Cosmos Vulnerability Scanner
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AutoGineer summary
Written by AutoGineer from the skill’s own files, not by the author
The Cosmos Vulnerability Scanner is an automated security auditing tool designed for Cosmos SDK-based blockchains. It performs a multi-phase analysis of custom modules and smart contracts to identify vulnerabilities that could lead to chain halts, state divergence, or loss of funds. The skill orchestrates parallel scanning agents that evaluate code against specific patterns related to core SDK logic, IBC integrations, EVM compatibility, and CosmWasm contracts. It emphasizes consensus-critical execution paths, ensuring that findings are relevant to the blockchain's stability and security.
What it does
- Generates a technical inventory and threat model via a discovery phase.
- Spawns parallel scanning agents to analyze code against predefined vulnerability patterns.
- Filters findings to focus exclusively on consensus-critical execution paths.
- Supports specialized scanning for IBC, EVM, and CosmWasm components.
- Writes detailed vulnerability reports as individual markdown files.
- Verifies that all required security patterns have been assessed.
When to use it
- Auditing custom Cosmos SDK modules.
- Reviewing CosmWasm smart contracts for security flaws.
- Conducting pre-launch security assessments for Cosmos-based chains.
- Investigating potential causes of chain halt incidents.
Advantages
- Reduces manual audit time through parallelized scanning.
- Focuses on high-impact consensus-critical bugs.
- Provides structured, actionable findings for remediation.
- Adapts to specific Cosmos SDK version requirements.
Usage examples
- “Run a security scan on the current directory.”
- The agent performs a discovery phase, identifies the platform and SDK version, executes parallel scans, and generates a report in the .bughunt_cosmos/ directory.
- “Audit my custom x/ modules and save findings to /tmp/audit_results.”
- The agent scans the codebase for consensus-critical vulnerabilities and outputs individual markdown files containing findings to the specified directory.
Install
Download the skill as a ZIP:
https://autogineer.com/agent-skills/trailofbits/cosmos-vulnerability-scanner/downloadUnzip it into the cross-client skills folder of your project:
mkdir -p .agents/skills && unzip cosmos-vulnerability-scanner.zip -d .agents/skills
Documentation by Trail of Bits
Cosmos Vulnerability Scanner
Purpose
Scan Cosmos SDK modules and CosmWasm contracts for vulnerabilities that cause chain halts, consensus failures, or fund loss. Spawns parallel scanning agents — each specializing in a vulnerability category — that return findings to the main skill, which then writes them as individual markdown files to an output directory.
Output directory: defaults to .bughunt_cosmos/. If the user specifies a different directory in their prompt, use that instead.
When to Use
Auditing Cosmos SDK modules (custom
x/modules)Reviewing CosmWasm smart contracts
Pre-launch security assessment of Cosmos chains
Investigating chain halt incidents
When NOT to Use
Pure Solidity/EVM audits without Cosmos SDK — use Solidity-specific tools
CometBFT consensus engine internals — this covers SDK modules, not the consensus layer itself
General Go code review with no blockchain context
Cosmos SDK application logic that is not consensus-critical (e.g., CLI commands, REST endpoints)
CosmWasm contract-only audits on chains without custom SDK modules — use the CosmWasm checklist items alone
Essential Principles
Consensus path is king — A bug only matters for chain halt/fund loss if it's on the consensus-critical execution path (BeginBlock, EndBlock, FinalizeBlock, msg_server handlers, AnteHandler). Always verify a finding is reachable from consensus before reporting it.
State divergence = chain halt — Any non-determinism that causes validators to compute different state roots will halt the chain. This is the highest-severity class because it affects all validators simultaneously.
Check the version — Cosmos SDK has breaking changes across major versions (v0.47 removed GetSigners, v0.50 added ABCI 2.0, v0.53 deprecated ValidateBasic). Always check
go.modversions before applying patterns.False positives waste audit time — A map iteration in a CLI command is not a consensus bug. A panic in a query handler does not halt the chain. Verify the execution context before flagging.
Cross-module interactions are where bugs hide — The most severe findings (IBC reentrancy, EVM/Cosmos state desync, authz escalation) involve interactions between modules, not bugs within a single module.
Scanning Workflow
Phase 1: Discovery (synchronous)
Entry: Target codebase path provided by user. Codebase contains Go source (e.g., x/ modules, go.mod) or Rust contracts with cosmwasm_std.
