Zeroize Audit
Trail of BitsOfficialPublished by Trail of Bits
- Skill
- Review and audit
- Security
- CC-BY-SA-4.0
- Low risk
- Has scripts
AutoGineer summary
Written by AutoGineer from the skill’s own files, not by the author
zeroize-audit is a specialized security analysis tool designed to verify that sensitive data—such as cryptographic keys, passwords, and tokens—is properly wiped from memory. It goes beyond simple source-level scanning by performing assembly-level analysis and control-flow verification to detect instances where compiler optimizations, such as dead-store elimination, inadvertently remove security-critical zeroization operations. The tool produces a structured report and generates proof-of-concept programs to validate findings, providing a rigorous audit path for security-sensitive software.
What it does
- Detects missing zeroization of sensitive data in source code.
- Identifies zeroization operations removed by compiler optimizations using IR and assembly diffing.
- Performs control-flow graph analysis to verify cleanup on all execution paths.
- Generates and validates proof-of-concept programs for identified vulnerabilities.
- Provides assembly-level analysis to detect stack retention and register spills of secrets.
- Supports C, C++, and Rust codebases with language-specific analysis pipelines.
When to use it
- Auditing cryptographic implementations and key management systems.
- Reviewing authentication systems handling passwords or session tokens.
- Analyzing codebases that process PII or sensitive credentials.
- Verifying secure memory cleanup in security-critical software.
- Investigating memory safety and data leakage risks in compiled binaries.
Advantages
- Reduces false negatives by accounting for compiler-level optimization behaviors.
- Provides actionable evidence through generated proof-of-concept programs.
- Supports complex analysis including control-flow and assembly-level verification.
- Automates the tedious process of manual security code review for memory wiping.
- Integrates with existing build systems via compile_commands.json or Cargo manifests.
Usage examples
- “Audit this C library for secrets left in memory.”
- The agent will analyze the provided compile_commands.json, perform source and compiler-level analysis, and generate a report detailing any missing or optimized-away zeroization.
- “Check that this Rust crate actually wipes its keys.”
- The agent will use the Cargo manifest to perform MIR and LLVM IR analysis, identifying if sensitive data is properly cleared or if compiler optimizations have weakened the security.
Install
Download the skill as a ZIP:
https://autogineer.com/agent-skills/trailofbits/zeroize-audit/downloadUnzip it into the cross-client skills folder of your project:
mkdir -p .agents/skills && unzip zeroize-audit.zip -d .agents/skills
Documentation by Trail of Bits
zeroize-audit
When to Use
Auditing cryptographic implementations (keys, seeds, nonces, secrets)
Reviewing authentication systems (passwords, tokens, session data)
Analyzing code that handles PII or sensitive credentials
Verifying secure cleanup in security-critical codebases
Investigating memory safety of sensitive data handling
When NOT to Use
General code review without security focus
Performance optimization (unless related to secure wiping)
Refactoring tasks not related to sensitive data
Code without identifiable secrets or sensitive values
Execution Contract
Use the agent environment's available tools for file access, shell commands, worker execution, and user input. The allowed-tools entry and role-file frontmatter are legacy host metadata; they do not define another environment's tool names or grant permissions there.
Resolve resources. Set
baseDirto the absolute directory containing thisSKILL.md. Confirm the linked input schema and orchestrator prompt exist there.{baseDir},{workdir}, and{{input}}are notation for values the orchestrator must substitute, not environment variables or automatic host expansion. Resolve relative Markdown links against the directory of the file containing them; resolve{baseDir}/…paths against the skill directory. Pass resolved paths to workers and shell commands.Launch a role. Read the role prompt linked in the Agent Architecture table. When the environment has a registered worker for the role, use its
zeroize-audit:<role-name>identifier (for example,zeroize-audit:0-preflight); otherwise create an independent worker with the Markdown body of that prompt, the current phase's instructions, and its parameter values. Always include the resolvedbaseDirand, once created,workdir, even when a phase table does not repeat them. Resolve resource references using the rules above before delegation. Worker file/search/shell actions use the environment's actual tool schemas and permissions. The role's name identifies its instructions, not a required dispatch API or model.Wait for results. Retain each worker's handle and wait through the environment's completion mechanism. A launch acknowledgement is not completion. Read the phase's required artifacts before updating its completion state or starting a dependent phase. On worker failure or unavailable dispatch, apply only that phase's documented fallback; otherwise record the failure in the existing run state and report the affected phase as blocked.
Concurrency. Respect available concurrency and phase barriers. Run workers sequentially when parallel execution is unavailable. Per-TU compiler workers write to separate directories and may run concurrently.
Collect decisions. Use the environment's user-input facility or ask in the conversation. When a phase requires an answer, wait for it; do not substitute a default or elapsed time for the user's decision. Preserve the validation and verification outcomes when recording any accepted or rejected PoC result.
