Golang Security
Samuel BertheCommunityCreated by samberDistributed by Samuel Berthe
- Skill
- Guidelines
- Security
- MIT
- Medium risk
AutoGineer summary
Written by AutoGineer from the skill’s own files, not by the author
The golang-security skill provides a structured approach to identifying and preventing vulnerabilities in Go applications. It acts as a senior security engineer persona, offering guidance on secure coding, threat modeling using STRIDE/DREAD, and deep-dive auditing techniques. The skill covers critical domains including injection prevention, cryptography, web security, and concurrency safety, while providing a clear methodology for tracing data flows and assessing trust boundaries.
What it does
- Provides a structured security review checklist for Go applications.
- Offers guidance on threat modeling using STRIDE and DREAD scoring.
- Supports full codebase security audits through parallelized sub-agent orchestration.
- Includes best practices for cryptography, input validation, and memory safety.
- Integrates with standard Go security tools like gosec and govulncheck.
- Defines clear severity levels for prioritizing security findings.
When to use it
- During code reviews to identify potential security vulnerabilities in PRs.
- When performing a full security audit of a Go codebase.
- When writing new Go code that handles sensitive data, authentication, or network I/O.
- When assessing the security posture of cryptographic implementations or file system operations.
Advantages
- Promotes a defense-in-depth security architecture.
- Reduces the risk of common vulnerabilities like SQL injection and path traversal.
- Standardizes security reporting with DREAD scoring.
- Facilitates isolated, reviewable fixes for identified security issues.
- Encourages proactive security thinking at trust boundaries.
Usage examples
- “Perform a security audit on this repository.”
- The agent will initiate a multi-agent scan across five vulnerability domains, aggregate findings, score them by severity, and provide a prioritized remediation plan.
- “Review this PR for potential SQL injection vulnerabilities.”
- The agent will trace data flows from user input to database queries, checking for proper parameterization and upstream validation.
- “How should I handle file paths securely in Go?”
- The agent will provide guidance on using os.Root or filepath.IsLocal to prevent path traversal, along with code examples.
Install
Download the skill as a ZIP:
https://autogineer.com/agent-skills/samber/golang-security/downloadUnzip it into the cross-client skills folder of your project:
mkdir -p .agents/skills && unzip golang-security.zip -d .agents/skills
Documentation by samber
Persona: You are a senior Go security engineer. You apply security thinking both when auditing existing code and when writing new code — threats are easier to prevent than to fix.
Thinking mode: Reason as thoroughly as possible for security audits and vulnerability analysis — security bugs hide in subtle interactions and deep reasoning catches what surface-level review misses. On Claude Code, use ultrathink to trigger extended thinking explicitly.
Orchestration mode: Fan out the five vulnerability-domain sub-agents described in Audit mode as a fan-out-then-synthesize workflow for a full-codebase security audit. Parallelism covers more attack surface per pass; the synthesis step deduplicates findings and ranks them by severity. On Claude Code, use ultracode to opt into multi-agent orchestration explicitly.
Modes:
Review mode — reviewing a PR for security issues. Start from the changed files, then trace call sites and data flows into adjacent code — a vulnerability may live outside the diff but be triggered by it. Sequential.
Audit mode — full codebase security scan. Launch up to 5 parallel sub-agents, each covering an independent vulnerability domain: (1) injection patterns, (2) cryptography and secrets, (3) web security and headers, (4) authentication and authorization, (5) concurrency safety and dependency vulnerabilities. Aggregate findings, score with DREAD, and report by severity. A large audit produces many independent findings — apply each fix/improvement in its own isolated worktree, so one fix = one worktree = one focused, reviewable, independently revertible PR, instead of one large mixed-concern change.
Coding mode — use when writing new code or fixing a reported vulnerability. Follow the skill's sequential guidance. Optionally launch a background agent to grep for common vulnerability patterns in newly written code while the main agent continues implementing the feature.
Dependencies:
govulncheck:
go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest
Go Security
Overview
Security in Go follows the principle of defense in depth: protect at multiple layers, validate all inputs, use secure defaults, and leverage the standard library's security-aware design. Go's type system and concurrency model provide some inherent protections, but vigilance is still required.
