Higgsfield Websites

Security

Threat model

When to Load

Only when the site has auth, user data, or storage bindings. Load when ANY of these conditions is true:

• references/auth.md is loaded for this build

• app.manifest.json contains "db": true, "r2": true, or "kv": true

• The website has createServerFn calls that write or mutate data

• The website has /api/user, __auth, or session-related routes

Skip for static landing pages, portfolios, brochure sites, and websites with no user-submitted data.

Detection

// Check app.manifest.json
const manifest = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync('app.manifest.json', 'utf-8'));
const hasStorage = manifest.db || manifest.r2 || manifest.kv;

// Check for auth routes
// Grep for: /api/user, __auth, createServerFn with .bind() or INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE

Trust Boundaries

Map these boundaries for every website with data. Each boundary is a point where input trust level changes.

Browser → Worker (untrusted → trusted)

All data crossing this boundary is attacker-controlled:

• URL path and query parameters

• Request headers (including cookies, but cookies are tamper-resistant if HttpOnly)

• Form submissions and JSON request bodies

• File uploads

Every createServerFn, page loader, and API route handler sits on this boundary. Inputs must be validated.

Worker → D1/R2/KV (trusted → trusted)

Both run in the same Cloudflare environment. The channel is trusted, but SQL injection is still possible if queries use string concatenation instead of parameterized .bind(). R2 key construction from user input can cause path traversal.

Worker → External API (trusted → semi-trusted)

Outbound fetch() from server functions. Risks:

• SSRF if the URL comes from user input

• Response injection if the external API is compromised

• Secret leakage if auth headers are sent to the wrong host

Validate outbound URLs. Validate response shapes before trusting them.

Worker → fnf.internal (trusted → trusted)

The platform's internal API. Auth is injected by the platform -- website code does not handle fnf tokens. Still validate response shapes; a malformed response should not crash the website or expose internal state.

Auth Routes → Public Routes (access control boundary)

Routes that require authentication vs. routes that are public. Map which is which. Every protected route must verify session before rendering or returning data. A missing check on one route is the most common access control bug.

Entry Point Inventory

Enumerate every entry point before analyzing threats. Build this list by scanning the codebase.

Page Routes (app/src/routes/**)

For each route file, record:

• Path pattern (e.g., /dashboard, /settings/$userId)

• Auth required: yes/no

• Data loaded: what server functions or loaders run

• Writable: does the page submit forms or call mutation server functions

Server Functions (createServerFn)

For each server function, record:

• Name and location

• HTTP method (GET/POST)

• Input shape (what data it accepts from the client)

• Data accessed (which D1 tables, R2 buckets, KV namespaces)

• Auth check: present/absent

API Routes (app/src/routes/api/**)

For each API route, record:

• Path and HTTP methods handled

• Auth check: present/absent

• Input sources (body, query params, path params)

• Response data (what it returns, any sensitive fields)

File Upload Surfaces

• R2 write operations (where file data comes from, size limits, type validation)

• Form file inputs (which pages accept file uploads)

• Filename/key construction (is user input used in R2 keys?)

Webhook/Callback Endpoints

• External services that call back into the website (payment processors, OAuth providers, etc.)

• Signature verification on incoming webhooks

• Idempotency handling (replayed webhooks should not duplicate side effects)

Asset Classification

Attacker Model

Anonymous Internet User

Capabilities:

• Reach all public routes and API endpoints

• Submit arbitrary form data, JSON bodies, file uploads

• Craft malicious URLs (XSS payloads in query params, path traversal)

• Replay and tamper with requests (no CSRF token = no protection on state changes)

• Enumerate routes and server functions by observing client JavaScript

Goals: Access other users' data, inject content, abuse server resources, exfiltrate secrets.

Authenticated User

Capabilities:

• Everything anonymous users can do, plus valid session

• Access own data and attempt to access other users' data (IDOR)

• Attempt privilege escalation (modify role claims, access admin routes)

• Abuse rate-unlimited endpoints (spam, resource exhaustion)

Goals: Read/modify other users' data, escalate to admin, abuse platform resources.

