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Security Review

SentryOfficialPublished by Sentry

  • Skill
  • Review and audit
  • Security
  • CC-BY-SA-4.0
  • Medium risk

From the author

Security code review for vulnerabilities. Use when asked to "security review", "find vulnerabilities", "check for security issues", "audit security", "OWASP review", or review code for injection, XSS, authentication, authorization, cryptography issues. Provides systematic review with confidence-based reporting.
— the description by Sentry

AutoGineer summary

Written by AutoGineer from the skill’s own files, not by the author

The Security Review skill provides a structured approach to auditing code for security vulnerabilities. It emphasizes deep research into data flow and context to distinguish between theoretical risks and truly exploitable issues. By focusing on attacker-controlled inputs and framework-specific mitigations, it reduces false positives and ensures that reported findings are actionable and high-confidence.

What it does

  • Performs systematic security audits on provided code snippets or files.
  • Traces data flow to confirm if inputs are attacker-controlled or server-controlled.
  • Evaluates code against common vulnerability patterns like injection, XSS, and authentication flaws.
  • Filters out false positives by checking for framework-level protections and sanitization.
  • Categorizes findings by severity and confidence levels.
  • Provides a standardized reporting format for identified vulnerabilities.

When to use it

  • When you need to audit code for potential security vulnerabilities.
  • When performing an OWASP-based security review.
  • When you need to verify if a specific code pattern is exploitable.
  • When checking for common security issues like SQL injection, XSS, or insecure authentication.

Advantages

  • Reduces noise by filtering out theoretical issues and server-controlled configurations.
  • Ensures high-confidence reporting by requiring codebase research before flagging.
  • Provides clear, actionable remediation advice for identified vulnerabilities.
  • Standardizes the security review process across different codebases.

Usage examples

“Perform a security review on this file: [code snippet]”
The agent will analyze the code, trace the data flow of inputs, and provide a report of any high-confidence vulnerabilities found, or state that none were identified.
“Check this API endpoint for potential injection vulnerabilities.”
The agent will examine the endpoint's input handling and database queries to determine if user input is properly parameterized or sanitized.
“Audit this authentication logic for security issues.”
The agent will review the authentication implementation against best practices, such as password storage algorithms and brute-force protections.

Install

  1. Download the skill as a ZIP:

    https://autogineer.com/agent-skills/getsentry/security-review/download
  2. Unzip it into the cross-client skills folder of your project:

    mkdir -p .agents/skills && unzip security-review.zip -d .agents/skills

Documentation by Sentry

<!-- Reference material based on OWASP Cheat Sheet Series (CC BY-SA 4.0) https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/ -->

Security Review Skill

Identify exploitable security vulnerabilities in code. Report only HIGH CONFIDENCE findings—clear vulnerable patterns with attacker-controlled input.

Scope: Research vs. Reporting

CRITICAL DISTINCTION:

  • Report on: Only the specific file, diff, or code provided by the user

  • Research: The ENTIRE codebase to build confidence before reporting

Before flagging any issue, you MUST research the codebase to understand:

  • Where does this input actually come from? (Trace data flow)

  • Is there validation/sanitization elsewhere?

  • How is this configured? (Check settings, config files, middleware)

  • What framework protections exist?

Do NOT report issues based solely on pattern matching. Investigate first, then report only what you're confident is exploitable.

Confidence Levels

LevelCriteriaAction
HIGHVulnerable pattern + attacker-controlled input confirmedReport with severity
MEDIUMVulnerable pattern, input source unclearNote as "Needs verification"
LOWTheoretical, best practice, defense-in-depthDo not report

Do Not Flag

General Rules
  • Test files (unless explicitly reviewing test security)

  • Dead code, commented code, documentation strings

  • Patterns using constants or server-controlled configuration

  • Code paths that require prior authentication to reach (note the auth requirement instead)

Server-Controlled Values (NOT Attacker-Controlled)

These are configured by operators, not controlled by attackers:

SourceExampleWhy It's Safe
Django settingssettings.API_URL, settings.ALLOWED_HOSTSSet via config/env at deployment
Environment variablesos.environ.get('DATABASE_URL')Deployment configuration
Config filesconfig.yaml, app.config['KEY']Server-side files
Framework constantsdjango.conf.settings.*Not user-modifiable
Hardcoded valuesBASE_URL = "https://api.internal"Compile-time constants

SSRF Example - NOT a vulnerability:

# SAFE: URL comes from Django settings (server-controlled)
response = requests.get(f"{settings.SEER_AUTOFIX_URL}{path}")

SSRF Example - IS a vulnerability:

# VULNERABLE: URL comes from request (attacker-controlled)
response = requests.get(request.GET.get('url'))
Framework-Mitigated Patterns

Check language guides before flagging. Common false positives:

PatternWhy It's Usually Safe
Django {{ variable }}Auto-escaped by default
React {variable}Auto-escaped by default
Vue {{ variable }}Auto-escaped by default
User.objects.filter(id=input)ORM parameterizes queries
cursor.execute("...%s", (input,))Parameterized query
innerHTML = "<b>Loading...</b>"Constant string, no user input

Only flag these when:

  • Django: {{ var|safe }}, {% autoescape off %}, mark_safe(user_input)

  • React: dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{__html: userInput}}

  • Vue: v-html="userInput"

  • ORM: .raw(), .extra(), RawSQL() with string interpolation

Review Process

1. Detect Context

What type of code am I reviewing?

Code TypeLoad These References
API endpoints, routesauthorization.md, authentication.md, injection.md
Django/DRF views, permission classes, object-level accessUse the django-access-review skill if available for access control; otherwise authorization.md
Frontend, templatesxss.md, csrf.md, modern-threats.md (DOM clobbering, prototype pollution)
File handling, uploadsfile-security.md
Crypto, secrets, tokenscryptography.md, data-protection.md
Data serializationdeserialization.md
External requestsssrf.md
Business workflowsbusiness-logic.md
GraphQL, REST designapi-security.md
Config, headers, CORSmisconfiguration.md
CI/CD, dependenciessupply-chain.md
Error handlingerror-handling.md
Audit, logginglogging.md
Object merging/cloning, __proto__, DOM id/name lookups, WebSocket handlers, LLM prompt constructionmodern-threats.md
2. Load Language Guide

Based on file extension or imports:

IndicatorsGuide
.py, django, flask, fastapilanguages/python.md
.js, .ts, express, react, vue, nextlanguages/javascript.md

For other languages there is no dedicated guide; rely on the references/ files and verify framework protections directly in the codebase.

3. Load Infrastructure Guide (if applicable)
File TypeGuide
Dockerfile, .dockerignoreinfrastructure/docker.md
GitHub Actions workflowsUse the gha-security-review skill if available; otherwise references/supply-chain.md
Other CI/CD pipelines, lockfiles, package manifestsreferences/supply-chain.md
4. Research Before Flagging

For each potential issue, research the codebase to build confidence:

  • Where does this value actually come from? Trace the data flow.

  • Is it configured at deployment (settings, env vars) or from user input?

  • Is there validation, sanitization, or allowlisting elsewhere?

  • What framework protections apply?

Only report issues where you have HIGH confidence after understanding the broader context.

5. Verify Exploitability

For each potential finding, confirm:

Is the input attacker-controlled?

Attacker-Controlled (Investigate)Server-Controlled (Usually Safe)
request.GET, request.POST, request.argssettings.X, app.config['X']
request.json, request.data, request.bodyos.environ.get('X')
request.headers (most headers)Hardcoded constants
request.cookies (unsigned)Internal service URLs from config
URL path segments: /users/<id>/Database content from admin/system
File uploads (content and names)Signed session data
Database content from other usersFramework settings
WebSocket messages

Does the framework mitigate this?

  • Check language guide for auto-escaping, parameterization

  • Check for middleware/decorators that sanitize

Is there validation upstream?

  • Input validation before this code

  • Sanitization libraries (DOMPurify, bleach, etc.)

6. Report HIGH Confidence Only

Skip theoretical issues. Report only what you've confirmed is exploitable after research.


Severity Classification

SeverityImpactExamples
CriticalDirect exploit, severe impact, no auth requiredRCE, SQL injection to data, auth bypass, hardcoded secrets
HighExploitable with conditions, significant impactStored XSS, SSRF to metadata, IDOR to sensitive data
MediumSpecific conditions required, moderate impactReflected XSS, CSRF on state-changing actions, path traversal
LowDefense-in-depth, minimal direct impactMissing headers, verbose errors, weak algorithms in non-critical context