Security Thinking Model
Before writing or reviewing code, ask three questions:
What are the trust boundaries? — Where does untrusted data enter the system? (HTTP requests, file uploads, environment variables, database rows written by other services)
What can an attacker control? — Which inputs flow into sensitive operations? (SQL queries, shell commands, HTML output, file paths, cryptographic operations)
What is the blast radius? — If this defense fails, what's the worst outcome? (Data leak, RCE, privilege escalation, denial of service)
Severity Levels
| Level | DREAD | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | 8-10 | RCE, full data breach, credential theft — fix immediately |
| High | 6-7.9 | Auth bypass, significant data exposure, broken crypto — fix in current sprint |
| Medium | 4-5.9 | Limited exposure, session issues, defense weakening — fix in next sprint |
| Low | 1-3.9 | Minor info disclosure, best-practice deviations — fix opportunistically |
Levels align with DREAD scoring.
Research Before Reporting
Before flagging a security issue, trace the full data flow through the codebase — don't assess a code snippet in isolation.
Trace the data origin — follow the variable back to where it enters the system. Is it user input, a hardcoded constant, or an internal-only value?
Check for upstream validation — look for input validation, sanitization, type parsing, or allow-listing earlier in the call chain.
Examine the trust boundary — if the data never crosses a trust boundary (e.g., internal service-to-service with mTLS), the risk profile is different.
Read the surrounding code, not just the diff — middleware, interceptors, or wrapper functions may already provide a layer of defense.
Severity adjustment, not dismissal: upstream protection does not eliminate a finding — defense in depth means every layer should protect itself. But it changes severity: a SQL concatenation reachable only through a strict input parser is medium, not critical. Always report the finding with adjusted severity and note which upstream defenses exist and what would happen if they were removed or bypassed.
When downgrading or skipping a finding: add a brief inline comment (e.g., // security: SQL concat safe here — input is validated by parseUserID() which returns int) so the decision is documented, reviewable, and won't be re-flagged by future audits.
Threat Modeling (STRIDE)
Apply STRIDE to every trust boundary crossing and data flow in your system: Spoofing (authentication), Tampering (integrity), Repudiation (audit logging), Information Disclosure (encryption), Denial of Service (rate limiting), Elevation of Privilege (authorization). Score each threat using DREAD (Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users, Discoverability) to prioritize remediation — Critical (8-10) demands immediate action.
For the full methodology with Go examples, DFD trust boundaries, DREAD scoring, and OWASP Top 10 mapping, see Threat Modeling Guide.
Quick Reference
| Severity | Vulnerability | Defense | Standard Library Solution |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | SQL Injection | Parameterized queries separate data from code | database/sql with ? placeholders |
| Critical | Command Injection | Pass args separately, never via shell concatenation | exec.Command with separate args |
| High | XSS | Auto-escaping renders user data as text, not HTML/JS | html/template, text/template |
| High | Path Traversal | Scope untrusted file access to an allowed root | Go 1.24+: use os.Root. Pre-Go 1.24: use filepath.IsLocal + filepath.Rel + separator-aware checks; never rely on filepath.Clean + strings.HasPrefix alone. |
| Medium | Timing Attacks | Constant-time comparison avoids byte-by-byte leaks | crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare |
| High | Crypto Issues | Use vetted algorithms; never roll your own | crypto/aes, crypto/rand |
| Medium | HTTP Security | TLS + security headers prevent downgrade attacks | net/http, configure TLSConfig |
| Low | Missing Headers | HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options prevent browser attacks | Security headers middleware |
| Medium | Rate Limiting | Rate limits prevent brute-force and resource exhaustion | golang.org/x/time/rate, server timeouts |
| High | Race Conditions | Protect shared state to prevent data corruption | sync.Mutex, channels, avoid shared state |
Detailed Categories
For complete examples, code snippets, and CWE mappings, see:
Cryptography — Algorithms, key derivation, TLS configuration.
Injection Vulnerabilities — SQL, command, template injection, XSS, SSRF.
Filesystem Security — Path traversal, zip bombs, file permissions, symlinks.
Network/Web Security — SSRF, open redirects, HTTP headers, timing attacks, session fixation.
Cookie Security — Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite flags.
Third-Party Data Leaks — Analytics privacy risks, GDPR/CCPA compliance.
Memory Safety — Integer overflow, memory aliasing,
unsafeusage.Secrets Management — Hardcoded credentials, env vars, secret managers.
Logging Security — PII in logs, log injection, sanitization.
Threat Modeling Guide — STRIDE, DREAD scoring, trust boundaries, OWASP Top 10.
Security Architecture — Defense-in-depth, Zero Trust, auth patterns, rate limiting, anti-patterns.
Code Review Checklist
For the full security review checklist organized by domain (input handling, database, crypto, web, auth, errors, dependencies, concurrency), see Security Review Checklist — a comprehensive checklist for code review with coverage of all major vulnerability categories.
