.error("Permission service unavailable")
return False # Deny access when unable to verify
# SAFE: Explicit denial on error
@app.route('/admin')
def admin():
try:
if not is_admin(current_user):
abort(403)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Admin check failed: {e}")
abort(500) # Don't proceed on error
return render_admin_panel()Exception Swallowing
Dangerous Patterns
# VULNERABLE: Silent exception swallowing
try:
validate_input(user_input)
except:
pass # Validation skipped entirely
# VULNERABLE: Catch-all hides security issues
try:
result = dangerous_operation(user_data)
except Exception:
result = default_value # May hide injection attempts
# VULNERABLE: Empty except block
try:
decrypt_sensitive_data(data)
except:
pass # Continues with encrypted/invalid dataSecure Exception Handling
# SAFE: Handle specific exceptions
try:
validate_input(user_input)
except ValidationError as e:
logger.warning(f"Validation failed: {e}")
return jsonify({'error': 'Invalid input'}), 400
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Unexpected validation error: {e}")
return jsonify({'error': 'Validation error'}), 500
# SAFE: Never silently swallow security-critical exceptions
try:
result = dangerous_operation(user_data)
except SecurityException as e:
logger.error(f"Security exception: {e}")
raise # Re-raise security exceptions
except ValueError as e:
logger.warning(f"Invalid data: {e}")
result = NoneDifferential Error Messages
User Enumeration via Errors
# VULNERABLE: Different messages reveal user existence
@app.route('/login', methods=['POST'])
def login():
user = User.query.filter_by(email=email).first()
if not user:
return jsonify({'error': 'User not found'}), 401 # Reveals user doesn't exist
if not check_password(password, user.password):
return jsonify({'error': 'Wrong password'}), 401 # Reveals user exists
return create_session(user)
# VULNERABLE: Timing difference reveals user existence
def login(email, password):
user = User.query.filter_by(email=email).first()
if not user:
return False # Fast return
return check_password(password, user.password) # Slow hash checkSecure Consistent Errors
# SAFE: Consistent error messages
@app.route('/login', methods=['POST'])
def login():
user = User.query.filter_by(email=email).first()
if not user or not check_password(password, user.password):
return jsonify({'error': 'Invalid credentials'}), 401 # Same message
return create_session(user)
# SAFE: Constant-time comparison with dummy hash
DUMMY_HASH = generate_password_hash('dummy')
def login(email, password):
user = User.query.filter_by(email=email).first()
if user:
valid = check_password(password, user.password)
else:
check_password(password, DUMMY_HASH) # Constant time even if user not found
valid = False
return validResource Exhaustion via Errors
Uncontrolled Exception Logging
# VULNERABLE: Attacker can fill logs
@app.route('/api/data')
def get_data():
try:
return process_data(request.json)
except Exception as e:
# Logs entire request body - attacker sends huge payloads
logger.error(f"Error processing: {request.json}")
return jsonify({'error': 'Error'}), 500Secure Logging
# SAFE: Limit logged data
@app.route('/api/data')
def get_data():
try:
return process_data(request.json)
except Exception as e:
# Log limited info, not full payload
logger.error(f"Error processing request from {request.remote_addr}")
return jsonify({'error': 'Error'}), 500Unhandled Async Exceptions
Dangerous Patterns
// VULNERABLE: Unhandled promise rejection
async function processUser(userId) {
const user = await fetchUser(userId); // No catch
return user;
}
// VULNERABLE: Missing error handler
app.get('/api/data', async (req, res) => {
const data = await fetchData(); // Unhandled rejection crashes server
res.json(data);
});Secure Async Handling
// SAFE: Always handle async errors
async function processUser(userId) {
try {
const user = await fetchUser(userId);
return user;
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to fetch user', { userId, error });
throw new UserFetchError('Unable to fetch user');
}
}
// SAFE: Express async wrapper
const asyncHandler = (fn) => (req, res, next) => {
Promise.resolve(fn(req, res, next)).catch(next);