How to Run
On a request like "audit this crate for secrets left in memory" or "check that this C library actually wipes its keys":
Collect inputs. Map the request onto the Inputs table below (full schema: schemas/input.json).
pathis required, plus at least one ofcompile_db(C/C++) orcargo_manifest(Rust); if neither is given or derivable from the repo, ask the user, because preflight stops the run without one. Leave all other fields at their defaults unless the user says otherwise.Read the orchestrator prompt, substituting the collected inputs for its
{{placeholder}}values. You act as the orchestrator it describes: it defines state recovery, the phase loop, early termination, and error handling. Read the shared instructions alongside it for the shared working-directory layout and the agent error protocol every phase depends on.Execute its phase loop. Run Phases 0-7 sequentially. Before each phase, read that phase's workflow file from
{baseDir}/workflows/phase-{N}-{name}.mdand follow its Preconditions, Instructions, State Update, and Error Handling sections. Each workflow specifies the role prompt and parameters to use under the Execution Contract above. Honor the per-phase skip conditions and the early-termination rules in task.md.Return the report (Phase 8, inline): read
{workdir}/report/final-report.mdand return its contents as the skill output.
To resume an interrupted run: if a workdir is known from prior context, read {workdir}/orchestrator-state.json and continue from its current_phase instead of starting at Phase 0 (see the Recovery section of task.md).
Purpose
Detect missing zeroization of sensitive data in source code and identify zeroization that is removed or weakened by compiler optimizations (e.g., dead-store elimination), with mandatory LLVM IR/asm evidence. Capabilities include:
Assembly-level analysis for register spills and stack retention
Data-flow tracking for secret copies
Heap allocator security warnings
Semantic IR analysis for loop unrolling and SSA form
Control-flow graph analysis for path coverage verification
Runtime validation test generation
Scope
Read-only against the target codebase (does not modify audited code; writes analysis artifacts to a temporary working directory).
Produces a structured report (JSON).
Requires valid build context (
compile_commands.json) and compilable translation units."Optimized away" findings only allowed with compiler evidence (IR/asm diff).
Inputs
See schemas/input.json for the full schema. Key fields:
| Field | Required | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
path | yes | — | Repo root |
compile_db | no | null | Path to compile_commands.json for C/C++ analysis. Required if cargo_manifest is not set. |
cargo_manifest | no | null | Path to Cargo.toml for Rust crate analysis. Required if compile_db is not set. |
config | no | — | YAML defining heuristics and approved wipes |
opt_levels | no | ["O0","O1","O2"] | Optimization levels for IR comparison. O1 is the diagnostic level: if a wipe disappears at O1 it is simple DSE; O2 catches more aggressive eliminations. |
languages | no | ["c","cpp","rust"] | Languages to analyze |
max_tus | no | 50 | Limit on translation units processed from compile DB |
mcp_mode | no | prefer | off, prefer, or require — controls Serena MCP usage |
mcp_required_for_advanced | no | true | Downgrade SECRET_COPY, MISSING_ON_ERROR_PATH, and NOT_DOMINATING_EXITS to needs_review when MCP is unavailable |
mcp_timeout_ms | no | 10000 | Timeout budget for MCP semantic queries |
poc_categories | no | all 11 exploitable | Finding categories for which to generate PoCs. C/C++ findings: all 11 categories supported. Rust findings: only MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE, SECRET_COPY, and PARTIAL_WIPE are supported; other Rust categories are marked poc_supported=false. |
poc_output_dir | no | generated_pocs/ | Output directory for generated PoCs |
enable_asm | no | true | Enable assembly emission and analysis (Step 8); produces STACK_RETENTION, REGISTER_SPILL. Auto-disabled if emit_asm.sh is missing. |
enable_semantic_ir | no | false | Enable semantic LLVM IR analysis (Step 9); produces LOOP_UNROLLED_INCOMPLETE |
enable_cfg | no | false | Enable control-flow graph analysis (Step 10); produces MISSING_ON_ERROR_PATH, NOT_DOMINATING_EXITS |
enable_runtime_tests | no | false | Enable runtime test harness generation (Step 11) |
Prerequisites
Before running, verify the following. Each has a defined failure mode.