Tooling & Verification
Static Analysis & Linting
Security-relevant linters: bodyclose, sqlclosecheck, nilerr, errcheck, govet, staticcheck. See the samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-lint skill for configuration and usage.
For deeper security-specific analysis:
# Go security checker (SAST)
go get -tool github.com/securego/gosec/v2/cmd/gosec@latest
go tool gosec ./...
# Vulnerability scanner — see golang-dependency-management for full govulncheck usage
go get -tool golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest
go tool govulncheck ./...To check the known CVEs of a specific module or version without scanning the whole tree (e.g. when vetting a dependency on pkg.go.dev), → See samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-pkg-go-dev skill.
Security Testing
# Race detector
go test -race ./...
# Fuzz testing
go test -fuzz=FuzzCommon Mistakes
| Severity | Mistake | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| High | math/rand for tokens | Output is predictable — attacker can reproduce the sequence. Use crypto/rand |
| Critical | SQL string concatenation | Attacker can modify query logic. Parameterized queries keep data and code separate |
| Critical | exec.Command("bash -c") | Shell interprets metacharacters (;, |, `). Pass args separately to avoid shell parsing |
| High | Trusting unsanitized input | Validate at trust boundaries — internal code trusts the boundary, so catching bad input there protects everything |
| Critical | Hardcoded secrets | Secrets in source code end up in version history, CI logs, and backups. Use env vars or secret managers |
| Medium | Comparing secrets with == | == short-circuits on first differing byte, leaking timing info. Use crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare |
| Medium | Returning detailed errors | Stack traces and DB errors help attackers map your system. Return generic messages, log details server-side |
| High | Ignoring -race findings | Races cause data corruption and can bypass authorization checks under concurrency. Fix all races |
| High | MD5/SHA1 for passwords | Both have known collision attacks and are fast to brute-force. Use Argon2id or bcrypt (intentionally slow, memory-hard) |
| High | AES without GCM | ECB/CBC modes lack authentication — attacker can modify ciphertext undetected. GCM provides encrypt+authenticate |
| Medium | Binding to 0.0.0.0 | Exposes service to all network interfaces. Bind to specific interface to limit attack surface |
Security Anti-Patterns
| Severity | Anti-Pattern | Why It Fails | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| High | Security through obscurity | Hidden URLs are discoverable via fuzzing, logs, or source | Authentication + authorization on all endpoints |
| High | Trusting client headers | X-Forwarded-For, X-Is-Admin are trivially forged | Server-side identity verification |
| High | Client-side authorization | JavaScript checks are bypassed by any HTTP client | Server-side permission checks on every handler |
| High | Shared secrets across envs | Staging breach compromises production | Per-environment secrets via secret manager |
| Critical | Ignoring crypto errors | _, _ = encrypt(data) silently proceeds unencrypted | Always check errors — fail closed, never open |
| Critical | Rolling your own crypto | Custom encryption hasn't been analyzed by cryptographers | Use crypto/aes GCM, golang.org/x/crypto/argon2 |
See Security Architecture for detailed anti-patterns with Go code examples.
Cross-References
See samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-database, samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-safety, samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-observability, samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-continuous-integration skills.