};
app.get('/api/data', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
const data = await fetchData();
res.json(data);
}));
// Global handler for unhandled rejections
process.on('unhandledRejection', (reason, promise) => {
logger.error('Unhandled Rejection', { reason });
// Don't exit - handle gracefully
});Error-Based SQL Injection Indicators
Verbose Database Errors
# VULNERABLE: Database errors exposed
@app.route('/api/search')
def search():
try:
results = db.execute(f"SELECT * FROM items WHERE name = '{query}'")
return jsonify(results)
except Exception as e:
return jsonify({'error': str(e)}), 500
# Exposes: "syntax error at or near 'OR'" - reveals SQL injection possibilitySecure Database Error Handling
# SAFE: Generic database errors
@app.route('/api/search')
def search():
try:
results = db.execute("SELECT * FROM items WHERE name = %s", (query,))
return jsonify(results)
except DatabaseError as e:
logger.error(f"Database error: {e}")
return jsonify({'error': 'Search failed'}), 500Cleanup on Error
Resource Leaks
# VULNERABLE: Resource not cleaned up on error
def process_file(filename):
f = open(filename)
data = f.read()
process(data) # If this raises, file handle leaks
f.close()
# VULNERABLE: Connection not returned to pool
def query_db():
conn = pool.get_connection()
result = conn.execute(query) # If this raises, connection leaks
pool.return_connection(conn)
return resultSecure Resource Management
# SAFE: Context managers ensure cleanup
def process_file(filename):
with open(filename) as f:
data = f.read()
process(data) # File closed even on exception
# SAFE: Try-finally for cleanup
def query_db():
conn = pool.get_connection()
try:
result = conn.execute(query)
return result
finally:
pool.return_connection(conn) # Always returns connectionGrep Patterns for Detection
# Bare except clauses
grep -rn "except:" --include="*.py" | grep -v "except Exception"
# Empty exception handlers
grep -rn "except.*:\s*$" -A1 --include="*.py" | grep "pass"
# Stack traces in responses
grep -rn "traceback\|format_exc\|exc_info" --include="*.py" | grep -v "logger\|logging"
# Fail-open patterns
grep -rn "except.*:\s*$" -A2 --include="*.py" | grep "return True\|return None"
# Detailed error messages
grep -rn "str(e)\|str(err)\|e\.args\|e\.message" --include="*.py" | grep "return\|jsonify\|response"
# Differential error messages
grep -rn "not found\|does not exist\|invalid password\|wrong password" --include="*.py"
# Unhandled async
grep -rn "await.*[^;]$" --include="*.js" --include="*.ts" | grep -v "try\|catch"Testing Checklist
[ ] No stack traces in production error responses
[ ] All security checks fail-closed (deny on error)
[ ] No empty except/catch blocks for security-critical code
[ ] Consistent error messages for auth (no user enumeration)
[ ] Async operations have error handlers
[ ] Resources cleaned up on error (files, connections)
[ ] Error logging doesn't include full user input
[ ] Database errors don't expose query structure
[ ] Rate limiting on error-generating endpoints
References
Requirements and compatibility
Works with: Claude Code, Claude apps, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Kiro, OpenCode, Goose, Amp, Roo Code, JetBrains Junie, Factory Droid, Devin (ex-Windsurf), Mistral Vibe, OpenHands, Letta
“Works with” means the tool reads the open Agent Skills format; a skill written for one tool may use features others lack.
Needs: Declares allowed tools, Needs an API key, Needs Python
Security
What our scanner noticed· Medium risk
- References to credential files
- Instructions that use the network
- Encoded commands that are executed
- Downloads piped into a shell
A static scan is not a guarantee. Skills are third-party content: review a skill before you let an agent use it.
Attribution and licence
- Published by
- Sentry
- Publisher
- Sentry (Official)
- Source
- getsentry/skills · skills/security-review · commit e94f222
- Licence
- Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (redistribution allowed)
- ATTRIBUTION.md (written by AutoGineer)
- Synced
AutoGineer is not affiliated with or endorsed by Sentry or Sentry.
Download ZIP
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