C/C++ prerequisites:
| Prerequisite | Failure mode if missing |
|---|---|
compile_commands.json at compile_db path | Fail fast — do not proceed |
clang on PATH | Fail fast — IR/ASM analysis impossible |
uvx on PATH (for Serena) | If mcp_mode=require: fail. If mcp_mode=prefer: continue without MCP; downgrade affected findings per Confidence Gating rules. |
{baseDir}/tools/extract_compile_flags.py | Fail fast — cannot extract per-TU flags |
{baseDir}/tools/emit_ir.sh | Fail fast — IR analysis impossible |
{baseDir}/tools/emit_asm.sh | Warn and skip assembly findings (STACK_RETENTION, REGISTER_SPILL) |
{baseDir}/tools/mcp/check_mcp.sh | Warn and treat as MCP unavailable |
{baseDir}/tools/mcp/normalize_mcp_evidence.py | Warn and use raw MCP output |
Rust prerequisites:
| Prerequisite | Failure mode if missing |
|---|---|
Cargo.toml at cargo_manifest path | Fail fast — do not proceed |
cargo check passes | Fail fast — crate must be buildable |
cargo +nightly on PATH | Fail fast — nightly required for MIR and LLVM IR emission |
uv on PATH | Fail fast — required to run Python analysis scripts |
{baseDir}/tools/validate_rust_toolchain.sh | Warn — run preflight manually. Checks all tools, scripts, nightly, and optionally cargo check. Use --json for machine-readable output, --manifest to also validate the crate builds. |
{baseDir}/tools/emit_rust_mir.sh | Fail fast — MIR analysis impossible (--opt, --crate, --bin/--lib supported; --out can be file or directory) |
{baseDir}/tools/emit_rust_ir.sh | Fail fast — LLVM IR analysis impossible (--opt required; --crate, --bin/--lib supported; --out must be .ll) |
{baseDir}/tools/emit_rust_asm.sh | Warn and skip assembly findings (STACK_RETENTION, REGISTER_SPILL). Supports --opt, --crate, --bin/--lib, --target, --intel-syntax; --out can be .s file or directory. |
{baseDir}/tools/diff_rust_mir.sh | Warn and skip MIR-level optimization comparison. Accepts 2+ MIR files, normalizes, diffs pairwise, and reports first opt level where zeroize/drop-glue patterns disappear. |
{baseDir}/tools/scripts/semantic_audit.py | Warn and skip semantic source analysis |
{baseDir}/tools/scripts/find_dangerous_apis.py | Warn and skip dangerous API scan |
{baseDir}/tools/scripts/check_mir_patterns.py | Warn and skip MIR analysis |
{baseDir}/tools/scripts/check_llvm_patterns.py | Warn and skip LLVM IR analysis |
{baseDir}/tools/scripts/check_rust_asm.py | Warn and skip Rust assembly analysis (STACK_RETENTION, REGISTER_SPILL, drop-glue checks). Dispatches to check_rust_asm_x86.py (production) or check_rust_asm_aarch64.py (EXPERIMENTAL — AArch64 findings require manual verification). |
{baseDir}/tools/scripts/check_rust_asm_x86.py | Required by check_rust_asm.py for x86-64 analysis; warn and skip if missing |
{baseDir}/tools/scripts/check_rust_asm_aarch64.py | Required by check_rust_asm.py for AArch64 analysis (EXPERIMENTAL); warn and skip if missing |
Common prerequisite:
| Prerequisite | Failure mode if missing |
|---|---|
{baseDir}/tools/generate_poc.py | Fail fast — PoC generation is mandatory |
Approved Wipe APIs
The following are recognized as valid zeroization. Configure additional entries in {baseDir}/configs/.
C/C++
explicit_bzeromemset_sSecureZeroMemoryOPENSSL_cleansesodium_memzeroVolatile wipe loops (pattern-based; see
volatile_wipe_patternsin{baseDir}/configs/default.yaml)In IR:
llvm.memsetwith volatile flag, volatile stores, or non-elidable wipe call
Rust
zeroize::Zeroizetrait (zeroize()method)Zeroizing<T>wrapper (drop-based)ZeroizeOnDropderive macro
Finding Capabilities
Findings are grouped by required evidence. Only attempt findings for which the required tooling is available.
| Finding ID | Description | Requires | PoC Support |
|---|---|---|---|
MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE | No zeroization found in source | Source only | Yes (C/C++ + Rust) |
PARTIAL_WIPE | Incorrect size or incomplete wipe | Source only | Yes (C/C++ + Rust) |
NOT_ON_ALL_PATHS | Zeroization missing on some control-flow paths (heuristic) | Source only | Yes (C/C++ only) |
SECRET_COPY | Sensitive data copied without zeroization tracking | Source + MCP preferred | Yes (C/C++ + Rust) |
INSECURE_HEAP_ALLOC | Secret uses insecure allocator (malloc vs. secure_malloc) | Source only | Yes (C/C++ only) |
OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE | Compiler removed zeroization | IR diff required (never source-only) | Yes |
STACK_RETENTION | Stack frame may retain secrets after return | Assembly required (C/C++); LLVM IR alloca+lifetime.end evidence (Rust); assembly corroboration upgrades to confirmed | Yes (C/C++ only) |
REGISTER_SPILL | Secrets spilled from registers to stack | Assembly required (C/C++); LLVM IR load+call-site evidence (Rust); assembly corroboration upgrades to confirmed | Yes (C/C++ only) |
MISSING_ON_ERROR_PATH | Error-handling paths lack cleanup | CFG or MCP required | Yes |
NOT_DOMINATING_EXITS | Wipe doesn't dominate all exits | CFG or MCP required | Yes |
LOOP_UNROLLED_INCOMPLETE | Unrolled loop wipe is incomplete | Semantic IR required | Yes |
Agent Architecture
The analysis pipeline uses 11 worker roles across 8 phases, launched by the orchestrator using the Execution Contract above. Agents write persistent finding files to a shared working directory (/tmp/zeroize-audit-{run_id}/), enabling parallel execution and protecting against context pressure.