Run a synchronous subagent (Agent tool) with the full contents of DISCOVERY.md as its prompt. The agent must:
Follow the Discovery workflow to explore the target codebase
Return the full CLAUDE.md content (the technical inventory and threat model) in its response
Return a structured summary with exactly these fields:
PLATFORM: pure-cosmos | evm | wasm (pick one; if multiple, comma-separated)
IBC_ENABLED: true | false
SDK_VERSION: <version from go.mod>
IBC_GO_VERSION: <version from go.mod, or "n/a">
CUSTOM_MODULES: <comma-separated list of x/* modules>After the subagent returns, you (the main skill) Write the CLAUDE.md to the target repo root. Save its path and the discovery values — these feed into Phase 2.
Exit: CLAUDE.md written by main skill. PLATFORM, IBC_ENABLED, SDK_VERSION, IBC_GO_VERSION, and CUSTOM_MODULES captured.
Phase 2: Parallel Vulnerability Scan
Spawn scanning agents in a single message for maximum parallelism. Use the Agent Prompt Template below, filling in the reference file for each agent. Subagents only need read access (Grep, Glob, Read) — they return findings in their response and the main skill writes the files.
Always spawn these 3 agents:
| Agent Name | Reference File | Scope |
|---|---|---|
core-scanner | VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md | §1-9: non-determinism, ABCI, signers, validation, handlers, ante security |
state-scanner | STATE_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md | §11-23: bookkeeping, bank, pagination, events, tx replay, governance, arithmetic, encoding, deprecated modules |
advanced-scanner | ADVANCED_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md | §24-27: storage keys, consensus validation, circuit breaker, crypto |
Spawn conditionally (in the same parallel message):
| Agent Name | Condition | Reference File |
|---|---|---|
evm-scanner | PLATFORM includes evm | EVM_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md |
ibc-scanner | IBC_ENABLED is true | IBC_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md |
cosmwasm-scanner | PLATFORM includes wasm | COSMWASM_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md |
Agent Prompt Template
Construct each agent's prompt by replacing {REFERENCE_FILE_PATH} with the full path to the reference file (under {baseDir}/resources/) and {CLAUDE_MD_PATH} with the path to the CLAUDE.md written in Phase 1:
Perform a very thorough security scan of a Cosmos SDK codebase for specific vulnerability patterns.
CONTEXT:
Read {CLAUDE_MD_PATH} for codebase context (SDK version, modules, threat model, key files).
PATTERNS:
Read {REFERENCE_FILE_PATH} — it contains numbered vulnerability patterns. For EACH pattern:
1. Read the detection patterns and "What to Check" items
2. Use Grep and Glob to search the target codebase for each pattern
3. When a match is found, Read surrounding code to verify it's on a consensus-critical path (BeginBlock, EndBlock, FinalizeBlock, msg_server handlers, AnteHandler)
4. Classify severity per the guidelines below
RULES:
- Consensus path only: Only flag code reachable from consensus-critical execution. CLI/query/test code is NOT a finding.
- Check SDK version in go.mod before applying patterns (v0.47 removed GetSigners, v0.50 added ABCI 2.0, v0.53 deprecated ValidateBasic).
- Always use the Grep tool for searches, not bash grep. The reference file contains search patterns — use them directly with the Grep tool.
- Ignore cross-references to other resource files (e.g., links to IBC or COSMWASM patterns). Those patterns are covered by other scanning agents.
- Reject these rationalizations:
- "ValidateBasic catches this" — deprecated and facultative since SDK v0.53
- "Behind governance, so safe" — governance proposals can be malicious
- "IBC counterparty is trusted" — any chain can open a channel
- "Panic can't happen, input is validated" — trace the full call chain
- "Rounding error is only a few tokens" — compounds over time, can be looped
- "EVM precompile handles rollback" — many have incomplete rollback
SEVERITY:
- Critical (fund loss): signer mismatch, broken bookkeeping, AnteHandler bypass, bank keeper misuse, IBC token inflation, EVM/Cosmos desync, Merkle proof forgery, arithmetic overflow
- High (chain halt): non-determinism, ABCI panics, slow ABCI, non-deterministic IBC acks, consensus gaps, CacheContext event leak
- Medium (DoS): unbounded pagination, tx replay, missing validation, governance spam, rate limiting, circuit breaker bypass, storage key collisions
- Low (logic): rounding errors, stub handlers, event override, module ordering
OUTPUT — RETURN FORMAT:
Do NOT write any files. Return ALL findings and the summary in your response.