What Attackers CANNOT Do

These are platform guarantees -- do not model threats against them:

• Access Worker internals at runtime. V8 isolates provide memory isolation between requests and between Workers. An attacker cannot read another request's memory.

• Intercept Worker-to-binding traffic. D1, R2, KV communication happens in-process or over Cloudflare's internal network. There is no network path for an attacker to intercept.

• Read Cloudflare Secrets. Secrets are injected at deploy time into the Worker's env object. They are not in the code, not in the git repo, and not accessible via any API the attacker can reach.

• Bypass Cloudflare edge security. HTTPS termination, DDoS mitigation, and bot management happen before traffic reaches the Worker.

Common Threat Patterns for the Stack

1. IDOR via Predictable Resource IDs

Attack: User changes /api/notes/123 to /api/notes/124 to read another user's note. Sequential integer IDs are trivially enumerable.

Mitigation: Always filter by authenticated user ID in D1 queries.

// VULNERABLE
db.prepare('SELECT * FROM notes WHERE id = ?').bind(noteId).first();

// SAFE
db.prepare('SELECT * FROM notes WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?').bind(noteId, session.userId).first();

Using UUIDs as IDs adds defense-in-depth but does NOT replace access control checks.

2. Server Function Input Manipulation

Attack: Client sends unexpected shape to createServerFn -- extra fields, wrong types, oversized strings, negative numbers, SQL fragments.

Mitigation: Validate every input field before processing.

import { z } from 'zod';

const CreateNoteSchema = z.object({
  title: z.string().min(1).max(200),
  body: z.string().max(10000),
});

const createNote = createServerFn({ method: 'POST' })
  .validator((data: unknown) => CreateNoteSchema.parse(data))
  .handler(async ({ data, request }) => {
    const session = await getSession(request);
    if (!session) throw new Error('Unauthorized');
    await db.prepare('INSERT INTO notes (id, user_id, title, body) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)')
      .bind(crypto.randomUUID(), session.userId, data.title, data.body).run();
  });

3. Test Data Contamination (Live D1)

Attack: There is one deploy and one D1 database — the live one. Test data created while building or debugging lands in production data, and destructive "test" queries modify real user data.

Mitigation:

• Never use real user data for testing

• If you must seed test rows, tag them explicitly (e.g. an is_test column or a reserved prefix) and clean them up

• Get explicit user approval before destructive migrations, UPDATEs, or backfills

4. Privilege Escalation via Client State

Attack: Client stores role: 'admin' in localStorage or sends { role: 'admin' } in a server function call. Server trusts the client-provided role.

Mitigation: Never trust client-sent roles, permissions, or user IDs for authorization decisions.

// VULNERABLE -- role from client
const { role } = data;
if (role === 'admin') return getAdminData();

// SAFE -- role from server session
const session = await getSession(request);
const user = await db.prepare('SELECT role FROM users WHERE id = ?').bind(session.userId).first();
if (user?.role === 'admin') return getAdminData();

5. SSRF via Server Function

Attack: Server function accepts a URL from the client and fetches it. Attacker provides http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ (cloud metadata), http://localhost:8787/internal-api, or internal network addresses.

Mitigation:

const ALLOWED_HOSTS = new Set(['api.example.com', 'cdn.example.com']);

function validateUrl(input: string): URL {
  const url = new URL(input);
  if (!['https:'].includes(url.protocol)) throw new Error('HTTPS only');
  if (!ALLOWED_HOSTS.has(url.hostname)) throw new Error('Host not allowed');
  // Block private IPs
  if (/^(127\.|10\.|192\.168\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\.|169\.254\.)/.test(url.hostname)) {
    throw new Error('Private IP blocked');
  }
  return url;
}

6. Webhook Replay / Forgery

Attack: Attacker sends forged webhook payloads to callback endpoints, or replays legitimate webhooks to duplicate side effects (double payment credits, duplicate notifications).

Mitigation:

• Verify webhook signatures using crypto.subtle.timingSafeEqual() (see worker-hardening rule 4)

• Track processed webhook IDs in D1/KV to enforce idempotency

• Reject webhooks with timestamps older than 5 minutes

Output

Present threat model findings inline in chat as a summary table. Do not write to a file.