Quick Patterns Reference

Always Flag (Critical)
eval(user_input)           # Any language
exec(user_input)           # Any language
pickle.loads(user_data)    # Python
yaml.load(user_data)       # Python (not safe_load)
unserialize($user_data)    # PHP
deserialize(user_data)     # Java ObjectInputStream
shell=True + user_input    # Python subprocess
child_process.exec(user)   # Node.js
Always Flag (High)
innerHTML = userInput              # DOM XSS
dangerouslySetInnerHTML={user}     # React XSS
v-html="userInput"                 # Vue XSS
f"SELECT * FROM x WHERE {user}"    # SQL injection
`SELECT * FROM x WHERE ${user}`    # SQL injection
os.system(f"cmd {user_input}")     # Command injection
Always Flag (Secrets)
password = "hardcoded"
api_key = "sk-..."
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY = "..."
private_key = "-----BEGIN"
Check Context First (MUST Investigate Before Flagging)
# SSRF - ONLY if URL is from user input, NOT from settings/config
requests.get(request.GET['url'])     # FLAG: User-controlled URL
requests.get(settings.API_URL)       # SAFE: Server-controlled config
requests.get(f"{settings.BASE}/{x}") # CHECK: Is 'x' user input?

# Path traversal - ONLY if path is from user input
open(request.GET['file'])            # FLAG: User-controlled path
open(settings.LOG_PATH)              # SAFE: Server-controlled config
open(f"{BASE_DIR}/{filename}")       # CHECK: Is 'filename' user input?

# Open redirect - ONLY if URL is from user input
redirect(request.GET['next'])        # FLAG: User-controlled redirect
redirect(settings.LOGIN_URL)         # SAFE: Server-controlled config

# Weak crypto - ONLY if used for security purposes
hashlib.md5(file_content)            # SAFE: File checksums, caching
hashlib.md5(password)                # FLAG: Password hashing
random.random()                      # SAFE: Non-security uses (UI, sampling)
random.random() for token            # FLAG: Security tokens need secrets module

Output Format

## Security Review: [File/Component Name]

### Summary
- **Findings**: X (Y Critical, Z High, ...)
- **Risk Level**: Critical/High/Medium/Low
- **Confidence**: High/Mixed