For each pattern, return one of:
§NUM PATTERN_NAME: Not applicable — [one-line reason]
§NUM PATTERN_NAME: FINDING (followed by the finding block below)
For each finding, include the full content using this template:
FINDING_FILE: {SEVERITY}-s{SECTION_NUM}-{kebab-description}.md
## [SEVERITY] Title
**Location**: `file:line`
**Description**: What the bug is and why it matters
**Vulnerable Code**: [snippet]
**Attack Scenario**: [numbered steps]
**Recommendation**: How to fix
**References**: [links to relevant advisories or building-secure-contracts]
You MUST report on ALL patterns in the reference file — do not skip any.Exit: All scanning agents returned. Each reported on every pattern in their reference file.
Phase 3: Write Findings
After all scanning agents return, write finding files to the output directory (default .bughunt_cosmos/):
Parse each agent's response for
FINDING_FILE:blocksFor each finding, Write the content to
{OUTPUT_DIR}/{filename}using the filename fromFINDING_FILE:Create the output directory first if it doesn't exist
Phase 4: Verify Completeness
After writing all findings, verify every pattern was assessed:
Collect the summary lines (§NUM entries) returned by each agent
Check pattern counts against expected totals:
core-scanner: 8 patterns (§1-9, excluding §8 legacy-only)state-scanner: 13 patterns (§11-23)advanced-scanner: 4 patterns (§24-27)evm-scanner(if spawned): 10 patterns (§1-10)ibc-scanner(if spawned): 16 patterns (§1-16)cosmwasm-scanner(if spawned): 3 patterns (§1-3)
If any pattern is missing from a summary, flag it and re-prompt that agent
List all finding files written to the output directory with a
Globfor*.md
Exit: All patterns accounted for. Finding files listed for the user.
Success Criteria
[ ] Discovery CLAUDE.md written with complete technical inventory and threat model
[ ] All scanning agents completed and reported on every pattern in their reference file
[ ] Pattern counts verified against expected totals (no patterns skipped)
[ ] All findings written to output directory as individual markdown files
[ ] Each finding file includes: severity, location, vulnerable code, attack scenario, recommendation
Resources
Discovery & CLAUDE.md: DISCOVERY.md
Core patterns (§1-9): VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
State & module patterns (§11-23): STATE_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
Advanced patterns (§24-27): ADVANCED_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
IBC vulnerabilities: IBC_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
CosmWasm vulnerabilities: COSMWASM_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
EVM vulnerabilities: EVM_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
Building Secure Contracts:
building-secure-contracts/not-so-smart-contracts/cosmos/Cosmos SDK Docs: https://docs.cosmos.network/
CodeQL for Cosmos SDK: https://github.com/crypto-com/cosmos-sdk-codeql
Files
- ATTRIBUTION.mdAdded by AutoGineer975 B
- CHANGELOG.md12.6 KiB
- LICENSELicence file added by AutoGineer19.7 KiB
- SKILL.md10.7 KiB
- agents/openai.yaml256 B
- assets/trail-of-bits-mark.svg3.0 KiB
- resources/ADVANCED_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md12.5 KiB
- resources/COSMWASM_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md7.5 KiB
- resources/DISCOVERY.md2.9 KiB
- resources/EVM_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md18.0 KiB
- resources/IBC_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md27.5 KiB
- resources/STATE_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md29.2 KiB
- resources/VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md26.4 KiB
CHANGELOG.md
Cosmos Vulnerability Scanner — Update Log
Third Update (2026-03-18) — 8 Missing Bug Classes Added
Summary
Added 8 missing vulnerability classes identified from real-world Cosmos findings catalog. Skill now covers 28 VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS + 16 IBC patterns. No existing patterns were duplicated.
