Token Integration Analyzer
Trail of BitsOfficialPublished by Trail of Bits
- Skill
- Review and audit
- Security
- CC-BY-SA-4.0
- No issues found
AutoGineer summary
Written by AutoGineer from the skill’s own files, not by the author
The Token Integration Analyzer provides a systematic security review for smart contract tokens and protocols that interact with them. It leverages the Trail of Bits token integration checklist to evaluate codebases for ERC20/ERC721 standard conformity, identify risks from over 20 non-standard 'weird' token patterns, and assess contract composition, owner privileges, and integration safety. The tool supports both static analysis of Solidity code and on-chain analysis of deployed contracts to ensure robust handling of external token interactions.
What it does
- Performs automated ERC20/ERC721 conformity checks using static analysis tools.
- Identifies risks from 20+ known weird token patterns like fee-on-transfer or missing return values.
- Evaluates contract composition, complexity, and owner privilege centralization.
- Analyzes on-chain data for token scarcity, holder concentration, and configuration.
- Provides a structured security report with prioritized remediation recommendations.
- Validates integration safety patterns for protocols interacting with external tokens.
When to use it
- When developing or auditing a new ERC20 or ERC721 token implementation.
- Before integrating external tokens into a DeFi protocol or smart contract system.
- When assessing the risk profile of arbitrary tokens accepted by a platform.
- To verify that a protocol correctly handles non-standard token behaviors.
Advantages
- Reduces risks associated with non-standard token behaviors in smart contract integrations.
- Provides a comprehensive, standardized checklist based on industry-recognized security practices.
- Combines static code analysis with on-chain data for a holistic security view.
- Helps developers identify and fix critical vulnerabilities before mainnet deployment.
Usage examples
- “Analyze my ERC20 token implementation for potential security risks and standard conformity.”
- The agent will review the provided Solidity code, run conformity checks, identify any non-standard patterns, and provide a report on potential vulnerabilities.
- “I am integrating USDT into my vault. What should I check for?”
- The agent will analyze the integration code, specifically checking for missing return value handling and other known USDT-specific quirks.
- “Assess the risks of this deployed token contract at address 0x123...”
- The agent will perform an on-chain analysis of the contract, checking for holder concentration, owner privileges, and configuration risks.
Install
Download the skill as a ZIP:
https://autogineer.com/agent-skills/trailofbits/token-integration-analyzer/downloadUnzip it into the cross-client skills folder of your project:
mkdir -p .agents/skills && unzip token-integration-analyzer.zip -d .agents/skills
Documentation by Trail of Bits
Token Integration Analyzer
Purpose
Systematically analyzes the codebase for token-related security concerns using Trail of Bits' token integration checklist:
Token Implementations: Analyze if your token follows ERC20/ERC721 standards or has non-standard behavior
Token Integrations: Analyze how your protocol handles arbitrary tokens, including weird/non-standard tokens
On-chain Analysis: Query deployed contracts for scarcity, distribution, and configuration
Security Assessment: Identify risks from 20+ known weird token patterns
Framework: Building Secure Contracts - Token Integration Checklist + Weird ERC20 Database
How This Works
Phase 1: Context Discovery
Determines analysis context:
Token implementation: Are you building a token contract?
Token integration: Does your protocol interact with external tokens?
Platform: Ethereum, other EVM chains, or different platform?
Token types: ERC20, ERC721, or both?
Phase 2: Slither Analysis (if Solidity)
For Solidity projects, I'll help run:
slither-check-erc- ERC conformity checksslither --print human-summary- Complexity and upgrade analysisslither --print contract-summary- Function analysisslither-prop- Property generation for testing
Phase 3: Code Analysis
Analyzes:
Contract composition and complexity
Owner privileges and centralization risks
ERC20/ERC721 conformity
Known weird token patterns
Integration safety patterns
Phase 4: On-chain Analysis (if deployed)
If you provide a contract address, I'll query:
Token scarcity and distribution
Total supply and holder concentration
Exchange listings
On-chain configuration
Phase 5: Risk Assessment
Provides:
Identified vulnerabilities
Non-standard behaviors
Integration risks
Prioritized recommendations
Assessment Categories
I check 10 comprehensive categories covering all aspects of token security. For detailed criteria, patterns, and checklists, see ASSESSMENT_CATEGORIES.md.