### Findings

#### [VULN-001] [Vulnerability Type] (Severity)
- **Location**: `file.py:123`
- **Confidence**: High
- **Issue**: [What the vulnerability is]
- **Impact**: [What an attacker could do]
- **Evidence**:
  ```python
  [Vulnerable code snippet]
  • Fix: [How to remediate]

Needs Verification
[VERIFY-001] [Potential Issue]
  • Location: file.py:456

  • Question: [What needs to be verified]


If no vulnerabilities found, state: "No high-confidence vulnerabilities identified."

---

## Reference Files

### Core Vulnerabilities (`references/`)
| File | Covers |
|------|--------|
| `injection.md` | SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP, template injection |
| `xss.md` | Reflected, stored, DOM-based XSS |
| `authorization.md` | Authorization, IDOR, privilege escalation |
| `authentication.md` | Sessions, credentials, password storage |
| `cryptography.md` | Algorithms, key management, randomness |
| `deserialization.md` | Pickle, YAML, Java, PHP deserialization |
| `file-security.md` | Path traversal, uploads, XXE |
| `ssrf.md` | Server-side request forgery |
| `csrf.md` | Cross-site request forgery |
| `data-protection.md` | Secrets exposure, PII, logging |
| `api-security.md` | REST, GraphQL, mass assignment |
| `business-logic.md` | Race conditions, workflow bypass |
| `modern-threats.md` | Prototype pollution, LLM injection, WebSocket |
| `misconfiguration.md` | Headers, CORS, debug mode, defaults |
| `error-handling.md` | Fail-open, information disclosure |
| `supply-chain.md` | Dependencies, build security |
| `logging.md` | Audit failures, log injection |

### Language Guides (`languages/`)
- `python.md` - Django, Flask, FastAPI patterns
- `javascript.md` - Node, Express, React, Vue, Next.js

### Infrastructure (`infrastructure/`)
- `docker.md` - Container security

Files

references/csrf.md

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Prevention Reference

Overview

CSRF attacks trick authenticated users into performing unintended actions by exploiting the browser's automatic credential transmission. The attack works because browsers automatically include cookies with requests to a domain, regardless of the request's origin.

Attack Scenario

<!-- Attacker's page -->
<img src="https://bank.com/transfer?to=attacker&amount=10000">

<!-- Or form submission -->
<form action="https://bank.com/transfer" method="POST" id="evil">
    <input name="to" value="attacker">
    <input name="amount" value="10000">
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('evil').submit();</script>

When a logged-in user visits the attacker's page, their browser makes the request with their session cookie.


Primary Defenses

1. Synchronizer Token Pattern

Generate and validate a unique token per session.

import secrets

# Generate token on session creation
def create_csrf_token(session_id):
    token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
    store_csrf_token(session_id, token)
    return token

# Include in forms
def render_form():
    token = get_csrf_token(session.id)
    return f'''
    <form method="POST">
        <input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{token}">
        <!-- form fields -->
    </form>
    '''

# Validate on submission
def validate_csrf():
    submitted_token = request.form.get('csrf_token')
    stored_token = get_csrf_token(session.id)

    if not submitted_token or not secrets.compare_digest(submitted_token, stored_token):
        raise CSRFValidationError()

Use a cryptographically signed token that doesn't require server-side storage.

import hmac
import hashlib
import time

SECRET_KEY = os.environ['CSRF_SECRET']

def generate_csrf_token(session_id):
    """Generate signed token tied to session."""
    timestamp = int(time.time())
    message = f"{session_id}:{timestamp}"
    signature = hmac.new(
        SECRET_KEY.encode(),
        message.encode(),
        hashlib.sha256
    ).hexdigest()
    return f"{timestamp}:{signature}"

def validate_csrf_token(token, session_id):
    """Validate token matches session and isn't expired."""
    try:
        timestamp, signature = token.split(':')
        timestamp = int(timestamp)

        # Check expiry (1 hour)
        if time.time() - timestamp > 3600:
            return False

        # Verify signature
        message = f"{session_id}:{timestamp}"
        expected = hmac.new(
            SECRET_KEY.encode(),
            message.encode(),
            hashlib.sha256
        ).hexdigest()

        return secrets.compare_digest(signature, expected)
    except:
        return False
# Modern browsers respect SameSite attribute
response.set_cookie(
    'session_id',
    value=session_id,
    samesite='Lax',   # Or 'Strict' for maximum protection
    secure=True,
    httponly=True
)

SameSite Values:

ValueBehavior
StrictNever sent cross-site
LaxSent only with safe methods (GET) on top-level navigation
NoneAlways sent (requires Secure)
4. Custom Request Headers

For AJAX/API requests, require a custom header that can't be set cross-origin without CORS.

// Client
fetch('/api/transfer', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: {
        'Content-Type': 'application/json',
        'X-CSRF-Token': getCSRFToken()  // Or any custom header
    },
    body: JSON.stringify(data)
});
# Server
@app.before_request
def verify_csrf_header():
    if request.method in ('POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'PATCH'):
        token = request.headers.get('X-CSRF-Token')
        if not validate_csrf_token(token):
            return jsonify({'error': 'CSRF validation failed'}), 403

Framework Implementations

Django
# Enabled by default via middleware
MIDDLEWARE = [
    'django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware',
    ...
]

# In templates
<form method="POST">
    {% csrf_token %}
    ...
</form>

# For AJAX
<script>
const csrftoken = document.querySelector('[name=csrfmiddlewaretoken]').value;
fetch('/api/endpoint', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: {'X-CSRFToken': csrftoken},
    ...
});
</script>
Flask
from flask_wtf.csrf import CSRFProtect

csrf = CSRFProtect(app)

# In templates
<form method="POST">