New Patterns in VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
§20 expanded: ROUNDING ERRORS → ARITHMETIC ERRORS. Added wrapping overflow (CWA-2024-002), wrong operand (Osmosis $5M), negative value validation (Barberry vesting poisoning)
§22 expanded: Added CacheContext event leak pattern (Huckleberry — events persist after state rollback, enables bridge spoofing)
§24 expanded: EVMOS/ETHERMINT-SPECIFIC → EVM/COSMOS STATE DESYNC. Full precompile atomicity section with 6 detection patterns from 7 findings ($7M+ real losses)
§25 new: STORAGE KEY DESIGN FLAWS — string concatenation collisions, prefix iterator malleability, redelegation bypass
§26 new: CONSENSUS VALIDATION GAPS — vote extension forgery (SEDA), block timestamp manipulation (CometBFT Tachyon), vesting on blocked addresses
§27 new: CIRCUIT BREAKER AUTHZ BYPASS — x/circuit scope escalation
§28 new: MERKLE PROOF / CRYPTOGRAPHIC VERIFICATION FLAWS — ICS-23 proof forgery (Dragonberry), IAVL RangeProof (Dragonfruit/$566M), ECDSA malleability (Gravity Bridge)
New Pattern in IBC_VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md
§16 new: IBC REENTRANCY / CEI VIOLATIONS — OnTimeoutPacket reentrancy (ASA-2024-007, $150M+ at risk), Terra IBC hooks ($6.4M stolen)
SKILL.md Updates
Updated description, Step 2 checklist, IBC reference count, and Priority Guidelines
Second Update (2026-03-06) — v0.53.x Re-validation + 4 New Patterns
Summary
Re-validated all 9 existing patterns against cosmos-sdk v0.53.x (commit 82fcb05ceb, CometBFT v0.38.21, cosmossdk.io/math v1.5.3, cosmossdk.io/collections v1.3.1). Added 4 new vulnerability patterns discovered during verification. Skill now covers 13 patterns.
Existing Pattern Corrections
Pattern 4.4 (Slow ABCI Methods):
Added
HasABCIEndBlock(returns[]abci.ValidatorUpdate, error) as a second EndBlock interface alongsideHasEndBlocker(returnserror). Used by x/staking. The skill previously only mentioned one variant.Added
HasPrecommitandHasPrepareCheckStateas additional lifecycle hooks (confirmed incore/appmodule/module.go:42-53). These run after EndBlock and are potential DoS surfaces.
Pattern 4.5 (ABCI Panics):
Added note about
ValidateBasic()deprecation (types/tx_msg.go:102: "deprecated and now facultative"). This increases the likelihood of invalid inputs reaching panic-prone code in ABCI methods.
New Patterns Added
4.10 Unbounded Pagination / Query DoS (HIGH):
types/query/pagination.goDefaultLimit=100only applies whenLimit==0. Any non-zero client-supplied limit is accepted without cap.Recent fix
d9d77304fdpartially addressed this inx/auth/txandx/bank/keeper/genesis.go, but core pagination still lacks a hard maximum.
4.11 Event Override / Suppression (MEDIUM):
New
EventManager.OverrideEvents()method added in commit2ddb9ac0a9(types/events.go:63). Replaces all previously emitted events.If called in module code, can silently suppress events from auth, bank, IBC — breaking indexers and relayers.
4.12 Unordered Transaction Replay (HIGH):
SDK v0.53 supports
TxBody.Unordered=truewith timestamp-based replay protection.Configurable via
WithMaxUnorderedTxTimeoutDuration(default 10min) andWithUnorderedTxGasCost(default 2240).x/authPreBlocker handlesRemoveExpiredUnorderedNoncescleanup.Risks: insufficient timeout, nonce flooding DoS, ordering assumptions in app logic.
4.13 Missing msg_server Validation (HIGH):
ValidateBasic()is now deprecated and facultative (types/tx_msg.go:102).Modules migrating away from
ValidateBasicmay forget to add equivalent validation inmsg_server.gohandlers.Authority/signer checks must be in the handler, not just in the removed
ValidateBasic.