| Agent | Phase | Purpose | Output Directory |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0-preflight | Phase 0 | Preflight checks (tools, toolchain, compile DB, crate build), config merge, workdir creation, TU enumeration | {workdir}/ |
| 1-mcp-resolver | Phase 1, Wave 1 (C/C++ only) | Resolve symbols, types, and cross-file references via Serena MCP | mcp-evidence/ |
| 2-source-analyzer | Phase 1, Wave 2a (C/C++ only) | Identify sensitive objects, detect wipes, validate correctness, data-flow/heap | source-analysis/ |
| 2b-rust-source-analyzer | Phase 1, Wave 2b (Rust only, parallel with 2a) | Rustdoc JSON trait-aware analysis + dangerous API grep | source-analysis/ |
| 3-tu-compiler-analyzer | Phase 2, Wave 3 (C/C++ only, N parallel) | Per-TU IR diff, assembly, semantic IR, CFG analysis | compiler-analysis/{tu_hash}/ |
| 3b-rust-compiler-analyzer | Phase 2, Wave 3R (Rust only, single agent) | Crate-level MIR, LLVM IR, and assembly analysis | rust-compiler-analysis/ |
| 4-report-assembler | Phase 3 (interim) + Phase 6 (final) | Collect findings from all agents, apply confidence gates; merge PoC results and produce final report | report/ |
| 5-poc-generator | Phase 4 | Craft bespoke proof-of-concept programs (C/C++: all categories; Rust: MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE, SECRET_COPY, PARTIAL_WIPE) | poc/ |
| 5b-poc-validator | Phase 5 | Compile and run all PoCs | poc/ |
| 5c-poc-verifier | Phase 5 | Verify each PoC proves its claimed finding | poc/ |
| 6-test-generator | Phase 7 (optional) | Generate runtime validation test harnesses | tests/ |
The orchestrator reads one per-phase workflow file from {baseDir}/workflows/ at a time, and maintains orchestrator-state.json for recovery after context compression. Agents receive configuration by file path (config_path), not by value.
Execution flow
Phase 0: 0-preflight agent — Preflight + config + create workdir + enumerate TUs
→ writes orchestrator-state.json, merged-config.yaml, preflight.json
Phase 1: Wave 1: 1-mcp-resolver (skip if mcp_mode=off OR language_mode=rust)
Wave 2a: 2-source-analyzer (C/C++ only; skip if no compile_db) ─┐ parallel
Wave 2b: 2b-rust-source-analyzer (Rust only; skip if no cargo_manifest) ─┘
Phase 2: Wave 3: 3-tu-compiler-analyzer x N (C/C++ only; parallel per TU)
Wave 3R: 3b-rust-compiler-analyzer (Rust only; single crate-level agent)
Phase 3: Wave 4: 4-report-assembler (mode=interim → findings.json; reads all agent outputs)
Phase 4: Wave 5: 5-poc-generator (C/C++: all categories; Rust: MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE, SECRET_COPY, PARTIAL_WIPE; other Rust findings: poc_supported=false)
Phase 5: PoC Validation & Verification
Step 1: 5b-poc-validator agent (compile and run all PoCs)
Step 2: 5c-poc-verifier agent (verify each PoC proves its claimed finding)
Step 3: Orchestrator asks the user to accept or reject failed verification
Step 4: Orchestrator merges all results into poc_final_results.json
Phase 6: Wave 6: 4-report-assembler (mode=final → merge PoC results, final-report.md)
Phase 7: Wave 7: 6-test-generator (optional)
Phase 8: Orchestrator — Return final-report.mdCross-Reference Convention
IDs are namespaced per agent to prevent collisions during parallel execution:
| Entity | Pattern | Assigned By |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitive object (C/C++) | SO-0001–SO-4999 | 2-source-analyzer |
| Sensitive object (Rust) | SO-5000–SO-9999 (Rust namespace) | 2b-rust-source-analyzer |
| Source finding (C/C++) | F-SRC-NNNN | 2-source-analyzer |
| Source finding (Rust) | F-RUST-SRC-NNNN | 2b-rust-source-analyzer |
| IR finding (C/C++) | F-IR-{tu_hash}-NNNN | 3-tu-compiler-analyzer |
| ASM finding (C/C++) | F-ASM-{tu_hash}-NNNN | 3-tu-compiler-analyzer |
| CFG finding | F-CFG-{tu_hash}-NNNN | 3-tu-compiler-analyzer |
| Semantic IR finding | F-SIR-{tu_hash}-NNNN | 3-tu-compiler-analyzer |
| Rust MIR finding | F-RUST-MIR-NNNN | 3b-rust-compiler-analyzer |
| Rust LLVM IR finding | F-RUST-IR-NNNN | 3b-rust-compiler-analyzer |
| Rust assembly finding | F-RUST-ASM-NNNN | 3b-rust-compiler-analyzer |
| Translation unit | TU-{hash} | Orchestrator |
| Final finding | ZA-NNNN | 4-report-assembler |
Every finding JSON object includes related_objects, related_findings, and evidence_files fields for cross-referencing between agents.