Quick Reference:
General Considerations - Security reviews, team transparency, security contacts
Contract Composition - Complexity analysis, SafeMath usage, function count, entry points
Owner Privileges - Upgradeability, minting, pausability, blacklisting, team accountability
ERC20 Conformity - Return values, metadata, decimals, race conditions, Slither checks
ERC20 Extension Risks - External calls/hooks, transfer fees, rebasing/yield-bearing tokens
Token Scarcity Analysis - Supply distribution, holder concentration, exchange distribution, flash loan/mint risks
Weird ERC20 Patterns (24 patterns including):
Reentrant calls (ERC777 hooks)
Missing return values (USDT, BNB, OMG)
Fee on transfer (STA, PAXG)
Balance modifications outside transfers (Ampleforth, Compound)
Upgradable tokens (USDC, USDT)
Flash mintable (DAI)
Blocklists (USDC, USDT)
Pausable tokens (BNB, ZIL)
Approval race protections (USDT, KNC)
Revert on approval/transfer to zero address
Revert on zero value approvals/transfers
Multiple token addresses
Low decimals (USDC: 6, Gemini: 2)
High decimals (YAM-V2: 24)
transferFrom with src == msg.sender
Non-string metadata (MKR)
No revert on failure (ZRX, EURS)
Revert on large approvals (UNI, COMP)
Code injection via token name
Unusual permit function (DAI, RAI, GLM)
Transfer less than amount (cUSDCv3)
ERC-20 native currency representation (Celo, Polygon, zkSync)
Token Integration Safety - Safe transfer patterns, balance verification, allowlists, wrappers, defensive patterns
ERC721 Conformity - Transfer to 0x0, safeTransferFrom, metadata, ownerOf, approval clearing, token ID immutability
ERC721 Common Risks - onERC721Received reentrancy, safe minting, burning approval clearing
Example Output
When analysis is complete, you'll receive a comprehensive report structured as follows:
=== TOKEN INTEGRATION ANALYSIS REPORT ===
Project: MultiToken DEX
Token Analyzed: Custom Reward Token + Integration Safety
Platform: Solidity 0.8.20
Analysis Date: March 15, 2024
---
## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Token Type: ERC20 Implementation + Protocol Integrating External Tokens
Overall Risk Level: MEDIUM
Critical Issues: 2
High Issues: 3
Medium Issues: 4
**Top Concerns:**
⚠ Fee-on-transfer tokens not handled correctly
⚠ No validation for missing return values (USDT compatibility)
⚠ Owner can mint unlimited tokens without cap
**Recommendation:** Address critical/high issues before mainnet launch.
---
## 1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
✓ Contract audited by CertiK (June 2023)
✓ Team contactable via [email protected]
✗ No security mailing list for critical announcements
**Risk:** Users won't be notified of critical issues
**Action:** Set up [email protected] mailing list
---
## 2. CONTRACT COMPOSITION
### Complexity Analysis
**Slither human-summary Results:**
- 456 lines of code
- Cyclomatic complexity: Average 6, Max 14 (transferWithFee())
- 12 functions, 8 state variables
- Inheritance depth: 3 (moderate)
✓ Contract complexity is reasonable
⚠ transferWithFee() complexity high (14) - consider splitting
### SafeMath Usage
✓ Using Solidity 0.8.20 (built-in overflow protection)
✓ No unchecked blocks found
✓ All arithmetic operations protected
### Non-Token Functions
**Functions Beyond ERC20:**
- setFeeCollector() - Admin function ✓
- setTransferFee() - Admin function ✓
- withdrawFees() - Admin function ✓
- pause()/unpause() - Emergency functions ✓
⚠ 4 non-token functions (acceptable but adds complexity)
### Address Entry Points
✓ Single contract address
✓ No proxy with multiple entry points
✓ No token migration creating address confusion
**Status:** PASS
---
## 3. OWNER PRIVILEGES
### Upgradeability
⚠ Contract uses TransparentUpgradeableProxy
**Risk:** Owner can change contract logic at any time
**Current Implementation:**
- ProxyAdmin: 0x1234... (2/3 multisig) ✓
- Timelock: None ✗
**Recommendation:** Add 48-hour timelock to all upgrades
### Minting Capabilities
❌ CRITICAL: Unlimited minting
File: contracts/RewardToken.sol:89
```solidity
function mint(address to, uint256 amount) external onlyOwner {
_mint(to, amount); // No cap!