Verification Notes
All patterns confirmed against the live codebase:
sdk.Msg = proto.Message(types/tx_msg.go:19) — confirmed0
GetSigners() []AccAddressmethods in x/ — confirmed (onlyLegacyMsginterface defines it)74
cosmos.msg.v1.signerannotations across 22 proto files — confirmedappmodule.HasBeginBlocker,HasEndBlocker,HasPreBlockerin core/appmodule/module.go:65-89 — confirmedmodule.HasABCIEndBlockin types/module/module.go:237-241 — confirmed (different return type!)appmodule.HasPrecommit,HasPrepareCheckStatein core/appmodule/module.go:42-53 — confirmedx/auth/module.goandx/upgrade/module.goimplementPreBlock— confirmedtime.Now()only in test files under x/, not consensus code — confirmedgo funconly in generatedpb.gw.gofiles under x/ — confirmedblockedAddrsmechanism in x/bank/keeper/keeper.go — confirmedQuoTruncate/QuoRoundUponmath.LegacyDecin math/legacy_dec.go — confirmedNo handler.go files for legacy SDK handler pattern under x/ — confirmed
22 modules under x/ (no x/accounts in this version) — confirmed
collectionsframework used extensively (81+ occurrences in keeper.go files) — confirmed
First Update (2026-03-06)
Context
The skill's vulnerability patterns were written for Cosmos SDK ~v0.46 and had not been updated for the breaking changes in v0.47–v0.53. The current cosmos-sdk codebase (v0.53.x, Go 1.23, cosmossdk.io/math v1.5.3) was used as the reference for validation.
1. Mismatched Pattern Summary in SKILL.md
Problem: SKILL.md:98–109 Section 5 listed 9 CosmWasm-specific patterns (Missing Denom Validation, Reentrancy via Submessages, etc.) that did not correspond to the actual 9 Cosmos SDK patterns defined in VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md. The summary and the resource file described completely different vulnerability classes.
Fix: Replaced the summary to accurately reflect the 9 patterns in the resource file.
2. Pattern 4.1 — GetSigners: Rewritten for Proto Annotations
Problem: The pattern described GetSigners() []sdk.AccAddress as a method on message types. This interface was removed in SDK v0.47. In the current codebase:
sdk.Msgis justproto.Message— types/tx_msg.go:19No
func.*GetSigners.*[]sdk.AccAddressmethods exist anywhere inx/Signers are declared via
cosmos.msg.v1.signerproto annotations — e.g. proto/cosmos/gov/v1/tx.proto:60Resolution happens in
x/tx/signing— x/tx/signing/context.go:358 (func (c *Context) GetSigners)
Fix: Rewrote pattern to describe the modern vulnerability: mismatch between cosmos.msg.v1.signer proto annotation and the field actually used for authorization in msg_server.go. Added detection patterns for wrong field annotation and proto vs handler mismatch.
3. Pattern 4.2 — Non-Determinism: Math Type References Updated
Problem: Pattern referenced sdk.Int, sdk.Dec, sdk.NewDec() which are removed/deprecated. The codebase uses:
math.Int/math.NewInt()fromcosmossdk.io/math— 186+ occurrences acrossx/modulesmath.LegacyDec/math.LegacyNewDec()— 83+ occurrences acrossx/modulesZero occurrences of
sdk.NewInt()orsdk.NewDec()inx/Go source (only in legacy tests via type aliases)
Fix: Updated all type references: sdk.Int → math.Int, sdk.Dec → math.LegacyDec.
4. Pattern 4.3 — Message Priority: Updated for ABCI 2.0
Problem: Pattern only discussed CheckTx priority. SDK v0.50 introduced ABCI 2.0 with PrepareProposal and ProcessProposal (267 occurrences in baseapp/), which give the block proposer direct control over transaction ordering.
Fix: Added PrepareProposal/ProcessProposal as the primary mechanism for transaction priority. Updated code examples.
Evidence: baseapp/abci.go — FinalizeBlock, PrepareProposal, ProcessProposal are the ABCI 2.0 entry points. DeliverTx still exists internally but is called within FinalizeBlock.
5. Pattern 4.4 — Slow ABCI Methods: Updated Interfaces
Problem: Pattern used standalone BeginBlocker(ctx sdk.Context, k keeper.Keeper) function signatures. In SDK v0.50+, modules implement interfaces:
appmodule.HasBeginBlocker— methodBeginBlock(context.Context) errorappmodule.HasEndBlocker— methodEndBlock(context.Context) errorModule manager calls these via types/module/module.go:776–825
PreBlockeris new (40 occurrences in codebase)
Evidence:
x/mint/module.go: _ appmodule.HasBeginBlocker = AppModule{}
x/staking/module.go: _ appmodule.HasBeginBlocker = AppModule{}
x/gov/module.go: _ appmodule.HasEndBlocker = AppModule{}
x/feegrant/module.go: _ appmodule.HasEndBlocker = AppModule{}Fix: Updated all code examples to use func (am AppModule) BeginBlock(ctx context.Context) error and EndBlock signatures. Added PreBlock as a new attack surface. Updated checklist.