Detection Strategy
Analysis runs in two phases. For complete step-by-step guidance, see {baseDir}/references/detection-strategy.md.
| Phase | Steps | Findings produced | Required tooling |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phase 1 (Source) | 1–6 | MISSING_SOURCE_ZEROIZE, PARTIAL_WIPE, NOT_ON_ALL_PATHS, SECRET_COPY, INSECURE_HEAP_ALLOC | Source + compile DB |
| Phase 2 (Compiler) | 7–12 | OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE, STACK_RETENTION, REGISTER_SPILL, LOOP_UNROLLED_INCOMPLETE†, MISSING_ON_ERROR_PATH‡, NOT_DOMINATING_EXITS‡ | clang, IR/ASM tools |
* requires enable_asm=true (default)
† requires enable_semantic_ir=true
‡ requires enable_cfg=true
For Rust, {baseDir}/references/rust-zeroization-patterns.md catalogues 40 named anti-patterns, keyed to the script that detects each one: Section A for rustdoc-JSON semantics (semantic_audit.py), Section B for dangerous APIs (find_dangerous_apis.py), and Section C for MIR/LLVM IR/assembly (check_mir_patterns.py, check_llvm_patterns.py, check_rust_asm.py). Read the relevant section when triaging a Rust finding, writing its fix recommendation, or deciding whether a hand-spotted pattern is already covered.
Two limits on how far that reference goes. The 34 entries in Sections A-C are what the scripts detect today; Section D's six are known gaps no script covers, so treat those as unaudited rather than clean. Sections A and C are also partial — the scripts emit some classes with no entry — so a finding that matches no catalogued pattern is still a finding, carrying whatever evidence the script produced.
Output Format
Each run produces two outputs:
final-report.md— Comprehensive markdown report (primary human-readable output)findings.json— Structured JSON matching{baseDir}/schemas/output.json(for machine consumption and downstream tools)
Markdown Report Structure
The markdown report (final-report.md) contains these sections:
Header: Run metadata (run_id, timestamp, repo, compile_db, config summary)
Executive Summary: Finding counts by severity, confidence, and category
Sensitive Objects Inventory: Table of all identified objects with IDs, types, locations
Findings: Grouped by severity then confidence. Each finding includes location, object, all evidence (source/IR/ASM/CFG), compiler evidence details, and recommended fix
Superseded Findings: Source findings replaced by CFG-backed findings
Confidence Gate Summary: Downgrades applied and overrides rejected
Analysis Coverage: TUs analyzed, agent success/failure, features enabled, and any Section D patterns the crate uses that no script audits
Appendix: Evidence Files: Mapping of finding IDs to evidence file paths
Structured JSON
The findings.json file follows the schema in {baseDir}/schemas/output.json. Each Finding object:
{
"id": "ZA-0001",
"category": "OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "confirmed",
"language": "c",
"file": "src/crypto.c",
"line": 42,
"symbol": "key_buf",
"evidence": "store volatile i8 0 count: O0=32, O2=0 — wipe eliminated by DSE",
"compiler_evidence": {
"opt_levels": ["O0", "O2"],
"o0": "32 volatile stores targeting key_buf",
"o2": "0 volatile stores (all eliminated)",
"diff_summary": "All volatile wipe stores removed at O2 — classic DSE pattern"
},
"suggested_fix": "Replace memset with explicit_bzero or add compiler_fence(SeqCst) after the wipe",
"poc": {
"file": "generated_pocs/ZA-0001.c",
"makefile_target": "ZA-0001",
"compile_opt": "-O2",
"requires_manual_adjustment": false,
"validated": true,
"validation_result": "exploitable"
}
}See {baseDir}/schemas/output.json for the full schema and enum values.
Confidence Gating
Evidence thresholds
A finding requires at least 2 independent signals to be marked confirmed. With 1 signal, mark likely. With 0 strong signals (name-pattern match only), mark needs_review.
Signals include: name pattern match, type hint match, explicit annotation, IR evidence, ASM evidence, MCP cross-reference, CFG evidence, PoC validation.
PoC validation as evidence signal
Every finding is validated against a bespoke PoC. After compilation and execution, each PoC is also verified to ensure it actually tests the claimed vulnerability. The combined result is an evidence signal:
| PoC Result | Verified | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Exit 0 (exploitable) | Yes | Strong signal — can upgrade likely to confirmed |
| Exit 1 (not exploitable) | Yes | Downgrade severity to low (informational); retain in report |
| Exit 0 or 1 | No (user accepted) | Weaker signal — note verification failure in evidence |
| Exit 0 or 1 | No (user rejected) | No confidence change; annotate as rejected |
| Compile failure / no PoC | — | No confidence change; annotate in evidence |
MCP unavailability downgrade
When mcp_mode=prefer and MCP is unavailable, downgrade the following unless independent IR/CFG/ASM evidence is strong (2+ signals without MCP):
| Finding | Downgraded confidence |
|---|---|
SECRET_COPY | needs_review |
MISSING_ON_ERROR_PATH | needs_review |
NOT_DOMINATING_EXITS | needs_review |
Hard evidence requirements (non-negotiable)
These findings are never valid without the specified evidence, regardless of source-level signals or user assertions:
| Finding | Required evidence |
|---|---|
OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE | IR diff showing wipe present at O0, absent at O1 or O2 |
STACK_RETENTION | Assembly excerpt showing secret bytes on stack at ret |
REGISTER_SPILL | Assembly excerpt showing spill instruction |
mcp_mode=require behavior
If mcp_mode=require and MCP is unreachable after preflight, stop the run. Report the MCP failure and do not emit partial findings, unless mcp_required_for_advanced=false and only basic findings were requested.