## Threat Model Summary

| # | Threat | Severity | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation Status |
|---|--------|----------|------------|--------|-------------------|
| 1 | IDOR on /api/notes/:id | High | High | User data leak | MITIGATED -- queries filter by user_id |
| 2 | Server function input manipulation | Medium | High | Data corruption | OPEN -- no validation on createNote |
| 3 | SSRF via /api/proxy | High | Medium | Internal network access | MITIGATED -- allowlist in place |
| 4 | Privilege escalation | Critical | Low | Full admin access | MITIGATED -- role derived from DB |
| 5 | Webhook replay | Medium | Medium | Duplicate transactions | OPEN -- no idempotency check |

**Open items: 2 | Mitigated: 3 | Total attack surface: 5 entry points, 3 server functions, 1 webhook**

Severity scale: Critical > High > Medium > Low. Base severity on worst-case impact. Likelihood accounts for how easy the attack is to execute (High = no special tools needed, just a browser).

Pitfalls

1. Don't threat-model brochure sites. A static landing page with no auth, no database, and no user input has no meaningful attack surface beyond XSS (covered by web-audit). Skip threat modeling for these.

2. Don't assume D1 is multi-tenant by default. Each website gets its own D1 database backing its single live deploy. Cross-tenant risk exists only between the website's own users sharing that one database, not between different websites.

3. Don't model attacks against Cloudflare infrastructure. V8 isolate escapes, edge network compromises, and Cloudflare-internal attacks are outside the website's threat model. The platform is the trust boundary.

4. Don't confuse authentication with authorization. A user being logged in (authenticated) does not mean they can access any resource (authorized). IDOR is an authorization bug, not an authentication bug. Check both.

5. Don't skip the entry point inventory. Jumping straight to threat patterns without enumerating entry points misses the routes and server functions unique to the website. The inventory is the foundation; patterns are applied against it.

Worker hardening

When to Load

Every website build. These are hard constraints of the Cloudflare Workers runtime, not optional best practices. Violating them causes data leaks, request cross-contamination, or runtime crashes. Load unconditionally alongside the build skill.

Hard Rules

1. No Global Mutable State

Module-level variables persist across requests in the same V8 isolate. A let at module scope is shared by every concurrent request hitting that isolate.

// BAD -- leaks between requests
let currentUser: User | null = null;

export default {
  async fetch(request: Request) {
    currentUser = await getUser(request); // overwrites for ALL concurrent requests
    return handleRequest();
  }
};

// GOOD -- request-scoped data flows through params
export default {
  async fetch(request: Request, env: Env, ctx: ExecutionContext) {
    const user = await getUser(request);
    return handleRequest(user, env);
  }
};

Module-level const for static config (strings, frozen objects) is fine. Any let or mutable object at module scope is a bug. React context resets per SSR render and is safe for per-request data.

2. Cryptographic Randomness Only

Math.random() is not a CSPRNG. In Workers, its output may be predictable across requests in the same isolate.

// BAD
const sessionId = `sess_${Math.random().toString(36)}`;

// GOOD
const sessionId = crypto.randomUUID();

// GOOD -- for raw bytes (tokens, nonces)
const token = new Uint8Array(32);
crypto.getRandomValues(token);

Math.random() is acceptable only in client-side UI code (animations, layout jitter). Flag any server-side usage.

3. No Hardcoded Secrets

Never put API keys, tokens, passwords, or connection strings in source code or wrangler.jsonc.

// BAD
const API_KEY = "sk-proj-abc123...";

// GOOD -- store it with `higgsfield website secrets set <website_id> --name … --value …`
// Access SERVER-SIDE via bindings().API_KEY (add it to AppEnv in bindings.server.ts)

In the Supercomputer builder, the platform injects secrets via the outbound Worker. Website code accesses them through env bindings at runtime. Secrets never appear in the git repo.