}Risk: Owner can inflate supply arbitrarily Fix: Add maximum supply cap or rate-limited minting
Pausability
✓ Pausable pattern implemented (OpenZeppelin) ✓ Only owner can pause ⚠ Paused state affects all transfers (including existing holders)
Risk: Owner can trap all user funds Mitigation: Use multi-sig for pause function (already implemented ✓)
Blacklisting
✗ No blacklist functionality Assessment: Good - no centralized censorship risk
Team Transparency
✓ Team members public (team.md) ✓ Company registered in Switzerland ✓ Accountable and contactable
Status: ACCEPTABLE
4. ERC20 CONFORMITY
Slither-check-erc Results
Command: slither-check-erc . RewardToken --erc erc20
✓ transfer returns bool ✓ transferFrom returns bool ✓ name, decimals, symbol present ✓ decimals returns uint8 (value: 18) ✓ Race condition mitigated (increaseAllowance/decreaseAllowance)
Status: FULLY COMPLIANT
slither-prop Test Results
Command: slither-prop . --contract RewardToken
Generated 12 properties, all passed: ✓ Transfer doesn't change total supply ✓ Allowance correctly updates ✓ Balance updates match transfer amounts ✓ No balance manipulation possible [... 8 more properties ...]
Echidna fuzzing: 50,000 runs, no violations ✓
Status: EXCELLENT
5. WEIRD TOKEN PATTERN ANALYSIS
Integration Safety Check
Your Protocol Integrates 5 External Tokens:
USDT (0xdac17f9...)
USDC (0xa0b86991...)
DAI (0x6b175474...)
WETH (0xc02aaa39...)
UNI (0x1f9840a8...)
Critical Issues Found
❌ Pattern 7.2: Missing Return Values Found in: USDT integration File: contracts/Vault.sol:156
IERC20(usdt).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
// No return value check! USDT doesn't return boolRisk: Silent failures on USDT transfers Exploit: User appears to deposit, but no tokens moved Fix: Use OpenZeppelin SafeERC20 wrapper
❌ Pattern 7.3: Fee on Transfer Risk for: Any token with transfer fees File: contracts/Vault.sol:170
uint256 balanceBefore = IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this));
token.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
shares = amount * exchangeRate; // WRONG! Should use actual received amountRisk: Accounting mismatch if token takes fees
Exploit: User credited more shares than tokens deposited
Fix: Calculate shares from balanceAfter - balanceBefore
Known Non-Standard Token Handling
✓ USDC: Properly handled (SafeERC20, 6 decimals accounted for) ⚠ DAI: permit() function not used (opportunity for gas savings) ✗ USDT: Missing return value not handled (CRITICAL) ✓ WETH: Standard wrapper, properly handled ⚠ UNI: Large approval handling not checked (reverts >= 2^96)
[... Additional sections for remaining analysis categories ...]
For complete report template and deliverables format, see [REPORT_TEMPLATES.md](resources/REPORT_TEMPLATES.md).