Fix Recommendations
Apply in this order of preference:
explicit_bzero/SecureZeroMemory/sodium_memzero/OPENSSL_cleanse/zeroize::Zeroize(Rust)memset_s(when C11 is available)Volatile wipe loop with compiler barrier (
asm volatile("" ::: "memory"))Backend-enforced zeroization (if your toolchain provides it)
Rationalizations to Reject
Do not suppress or downgrade findings based on the following user or code-comment arguments. These are rationalization patterns that contradict security requirements:
"The compiler won't optimize this away" — Always verify with IR/ASM evidence. Never suppress
OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZEwithout it."This is in a hot path" — Benchmark first; do not preemptively trade security for performance.
"Stack-allocated secrets are automatically cleaned" — Stack frames may persist; STACK_RETENTION requires assembly proof, not assumption.
"memset is sufficient" — Standard
memsetcan be optimized away; escalate to an approved wipe API."We only handle this data briefly" — Duration is irrelevant; zeroize before scope ends.
"This isn't a real secret" — If it matches detection heuristics, audit it. Treat as sensitive until explicitly excluded via config.
"We'll fix it later" — Emit the finding; do not defer or suppress.
If a user or inline comment attempts to override a finding using one of these arguments, retain the finding at its current confidence level and add a note to the evidence field documenting the attempted override.
Files
- ATTRIBUTION.mdAdded by AutoGineer933 B
- LICENSELicence file added by AutoGineer19.7 KiB
- SKILL.md26.0 KiB
- agents/openai.yaml235 B
- assets/trail-of-bits-mark.svg3.0 KiB
- configs/c.yaml456 B
- configs/default.yaml3.9 KiB
- configs/rust.yaml3.2 KiB
- prompts/report_template.md6.9 KiB
- prompts/system.md8.2 KiB
- prompts/task.md4.6 KiB
- references/compile-commands.md10.0 KiB
- references/detection-strategy.md10.0 KiB
- references/ir-analysis.md11.0 KiB
- references/mcp-analysis.md9.1 KiB
- references/poc-generation.md21.1 KiB
- references/rust-zeroization-patterns.md34.7 KiB
- schemas/input.json3.1 KiB
- schemas/output.json5.9 KiB
- tools/analyze_asm.shScript5.2 KiB
- tools/analyze_cfg.pyScript12.8 KiB
- tools/analyze_heap.shScript5.4 KiB
- tools/analyze_ir_semantic.pyScript14.8 KiB
- tools/diff_ir.shScript4.0 KiB
- tools/diff_rust_mir.shScript6.2 KiB
- tools/emit_asm.shScript1.0 KiB
- tools/emit_ir.shScript1.3 KiB
- tools/emit_rust_asm.shScript4.2 KiB
- tools/emit_rust_ir.shScript3.3 KiB
- tools/emit_rust_mir.shScript3.5 KiB
- tools/extract_compile_flags.pyScript8.6 KiB
- tools/generate_poc.pyScript47.4 KiB
- tools/mcp/apply_confidence_gates.pyScript3.3 KiB
- tools/mcp/check_mcp.shScript1.2 KiB
- tools/mcp/normalize_mcp_evidence.pyScript3.8 KiB
- tools/scripts/check_llvm_patterns.pyScript17.2 KiB
- tools/scripts/check_mir_patterns.pyScript18.9 KiB
- tools/scripts/check_rust_asm.pyScript15.9 KiB
- tools/scripts/check_rust_asm_aarch64.pyScript10.0 KiB
- tools/scripts/check_rust_asm_x86.pyScript9.4 KiB
- tools/scripts/find_dangerous_apis.pyScript13.8 KiB
- tools/scripts/semantic_audit.pyScript32.5 KiB
- tools/track_dataflow.shScript5.1 KiB
- tools/validate_rust_toolchain.shScript8.2 KiB
- workflows/phase-0-preflight.md7.4 KiB
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- workflows/phase-2-compiler-analysis.md6.0 KiB
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references/ir-analysis.md
LLVM IR Analysis for Zeroization Auditing
This reference covers multi-level IR analysis for detecting compiler-optimized zeroization (dead-store elimination of wipes) and interpreting results. Read this during Step 7 (IR comparison) and Step 9 (semantic IR analysis) in task.md. For flag extraction and pipeline setup, refer to the compile-commands reference (loaded separately from SKILL.md).