6. Pattern 4.5 — ABCI Panics: Updated Types and Deprecated Params
Problem: Two sub-issues:
Math types: Pattern used
sdk.NewDec(),sdk.NewInt(). Current SDK usesmath.NewInt(),math.LegacyNewDecFromStr(), and panic-proneMust*variants likemath.LegacyMustNewDecFromStr().SetParamSet: Pattern described
SetParamSetpanics. The entirex/paramsmodule is deprecated:x/params/module.go:61:
"Deprecated: the params module is deprecated and will be removed in the next Cosmos SDK major release."x/params/keeper/keeper.go:15: keeper also deprecated
Modern modules store params directly in keeper state via
collections
Fix: Updated math type references. Replaced SetParamSet panic pattern with direct keeper param storage pattern. Added Must* variant warning as a new detection pattern.
7. Pattern 4.7 — Rounding Errors: Updated Types
Problem: All references used sdk.Dec, sdk.NewDec(), sdk.ZeroDec(). These are gone.
Evidence: QuoTruncate and QuoRoundUp still exist on math.LegacyDec — math/legacy_dec.go (5 occurrences of QuoTruncate/QuoCeil in codebase). The vulnerability pattern itself is still valid.
Fix: Updated all type references to math.LegacyDec, math.LegacyNewDec(), math.LegacyZeroDec().
8. Pattern 4.8 — Unregistered Handler: Marked Legacy Only
Problem: Pattern described NewHandler / sdk.Handler switch-case pattern. This is completely gone from the SDK:
Zero
handler.gofiles exist underx/Zero matches for
NewHandlerorsdk.Handlerin Go files underx/All 16 modules use
msg_server.gowith protobuf service registration:x/auth/keeper/msg_server.go x/bank/keeper/msg_server.go x/gov/keeper/msg_server.go x/staking/keeper/msg_server.go ... (16 total)
Fix: Marked pattern as legacy-only (pre-v0.47). Added modern equivalent: stub/no-op msg_server.go implementations where a proto RPC method is technically implemented but does nothing. The Go compiler catches missing methods (unlike the old switch-case), but stub implementations are still a risk.
9. Scanning Workflow: Updated Throughout
Changes in SKILL.md Section 6:
| Old | New |
|---|---|
handler.go — Message handlers (legacy) | keeper/msg_server.go — Message handlers (protobuf service) |
abci.go — BeginBlocker/EndBlocker | module.go — appmodule interface implementations |
types/msgs.go, GetSigners() | proto/.../tx.proto with cosmos.msg.v1.signer annotations |
DeliverTx | FinalizeBlock |
CheckTx priority only | PrepareProposal / ProcessProposal / CheckTx |
sdk.Dec / sdk.Int | math.LegacyDec / math.Int |
Quick Reference Checklist updated similarly — signer check now references proto annotations, ABCI check includes PreBlock, testing uses FinalizeBlock.
Files Modified
SKILL.md — Full rewrite of sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11
resources/VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md — All 9 patterns updated
Validation Method
Each pattern was validated against the cosmos-sdk codebase against cosmos-sdk (v0.53.x, commit 82fcb05ceb) using grep/glob searches to confirm:
Which interfaces/types still exist
Which have been removed or deprecated
What replaced them
Occurrence counts to verify patterns are real
Requirements and compatibility
Works with: Claude Code, Claude apps, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Kiro, OpenCode, Goose, Amp, Roo Code, JetBrains Junie, Factory Droid, Devin (ex-Windsurf), Mistral Vibe, OpenHands, Letta
“Works with” means the tool reads the open Agent Skills format; a skill written for one tool may use features others lack.
Security
No issues found by our static scan· No issues found
A static scan is not a guarantee. Skills are third-party content: review a skill before you let an agent use it.
Attribution and licence
- Published by
- Trail of Bits
- Publisher
- Trail of Bits (Official)
- Source
- trailofbits/skills · plugins/building-secure-contracts/skills/cosmos-vulnerability-scanner · commit e4dd0bb
- Licence
- Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (redistribution allowed)
- LICENSE (added by AutoGineer from LICENSE)
- ATTRIBUTION.md (written by AutoGineer)
- Synced
AutoGineer is not affiliated with or endorsed by Trail of Bits or Trail of Bits.
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