---
## Rationalizations (Do Not Skip)
| Rationalization | Why It's Wrong | Required Action |
|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| "Token looks standard, ERC20 checks pass" | 20+ weird token patterns exist beyond ERC20 compliance | Check ALL weird token patterns from database (missing return, revert on zero, hooks, etc.) |
| "Slither shows no issues, integration is safe" | Slither detects some patterns, misses integration logic | Complete manual analysis of all 5 token integration criteria |
| "No fee-on-transfer detected, skip that check" | Fee-on-transfer can be owner-controlled or conditional | Test all transfer scenarios, check for conditional fee logic |
| "Balance checks exist, handling is safe" | Balance checks alone don't protect against all weird tokens | Verify safe transfer wrappers, revert handling, approval patterns |
| "Token is deployed by reputable team, assume standard" | Reputation doesn't guarantee standard behavior | Analyze actual code and on-chain behavior, don't trust assumptions |
| "Integration uses OpenZeppelin, must be safe" | OpenZeppelin libraries don't protect against weird external tokens | Verify defensive patterns around all external token calls |
| "Can't run Slither, skipping automated analysis" | Slither provides critical ERC conformance checks | Manually verify all slither-check-erc criteria or document why blocked |
| "This pattern seems fine" | Intuition misses subtle token integration bugs | Systematically check all 20+ weird token patterns with code evidence |
---
## Deliverables
When analysis is complete, I'll provide:
1. **Compliance Checklist** - Checkboxes for all assessment categories
2. **Weird Token Pattern Analysis** - Presence/absence of all 24 patterns with risk levels and evidence
3. **On-chain Analysis Report** (if applicable) - Holder distribution, exchange listings, configuration
4. **Integration Safety Assessment** (if applicable) - Safe transfer usage, defensive patterns, weird token handling
5. **Prioritized Recommendations** - CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW issues with specific fixes
Complete deliverable templates available in [REPORT_TEMPLATES.md](resources/REPORT_TEMPLATES.md).
---
## Ready to Begin
**What I'll need**:
- Your codebase
- Context: Token implementation or integration?
- Token type: ERC20, ERC721, or both?
- Contract address (if deployed and want on-chain analysis)
- RPC endpoint (if querying on-chain)
Let's analyze your token implementation or integration for security risks!Files
- ATTRIBUTION.mdAdded by AutoGineer971 B
- LICENSELicence file added by AutoGineer19.7 KiB
- SKILL.md12.4 KiB
- agents/openai.yaml247 B
- assets/trail-of-bits-mark.svg3.0 KiB
- resources/ASSESSMENT_CATEGORIES.md12.7 KiB
- resources/REPORT_TEMPLATES.md3.2 KiB
resources/ASSESSMENT_CATEGORIES.md
Assessment Categories Reference
This document contains detailed assessment criteria for token analysis. Each category includes what to check, analysis methods, and verification checklists.
1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
What I'll check:
Security review history
Team contacts and transparency
Security mailing list existence
I'll ask you:
Has this token been audited?
Is the team contactable?
Is there a security mailing list?