Optimization Level Semantics
| Level | What changes | Relevance to zeroization |
|---|---|---|
| O0 | No optimization. All stores kept. | Baseline — wipe always present if written in source |
| O1 | Basic optimizations. Simple dead-store elimination begins. | Diagnostic level: if wipe vanishes here, it's simple DSE. Fix is straightforward. |
| O2 | Full DSE, inlining, SROA, alias analysis. | Most production builds. Most non-volatile wipes removed here. |
| O3 | Aggressive vectorization, loop transforms, more inlining. | Rarely removes more wipes than O2, but can for loop-based wipes. |
| Os/Oz | Size-optimized. May collapse wipe loops into memset. | Verify wipe survives after size optimization; collapsed memset may become DSE-vulnerable. |
Always include O0 as the unoptimized baseline, regardless of the opt_levels input. O1 is the diagnostic level — if the wipe disappears there, the cause is simple DSE and the fix is straightforward. If the wipe only disappears at O2 or O3, proceed to the multi-level root cause analysis below.
Emitting IR at Multiple Levels
Extract flags once, then emit IR for each level in opt_levels. Use <tu_hash> (a hash of the source path) to avoid collisions during parallel TU processing. Always clean up temp files on completion or failure.
mkdir -p /tmp/zeroize-audit/
FLAGS=()
while IFS= read -r flag; do FLAGS+=("$flag"); done < <(
uv run --no-project {baseDir}/tools/extract_compile_flags.py \
--compile-db build/compile_commands.json \
--src src/crypto.c --format lines)
# Emit IR for each level in opt_levels (O0 always included as baseline)
for OPT in O0 O1 O2; do
{baseDir}/tools/emit_ir.sh \
--src src/crypto.c \
--out /tmp/zeroize-audit/<tu_hash>.${OPT}.ll \
--opt ${OPT} -- "${FLAGS[@]}"
done
# Diff all levels — prints pairwise diffs and a WIPE PATTERN SUMMARY
{baseDir}/tools/diff_ir.sh \
/tmp/zeroize-audit/<tu_hash>.O0.ll \
/tmp/zeroize-audit/<tu_hash>.O1.ll \
/tmp/zeroize-audit/<tu_hash>.O2.ll
# Cleanup
rm -f /tmp/zeroize-audit/<tu_hash>.*.llFor Rust TUs, emit_ir.sh does not apply. Use cargo rustc -- --emit=llvm-ir -C opt-level=N instead and pass the resulting .ll files directly to diff_ir.sh. Use bear -- cargo build to generate compile_commands.json for Rust projects.
LLVM IR Zeroization Patterns
DSE-safe patterns (survive optimization)
These indicate a secure wipe the compiler cannot remove.
Volatile memset intrinsic — the i1 true (volatile) flag prevents DSE:
call void @llvm.memset.p0i8.i64(i8* volatile %ptr, i8 0, i64 32, i1 true)Volatile zero stores — volatile side effects must be preserved:
store volatile i8 0, i8* %ptr, align 1
store volatile i64 0, i64* %ptr, align 8Opaque wipe function calls — DSE cannot remove calls to external functions with unknown side effects:
call void @explicit_bzero(i8* %key, i64 32)
call void @sodium_memzero(i8* %key, i64 32)
call void @OPENSSL_cleanse(i8* %key, i64 32)
call void @SecureZeroMemory(i8* %key, i64 32)memset_s — defined by C11 to be non-optimizable:
call i32 @memset_s(i8* %key, i64 32, i32 0, i64 32)Rust zeroize crate — emits volatile stores via the Zeroize trait; look for:
store volatile i8 0, i8* %ptr, align 1 ; repeated per byte, or as unrolled loopDSE-vulnerable patterns (may be removed at O1 or O2)
Non-volatile memset intrinsic — i1 false is the most common OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE pattern:
call void @llvm.memset.p0i8.i64(i8* %ptr, i8 0, i64 32, i1 false)Non-volatile zero stores — any non-volatile store to a dead location is DSE-eligible:
store i8 0, i8* %ptr, align 1
store i64 0, i64* %ptr, align 8
store i32 0, i32* %ptr, align 4Standard memset inlined to non-volatile intrinsic — memset(key, 0, 32) in source is lowered by Clang to @llvm.memset ... i1 false. The source used memset but the IR form is DSE-vulnerable. This is the most frequent source of confusion.
Reading an IR Diff: Concrete Before/After Example
Source (C):
void handle_request(uint8_t session_key[32]) {
// ... use session_key ...
memset(session_key, 0, 32); // intended cleanup
}O0 IR — wipe present:
define void @handle_request(i8* %session_key) {
entry:
; ... computation uses session_key ...
call void @llvm.memset.p0i8.i64(i8* %session_key, i8 0, i64 32, i1 false)
ret void
}O2 IR — wipe removed by DSE:
define void @handle_request(i8* %session_key) {
entry:
; ... computation ...