    <input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{ csrf_token() }}">
    ...
</form>

# Exempt specific routes if needed (be careful!)
@csrf.exempt
@app.route('/webhook', methods=['POST'])
def webhook():
    pass
Express.js
const csrf = require('csurf');
const csrfProtection = csrf({ cookie: true });

app.use(csrfProtection);

app.get('/form', (req, res) => {
    res.render('form', { csrfToken: req.csrfToken() });
});

// In template
<form method="POST">
    <input type="hidden" name="_csrf" value="<%= csrfToken %>">
    ...
</form>

Origin and Referer Validation

As a supplementary defense:

def verify_origin():
    """Verify request origin matches expected domain."""
    origin = request.headers.get('Origin')
    referer = request.headers.get('Referer')

    # Prefer Origin header
    if origin:
        if not is_trusted_origin(origin):
            return False
        return True

    # Fall back to Referer
    if referer:
        parsed = urlparse(referer)
        if not is_trusted_origin(f"{parsed.scheme}://{parsed.netloc}"):
            return False
        return True

    # No origin info - could be same-origin or direct request
    # Decision depends on security requirements
    return True  # Or False for strict validation

def is_trusted_origin(origin):
    TRUSTED = {'https://example.com', 'https://admin.example.com'}
    return origin in TRUSTED

Fetch Metadata Headers

Modern browsers send additional headers that indicate request context:

def check_fetch_metadata():
    """Use Fetch Metadata headers for CSRF protection."""
    sec_fetch_site = request.headers.get('Sec-Fetch-Site')
    sec_fetch_mode = request.headers.get('Sec-Fetch-Mode')

    # Allow same-origin requests
    if sec_fetch_site == 'same-origin':
        return True

    # Allow navigation requests (clicking links)
    if sec_fetch_site == 'none' and sec_fetch_mode == 'navigate':
        return True

    # Block cross-origin state-changing requests
    if request.method in ('POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'PATCH'):
        if sec_fetch_site in ('cross-site', 'same-site'):
            return False

    return True

Client-Side CSRF

Modern variant where JavaScript code uses attacker-controlled input:

// VULNERABLE: URL fragment used in request
const param = window.location.hash.substring(1);
fetch(`/api/action?${param}`, { method: 'POST' });

// Attack: https://example.com#action=delete&target=all

// SAFE: Validate before use
const allowedActions = ['view', 'refresh'];
const param = window.location.hash.substring(1);
const parsed = new URLSearchParams(param);
if (allowedActions.includes(parsed.get('action'))) {
    fetch(`/api/action?${param}`, { method: 'POST' });
}

Common Mistakes

1. GET Requests for State Changes
# VULNERABLE: State change via GET
@app.route('/delete/<id>')
def delete_item(id):
    Item.delete(id)  # Attacker: <img src="/delete/123">

# SAFE: Use POST for state changes
@app.route('/delete/<id>', methods=['POST'])
@csrf_required
def delete_item(id):
    Item.delete(id)
2. CORS Misconfiguration
# VULNERABLE: Allows any origin with credentials
@app.after_request
def add_cors(response):
    response.headers['Access-Control-Allow-Origin'] = request.headers.get('Origin')
    response.headers['Access-Control-Allow-Credentials'] = 'true'
    return response

# SAFE: Explicit allowlist
ALLOWED_ORIGINS = {'https://trusted.com'}

@app.after_request
def add_cors(response):
    origin = request.headers.get('Origin')
    if origin in ALLOWED_ORIGINS:
        response.headers['Access-Control-Allow-Origin'] = origin
        response.headers['Access-Control-Allow-Credentials'] = 'true'
    return response
3. Token in URL
<!-- VULNERABLE: Token exposed in URL (logged, cached, referer) -->
<a href="/action?csrf_token=abc123">Do Action</a>

<!-- SAFE: Token in form -->
<form method="POST" action="/action">
    <input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="abc123">
    <button type="submit">Do Action</button>
</form>

Grep Patterns for Detection

# Missing CSRF protection
grep -rn "@app\.route.*POST\|@router\.post" --include="*.py" | grep -v "csrf"

# State-changing GET requests
grep -rn "\.delete\|\.update\|\.create" --include="*.py" | grep "GET"

# CORS wildcards
grep -rn "Access-Control-Allow-Origin.*\*" --include="*.py"

# Framework CSRF disabled
grep -rn "csrf_exempt\|WTF_CSRF_ENABLED.*False\|csrf.*disable" --include="*.py"

Testing Checklist

  • [ ] All state-changing requests require POST/PUT/DELETE

  • [ ] CSRF tokens included in all forms

  • [ ] CSRF tokens validated on submission

  • [ ] SameSite cookie attribute set (Lax or Strict)

  • [ ] Custom headers required for API requests

  • [ ] Origin/Referer validated as secondary defense

  • [ ] Fetch Metadata headers checked where supported

  • [ ] CORS properly configured (no wildcard with credentials)

  • [ ] Token not exposed in URL/logs

  • [ ] GET requests never change state


References

Requirements and compatibility

Works with: Claude Code, Claude apps, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Kiro, OpenCode, Goose, Amp, Roo Code, JetBrains Junie, Factory Droid, Devin (ex-Windsurf), Mistral Vibe, OpenHands, Letta

“Works with” means the tool reads the open Agent Skills format; a skill written for one tool may use features others lack.

Needs: Declares allowed tools, Needs an API key, Needs Python

Security

What our scanner noticed· Medium risk

  • References to credential files
  • Instructions that use the network
  • Encoded commands that are executed
  • Downloads piped into a shell

A static scan is not a guarantee. Skills are third-party content: review a skill before you let an agent use it.

Attribution and licence

Published by
Sentry
Publisher
Sentry (Official)
Source
getsentry/skills · skills/security-review · commit e94f222
Licence
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (redistribution allowed)
  • ATTRIBUTION.md (written by AutoGineer)
Synced

AutoGineer is not affiliated with or endorsed by Sentry or Sentry.

Download ZIP

The ZIP holds the skill’s files, its licence files and an ATTRIBUTION.md. Download security-review.zip