Best practices:
Interact only with reviewed tokens
Maintain contact with token teams
Subscribe to security announcements
2. CONTRACT COMPOSITION
What I'll analyze:
Complexity:
Overall contract complexity
Lines of code
Inheritance depth
Function count
Use Slither's
human-summaryprinter
SafeMath Usage (pre-0.8 Solidity):
Arithmetic operations protection
Unchecked blocks justification
Non-token Functions:
Functions beyond standard ERC interface
Unnecessary complexity
Use Slither's
contract-summaryprinter
Single Address Entry Point:
Multiple addresses pointing to same token
Proxy patterns that create multiple entry points
Checks:
[ ] Contract avoids unnecessary complexity
[ ] Contract uses SafeMath or Solidity 0.8+ (for Solidity)
[ ] Contract has only a few non-token-related functions
[ ] Token has only one address entry point
3. OWNER PRIVILEGES
What I'll check:
Upgradeability:
Proxy patterns (UUPS, Transparent, Beacon)
Implementation change mechanisms
Use Slither's
human-summaryprinter
Minting Capabilities:
Unlimited vs limited minting
Minting access controls
Total supply caps
Pausability:
Pause mechanisms
Who can pause
Impact on existing holders
Blacklisting:
Blocklist functionality
Admin controls
USDC/USDT-style blocklists
Team Transparency:
Known team members
Legal jurisdiction
Accountability
Checks:
[ ] Token is not upgradeable (or upgrade risks understood)
[ ] Owner has limited minting capabilities
[ ] Token is not pausable (or pause risks understood)
[ ] Owner cannot blacklist addresses (or risks understood)
[ ] Team is known and accountable
4. ERC20 CONFORMITY CHECKS
What I'll analyze:
Return Values:
transferreturns booltransferFromreturns boolMissing returns (USDT, BNB, OMG pattern)
False returns (Tether Gold pattern)
Function Presence:
name,decimals,symbolexistenceOptional functions handling
Decimals Type:
Returns
uint8Value below 255
Low decimals (USDC: 6, Gemini USD: 2)
High decimals (YAM-V2: 24)
Race Condition Mitigation:
ERC20 approve race condition
Increase/decrease allowance pattern
USDT/KNC approval protection
Slither Tools:
Run
slither-check-ercfor automated checksRun
slither-propto generate properties
Checks:
[ ]
transferandtransferFromreturn boolean[ ]
name,decimals,symbolpresent if used[ ]
decimalsreturnsuint8with value < 255[ ] Token mitigates ERC20 race condition
[ ] Contract passes
slither-check-erctests[ ] Contract passes
slither-propgenerated tests
5. ERC20 EXTENSION RISKS
What I'll check:
External Calls in Transfers:
ERC777 hooks
Reentrancy risks
tokensReceivedcallbacksCheck for: Amp (AMP), imBTC patterns
Transfer Fees:
Deflationary tokens
Fee-on-transfer (STA, PAXG)
Future fee risks (USDT, USDC can add fees)
Balance checks after transfer
Interest/Yield Bearing:
Rebasing tokens (Ampleforth)
Airdropped governance tokens
Compound-style interest
Cached balance issues
Checks:
[ ] Token is not ERC777 or has no external calls in transfer
[ ]
transfer/transferFromdo not take fees[ ] Interest earned from token is accounted for
6. TOKEN SCARCITY ANALYSIS
What I'll do:
For deployed tokens, I'll query on-chain data using web3/ethers:
Supply Distribution:
// Query holder distribution
// Check top 10 holders percentage
// Identify concentration riskTotal Supply:
// Query totalSupply
// Check if sufficient for manipulation resistance
// Identify low supply riskExchange Distribution:
// Query balance on major DEXs/CEXs
// Check if tokens concentrated in one exchange
// Identify single point of failureFlash Loan Risk:
Large fund attack potential
Flash loan availability for this token
Flash Minting:
Flash mint functions (DAI-style)
Maximum mintable amount
Overflow risks
Checks:
[ ] Supply owned by more than a few users
[ ] Total supply is sufficient
[ ] Tokens located in more than a few exchanges
[ ] Flash loan/large fund risks understood
[ ] Token does not allow flash minting (or risks understood)
Note: I'll only perform on-chain analysis if you provide a contract address. Won't hallucinate if not applicable.