4. Timing-Safe Secret Comparison

String === leaks secret length via timing side-channels. Use crypto.subtle.timingSafeEqual() for any secret, token, or API key comparison.

async function safeCompare(a: string, b: string): Promise<boolean> {
  const encoder = new TextEncoder();
  const aBuf = encoder.encode(a);
  const bBuf = encoder.encode(b);
  if (aBuf.byteLength !== bBuf.byteLength) return false;
  return crypto.subtle.timingSafeEqual(aBuf, bBuf);
}

// Usage in a webhook handler
const signature = request.headers.get('X-Webhook-Signature') ?? '';
if (!(await safeCompare(signature, env.WEBHOOK_SECRET))) {
  return new Response('Forbidden', { status: 403 });
}

5. Stream Large Payloads

Workers have a 128 MB memory limit. await response.text() or await response.json() buffers the entire body into memory. On unbounded external responses this causes OOM crashes.

// BAD -- buffers entire response
const data = await fetch(externalUrl).then(r => r.text());

// GOOD -- stream through
const upstream = await fetch(externalUrl);
return new Response(upstream.body, {
  headers: { 'Content-Type': upstream.headers.get('Content-Type') ?? 'application/octet-stream' },
});

For JSON processing of large payloads, use streaming JSON parsers or paginate the upstream API. Only call .json() when you control the response size (e.g., your own D1 queries).

6. Handle Every Promise

Every Promise must be awaited, returned, or passed to ctx.waitUntil(). Floating promises silently swallow errors, may execute after the response is sent, and can leak data into subsequent requests.

// BAD -- fire-and-forget
logAnalytics(event); // returns Promise, nobody awaits it

// GOOD -- defer non-critical work
ctx.waitUntil(logAnalytics(event));

// GOOD -- critical work
await saveToDatabase(record);

7. No passThroughOnException()

This Cloudflare API forwards the original request to origin when the Worker throws, bypassing all security logic (auth checks, rate limiting, header injection).

// BAD -- security bypass on any error
export default {
  async fetch(request, env, ctx) {
    ctx.passThroughOnException();
    return handleRequest(request, env);
  }
};

// GOOD -- explicit error handling
export default {
  async fetch(request, env, ctx) {
    try {
      return await handleRequest(request, env);
    } catch (err) {
      console.error('Worker error:', err);
      return new Response('Internal Server Error', { status: 500 });
    }
  }
};

8. Security Headers on Every Response

Security headers are owned by a single canonical helper: app/src/lib/security-headers.server.ts. Import applySecurityHeaders() in app/src/server.ts and wrap every response leaving the Worker — including redirects and error responses. Do not hand-roll a second header function.

The canonical helper is the drop-in app/src/lib/security-headers.server.ts:

export function applySecurityHeaders(response: Response): Response {
  const headers = new Headers(response.headers);
  // Framing: the Supercomputer Design-mode inspector renders the live app
  // inside an iframe from a higgsfield.app origin (cross-origin to the app's own
  // subdomain). `X-Frame-Options` has no cross-origin allowlist, so SAMEORIGIN/
  // DENY would blank Design mode. We deliberately DO NOT set X-Frame-Options and
  // control framing via the CSP `frame-ancestors` allowlist below. Reviewer:
  // confirm/tighten the editor origin for your deployment.
  headers.set(
    'Content-Security-Policy',
    "default-src 'self'; " +
      "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; " +
      "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; " +
      "font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; " +
      "img-src 'self' data: https:; media-src 'self' https:; " +
      "connect-src 'self' https:; " +
      "frame-ancestors 'self' https://*.higgsfield.app https://higgsfield.app " +
      "https://*.higgsfield.ai https://fnf-dev.anwar-695.workers.dev " +
      "https://feat-apps-marketplace-tools-fnf-dev.anwar-695.workers.dev; " +
      "base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'",
  );
  headers.set('Strict-Transport-Security', 'max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload');
  headers.set('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
  headers.set('Referrer-Policy', 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin');
  headers.set('Permissions-Policy', 'camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()');
  headers.set('X-XSS-Protection', '0');
  return new Response(response.body, {
    status: response.status,
    statusText: response.statusText,
    headers,
  });
}

Adjust CSP directives per website needs (e.g., add specific CDN origins), but keep X-Content-Type-Options and keep frame-ancestors as the editor allowlist. Never set X-Frame-Options — it has no cross-origin allowlist, so DENY/SAMEORIGIN would blank the Supercomputer Design-mode iframe, which loads the live website from a cross-origin higgsfield.app host. Framing is controlled exclusively by the CSP frame-ancestors allowlist: it permits the Supercomputer hosts while still blocking arbitrary third parties. Keep that allowlist — never narrow it to 'none' and never remove it.