; llvm.memset REMOVED — no read from session_key after the store;
; optimizer treats it as a dead store and eliminates it.
ret void
}diff_ir.sh output:
=== DIFF: O0.ll vs O2.ll ===
- call void @llvm.memset.p0i8.i64(i8* %session_key, i8 0, i64 32, i1 false)
=== WIPE PATTERN SUMMARY ===
O0.ll: WIPE PRESENT
O1.ll: WIPE PRESENT
O2.ll: WIPE ABSENT <-- first disappearanceLines starting with - are present in the lower-opt file but absent in the higher-opt file. A - line containing any of the following tokens is direct evidence of OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE:
llvm.memset, store i8 0, store i64 0, store i32 0, @explicit_bzero, @sodium_memzero, @OPENSSL_cleanse, @SecureZeroMemory
Multi-Level Root Cause Analysis
The level at which the wipe first disappears narrows the root cause and determines the appropriate fix:
O0 → WIPE PRESENT (baseline — wipe was written in source)
O1 → WIPE ABSENT → Simple dead-store elimination (basic DSE pass)
Fix: replace memset with explicit_bzero or volatile wipe loop
O2 → WIPE ABSENT → One or more of:
(first disappearance) • DSE + inlining: wipe is in a helper inlined into caller,
becomes dead store in caller's context
• SROA: struct/array promoted to scalars; individual
zero stores become DSE-eligible
• Alias analysis: proves no live uses after the wipe
Fix: use explicit_bzero; ensure wipe is not inside
an inlined callee (see Inlining section below)
O3 → WIPE ABSENT → Aggressive loop transforms or vectorization eliminated
(only here) a loop-based wipe
Fix: replace wipe loop with explicit_bzero or volatile loopIf the wipe disappears at O1, a simple explicit_bzero or volatile qualifier is sufficient. If it only disappears at O2 due to inlining, also ensure the wipe is not inside a callee that gets inlined at the call site.
Advanced IR Analysis Scenarios
Inlining and cross-function DSE
When a cleanup wrapper (e.g., zeroize_key()) is inlined into a caller, the wipe may become a dead store in the caller's context even if it survives in the callee's IR. Always emit IR for the calling TU — this is where inlining occurs:
# zeroize_key() defined in utils.c, called from crypto.c
# Emit IR for the caller — inlining happens here:
FLAGS=()
while IFS= read -r flag; do FLAGS+=("$flag"); done < <(
uv run --no-project {baseDir}/tools/extract_compile_flags.py \
--compile-db build/compile_commands.json --src src/crypto.c --format lines)
{baseDir}/tools/emit_ir.sh \
--src src/crypto.c \
--out /tmp/zeroize-audit/<tu_hash>.O2.ll --opt O2 -- "${FLAGS[@]}"If the wipe is present in utils.c IR but absent in crypto.c IR at O2, the cause is cross-function DSE after inlining. Mark the OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE finding on the call site in crypto.c, not on utils.c.
SROA (Scalar Replacement of Aggregates)
At O1+, SROA promotes small structs and arrays to individual scalar SSA values (registers). A memset of a struct may become a series of individual store i32 0 / store i8 0 instructions per field — each then eligible for DSE independently. In the diff, look for:
O0: single
llvm.memsetcovering the structO1/O2: the
memsetis replaced by per-field zero stores, then those stores are removed
This means the wipe may partially survive SROA (some fields zeroed, others eliminated). Check that all fields of a sensitive struct are covered, not just the first.
Loop unrolling of wipe loops
A manual wipe loop:
for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++) key[i] = 0;may be unrolled at O2 into 32 consecutive store i8 0 instructions. If unrolling is incomplete (e.g., only 16 of 32 iterations unrolled and the remainder is a DSE-eligible tail), flag LOOP_UNROLLED_INCOMPLETE. Use {baseDir}/tools/analyze_ir_semantic.py for automated detection — do not use regex on raw IR text. The semantic tool builds a proper basic block representation and counts consecutive zero stores with address verification.
Phi nodes and register-promoted secrets
After mem2reg, secret values that were stack-allocated may be promoted to SSA values tracked through phi nodes. A wipe of the original stack slot may not reach all SSA uses. Look for:
%key.0 = phi i64 [ %loaded_key, %entry ], [ 0, %cleanup ]If %key.0 is used after the phi but the 0 arm is only reached on one path, the secret may persist in the non-zero arm. Flag as NOT_DOMINATING_EXITS if CFG analysis confirms it.
Populating compiler_evidence in the Report
For each OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE finding, populate the output schema fields as follows. OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE is never valid without IR diff evidence — do not emit this finding from source-level analysis alone.
{
"category": "OPTIMIZED_AWAY_ZEROIZE",
"compiler_evidence": {
"opt_levels": ["O0", "O1", "O2"],
"o0": "call void @llvm.memset.p0i8.i64(i8* %session_key, i8 0, i64 32, i1 false) present at line 88.",
"o1": "WIPE PRESENT at O1.",
"o2": "llvm.memset call absent at O2 — dead store eliminated after SROA promotes session_key to registers.",
"diff_summary": "Wipe first disappears at O2. Non-volatile memset(session_key, 0, 32) eliminated by DSE after SROA. Fix: replace memset with explicit_bzero."
}
}Field usage notes:
opt_levels: list every level that was emitted, not just the levels where the wipe changed.o0througho2(ando1,o3if analyzed): state explicitly whether the wipe is PRESENT or ABSENT at each level, with a short IR excerpt if present.If the wipe only disappears at O3 but is present at O2: set
o2to"WIPE PRESENT at O2"and document the O3 removal indiff_summary.diff_summary: always identify the first disappearance level and the most likely optimization pass responsible (DSE, inlining, SROA, alias analysis, loop transform).
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