7. WEIRD ERC20 PATTERNS
I'll check for all 20+ known weird token patterns:
7.1 Reentrant Calls
ERC777 tokens with hooks
Transfer callbacks
Historical exploits: imBTC Uniswap, lendf.me
Tokens: Amp (AMP), imBTC
7.2 Missing Return Values
No bool return on transfer/transferFrom
Some methods return, others don't
False returns on success (Tether Gold)
Tokens: USDT, BNB, OMG, Tether Gold
7.3 Fee on Transfer
Transfer fees (STA, PAXG)
Future fee capability (USDT, USDC)
Deflationary mechanics
Exploit: Balancer STA hack ($500k)
7.4 Balance Modifications Outside Transfers
Rebasing tokens (Ampleforth)
Governance airdrops (Compound)
Mintable/burnable by admin
Cached balance risks
7.5 Upgradable Tokens
USDC, USDT upgradeability
Logic change risks
Freeze integration on upgrade
7.6 Flash Mintable
DAI flash mint module
type(uint256).maxsupply riskOne-transaction minting
7.7 Blocklists
USDC, USDT blocklists
Admin-controlled blocking
Contract trap risk
Regulatory/extortion risk
7.8 Pausable Tokens
BNB, ZIL pause functionality
Admin pause risk
User fund trap
7.9 Approval Race Protections
USDT, KNC approval restrictions
Cannot approve M > 0 when N > 0 approved
Integration issues
7.10 Revert on Approval to Zero Address
OpenZeppelin pattern
approve(address(0), amt)revertsSpecial case handling needed
7.11 Revert on Zero Value Approvals
BNB pattern
approve(address, 0)revertsApproval reset issues
7.12 Revert on Zero Value Transfers
LEND pattern
Zero amount transfers fail
Edge case handling
7.13 Multiple Token Addresses
Proxied tokens with multiple addresses
Address-based tracking broken
Rescue function exploits
7.14 Low Decimals
USDC: 6 decimals
Gemini USD: 2 decimals
Precision loss amplified
7.15 High Decimals
YAM-V2: 24 decimals
Overflow risks
Liveness issues
7.16 transferFrom with src == msg.sender
DSToken: no allowance decrease
OpenZeppelin: always decrease
Different semantics
7.17 Non-string Metadata
MKR: bytes32 name/symbol
Metadata consumption issues
Type casting needed
7.18 Revert on Transfer to Zero Address
OpenZeppelin pattern
Burn mechanism broken
Zero address handling
7.19 No Revert on Failure
ZRX, EURS pattern
Returns false instead of reverting
Forgotten require wrapping
7.20 Revert on Large Approvals
UNI, COMP: max uint96
uint256(-1) special case
Allowance mapping mismatch
7.21 Code Injection via Token Name
Malicious JavaScript in name
Frontend exploits
Etherdelta hack pattern
7.22 Unusual Permit Function
DAI, RAI, GLM non-EIP2612 permit
No revert on unsupported permit
Phantom function execution
7.23 Transfer Less Than Amount
cUSDCv3 type(uint256).max handling
Only balance transferred
Vault accounting broken
7.24 ERC-20 Native Currency Representation
Celo: CELO token
Polygon: POL token
zkSync Era: ETH token
Double spending risks
Exploit: Uniswap V4 critical vulnerability
For each pattern I'll:
Search for implementation
Assess risk level
Check integration safety
Provide mitigation strategies
8. TOKEN INTEGRATION SAFETY
If analyzing a protocol that integrates tokens:
What I'll check:
Safe Transfer Pattern:
// Check for proper transfer handling
// Verify return value checking
// Look for SafeERC20 usageBalance Verification:
// Check balance before and after
// Don't assume transfer amount = actual amount
// Fee-on-transfer protectionAllowlist Pattern:
// Contract-level allowlist
// Known good tokens
// UI-level filteringWrapper Contracts:
// Edge wrappers for external tokens
// Consistent internal semantics
// Isolation of weird behaviorDefensive Patterns:
Reentrancy guards on token interactions
Balance caching strategies
Upgrade detection mechanisms
Zero value handling
Return value verification
9. ERC721 CONFORMITY CHECKS
What I'll analyze:
Transfer to 0x0:
Should revert per standard
Burning mechanism
Token loss prevention
safeTransferFrom Implementation:
Correct signature
onERC721Received callback
NFT loss to contracts
Metadata Functions:
name,symbolpresenceCan return empty string
decimalsreturnsuint8(0)if present
ownerOf Behavior:
Reverts for invalid tokenId
Reverts for burned tokens
Never returns 0x0
Transfer Clears Approvals:
Per standard requirement
Approval state management
Token ID Immutability:
ID cannot change during lifetime
Per standard requirement
Checks:
[ ] Transfers to 0x0 revert
[ ]
safeTransferFromimplemented correctly[ ]
name,symbolpresent if used[ ]
decimalsreturnsuint8(0)if present[ ]
ownerOfreverts for invalid/burned tokens[ ] Transfers clear approvals
[ ] Token IDs immutable during lifetime
10. ERC721 COMMON RISKS
What I'll check:
onERC721Received Callback:
Reentrancy via callback
safeMint risks
External call ordering
Safe Minting to Contracts:
Minting functions behave like
safeTransferFromPrevent NFT loss to contracts
Handle contract recipients
Burning Clears Approvals:
Burn function existence
Approval clearing
Approval state after burn
Checks:
[ ]
onERC721Receivedcallback reentrancy protected[ ] NFTs safely minted to smart contracts
[ ] Burning tokens clears approvals
Slither Integration
Commands I'll Help Run
ERC Conformity Check:
# For ERC20
slither-check-erc [address-or-path] TokenName --erc erc20
# For ERC721
slither-check-erc [address-or-path] TokenName --erc erc721Contract Analysis:
# Human-readable summary (complexity, upgrades, etc.)
slither [target] --print human-summary
# Function and modifier summary
slither [target] --print contract-summaryProperty Generation:
# Generate test properties for Echidna/Manticore
slither-prop . --contract TokenNameNote: I'll adapt based on whether tools are available. I can work without Slither but recommend using it for Solidity projects.
On-chain Analysis Integration
Querying Deployed Contracts
If you provide a contract address, I can query on-chain data:
Setup:
// I'll use web3.js or ethers.js
const Web3 = require('web3');
const web3 = new Web3('RPC_URL');Token Information:
// Query basic info
const name = await token.methods.name().call();
const symbol = await token.methods.symbol().call();
const decimals = await token.methods.decimals().call();
const totalSupply = await token.methods.totalSupply().call();Holder Analysis:
// Query top holders
// Calculate concentration
// Identify whale riskExchange Analysis:
// Query balances on Uniswap, Curve, etc.
// Check centralization in single exchangeConfiguration:
// Query owner/admin
// Check pause status
// Verify upgrade configurationNote: I'll only perform on-chain queries if you provide an address and RPC endpoint. Won't hallucinate if not applicable.
Known Non-Standard Tokens Database
I have comprehensive knowledge of known non-standard tokens:
Missing Revert
Basic Attention Token (BAT)
Huobi Token (HT)
Compound USD Coin (cUSDC)
0x Protocol Token (ZRX)
Transfer Hooks (Reentrant)
Amp (AMP)
The Tokenized Bitcoin (imBTC)
Missing Return Data
Binance Coin (BNB) - only on
transferOMGToken (OMG)
Tether USD (USDT)
Permit No-op
Wrapped Ether (WETH)
Additional Non-Standard
USDC: upgradeable, 6 decimals
DAI: non-standard permit, flash mintable
UNI, COMP: revert on large approvals (>= 2^96)
I'll check if your codebase interacts with any of these and verify proper handling.
Requirements and compatibility
Works with: Claude Code, Claude apps, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Kiro, OpenCode, Goose, Amp, Roo Code, JetBrains Junie, Factory Droid, Devin (ex-Windsurf), Mistral Vibe, OpenHands, Letta
“Works with” means the tool reads the open Agent Skills format; a skill written for one tool may use features others lack.
Security
No issues found by our static scan· No issues found
A static scan is not a guarantee. Skills are third-party content: review a skill before you let an agent use it.
Attribution and licence
- Published by
- Trail of Bits
- Publisher
- Trail of Bits (Official)
- Source
- trailofbits/skills · plugins/building-secure-contracts/skills/token-integration-analyzer · commit e4dd0bb
- Licence
- Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (redistribution allowed)
- LICENSE (added by AutoGineer from LICENSE)
- ATTRIBUTION.md (written by AutoGineer)
- Synced
AutoGineer is not affiliated with or endorsed by Trail of Bits or Trail of Bits.
Download ZIP
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