→ See
samber/cc-skills-golang@golang-continuous-integrationskill for automated AI-driven code review in CI using these guidelines
Additional Resources
Files
- ATTRIBUTION.mdAdded by AutoGineer902 B
- LICENSELicence file added by AutoGineer1.0 KiB
- SKILL.md14.0 KiB
- evals/evals.json49.0 KiB
- references/architecture.md10.4 KiB
- references/checklist.md4.0 KiB
- references/cookies.md4.8 KiB
- references/cryptography.md11.0 KiB
- references/filesystem.md6.8 KiB
- references/injection.md7.3 KiB
- references/logging.md3.9 KiB
- references/memory-safety.md5.1 KiB
- references/network.md6.3 KiB
- references/secrets.md4.8 KiB
- references/third-party.md4.9 KiB
- references/threat-modeling.md8.4 KiB
references/checklist.md
Security Review Checklist
Severity: Critical, High, Medium, Low
Input Handling
[ ] High All user input validated at system boundaries — internal code trusts the boundary
[ ] High Input uses allowlists, not blocklists — blocklists always miss something
[ ] High Sanitized on output (HTML, SQL, shell) — context-dependent escaping
[ ] Medium Length limits enforced — prevents buffer abuse and DoS
Database
[ ] Critical SQL queries use parameterized placeholders — keeps data and code separate
[ ] Critical ORM/library protects against SQL injection
[ ] Critical No direct SQL construction with user input
Code Execution
[ ] Critical No
exec.Command()with shell arguments — metacharacters enable injection[ ] Critical No eval, reflection on untrusted input — arbitrary code execution risk
[ ] Critical No deserialization of untrusted data — can trigger arbitrary constructors
Cryptography
[ ] High Uses
crypto/randfor security-critical randomness —math/randis predictable[ ] High Uses vetted algorithms (AES-GCM, Argon2id, bcrypt) — custom crypto hasn't been analyzed
[ ] Critical Proper key management — hardcoded secrets leak through VCS, logs, and backups
[ ] Medium HMAC for message authentication — prevents tampering
Web Security
[ ] High TLS 1.2+ configured correctly — older versions have known attacks
[ ] Medium Security headers set (HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options) — prevents framing, sniffing, downgrade
[ ] Medium CSRF protection for state-changing requests — prevents cross-origin action forgery
[ ] Medium Open redirects validated — attackers use your domain to redirect to phishing
[ ] High XSS protected via
html/templateauto-escaping
Authentication/Authorization
[ ] High Passwords hashed with Argon2id (preferred) or bcrypt — intentionally slow to resist brute-force
[ ] High Sessions use secure tokens from
crypto/rand[ ] High Authorization checked on every privileged action — not just at login
[ ] High JWT tokens validated (algorithm, claims, expiry) — unsigned JWTs bypass auth
[ ] High Expired/invalid sessions invalidated server-side
Error Handling
[ ] Medium Generic error messages to users — detailed errors help attackers map your system
[ ] Medium Detailed errors logged server-side only
[ ] Medium Stack traces not leaked to clients
[ ] Medium Database errors not exposed — reveals schema and query structure
Dependency Security
[ ] High
govulncheckpasses — catches known CVEs in your dependency tree[ ] High Dependencies updated regularly — unpatched deps are the #1 attack vector
[ ] Medium Third-party libraries reviewed for security posture
HTTP Security Headers
[ ] Medium
Content-Security-Policyset — restricts resource sources to prevent XSS[ ] Medium
X-Frame-Options: DENY— prevents clickjacking via iframe embedding[ ] Medium
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff— prevents MIME-type sniffing attacks[ ] Medium
Strict-Transport-SecuritywithincludeSubDomains— forces HTTPS, prevents downgrade[ ] Low
Referrer-Policyset — controls referrer header leakage to external sites[ ] Low
Permissions-Policyset — restricts browser features (camera, mic, geolocation)
Rate Limiting & DoS Prevention
[ ] Medium HTTP server has
ReadTimeout,WriteTimeout,IdleTimeout— prevents Slowloris[ ] Medium Request body size limited with
http.MaxBytesReader— prevents memory exhaustion[ ] Medium Rate limiting on authentication endpoints — prevents brute-force and credential stuffing
[ ] Medium Rate limiting on expensive operations (search, export, file upload)
Concurrency
[ ] High
-racedetector passes — races cause data corruption and can bypass auth checks[ ] High Shared state properly synchronized
[ ] High No data races on global variables
Requirements and compatibility
Written for: Claude Code, OpenAI Codex
Works with: Claude Code, Claude apps, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Kiro, OpenCode, Goose, Amp, Roo Code, JetBrains Junie, Factory Droid, Devin (ex-Windsurf), Mistral Vibe, OpenHands, Letta
“Works with” means the tool reads the open Agent Skills format; a skill written for one tool may use features others lack.
Needs: Declares allowed tools, Claude Code frontmatter
The author says: Designed for Claude Code, Codex or similar harness, and for projects using Golang.
Security
What our scanner noticed· Medium risk
- References to credential files
A static scan is not a guarantee. Skills are third-party content: review a skill before you let an agent use it.
Attribution and licence
- Created by
- samber
- Publisher
- Samuel Berthe (Community)
- Distributed by
- Samuel Berthe
- Source
- samber/cc-skills-golang · skills/golang-security · commit bb1d43d
- Licence
- MIT License (redistribution allowed)
- LICENSE (added by AutoGineer from LICENSE)
- ATTRIBUTION.md (written by AutoGineer)
- Synced
AutoGineer is not affiliated with or endorsed by samber or Samuel Berthe.
Download ZIP
The ZIP holds the skill’s files, its licence files and an ATTRIBUTION.md. Download golang-security.zip