9. Validate Server Function Inputs

createServerFn code runs server-only, but its inputs arrive from the client over the network. The client can send any shape of data.

// BAD -- trusts client input shape
const getUser = createServerFn({ method: 'GET' })
  .handler(async ({ data }: { data: { userId: string } }) => {
    return db.prepare('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?').bind(data.userId).first();
  });

// GOOD -- validate before use
const getUser = createServerFn({ method: 'GET' })
  .validator((data: unknown) => {
    if (!data || typeof data !== 'object' || !('userId' in data)) throw new Error('Invalid input');
    const { userId } = data as { userId: string };
    if (typeof userId !== 'string' || userId.length > 36) throw new Error('Invalid userId');
    return { userId };
  })
  .handler(async ({ data }) => {
    return db.prepare('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?').bind(data.userId).first();
  });

Use TanStack Start's .validator() chain or manual checks. For complex shapes, use zod.

10. No Secrets in React Props

React component props serialize into the client HTML during SSR. Any value passed as a prop is visible in the page source.

// BAD -- API key appears in client HTML
function Dashboard({ apiKey }: { apiKey: string }) {
  return <Widget config={{ key: apiKey }} />;
}

// GOOD -- fetch server data in a server function, return only safe data
const getDashboardData = createServerFn({ method: 'GET' })
  .handler(async () => {
    const result = await fetch(API_URL, { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${env.API_KEY}` } });
    return result.json(); // only the response data reaches the client
  });

This includes env bindings, database results containing sensitive columns, and internal URLs.

11. Cookie Security

Custom cookies set in server routes or API handlers must use secure attributes.

// GOOD
const cookie = `session=${token}; Path=/; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict; Max-Age=86400`;
return new Response(null, {
  status: 302,
  headers: {
    'Set-Cookie': cookie,
    'Location': '/dashboard',
  },
});

• HttpOnly -- prevents JavaScript access (XSS can't steal it)

• Secure -- HTTPS only (always true on Cloudflare)

• SameSite=Strict -- blocks cross-site sends (use Lax for OAuth redirect flows)

The platform handles auth cookies automatically. This rule applies to any additional cookies the website sets.

12. CORS Only When Needed

Workers don't add CORS headers by default -- this is the secure default. Only add Access-Control-Allow-Origin when the site genuinely serves API responses to a different origin.

// BAD -- allows any origin with credentials
headers.set('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');
headers.set('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials', 'true'); // browser ignores * with credentials, but intent is wrong

// GOOD -- specific origin, only on API routes that need it
if (request.headers.get('Origin') === 'https://trusted-app.example.com') {
  headers.set('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', 'https://trusted-app.example.com');
  headers.set('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials', 'true');
}

Never add CORS headers to page routes. Only add them to /api/* routes consumed by external clients.

Anti-Patterns to Flag

Pitfalls

1. const objects are still mutable. const cache = {} at module scope is mutable state -- properties can be added/modified across requests. Use Object.freeze() for true immutability, or scope caches to the request.

2. crypto.subtle.timingSafeEqual requires equal-length buffers. If the two buffers differ in length, it throws. Always check .byteLength equality first and return false on mismatch (do not pad to equal length -- that leaks info about which is shorter).

3. ctx.waitUntil() does not extend memory limits. Deferred work still shares the 128 MB isolate memory. Don't use it to process large payloads after responding.

4. CSP 'unsafe-inline' for scripts weakens XSS protection. It's included above for compatibility with SSR hydration scripts. Prefer hash-based or nonce-based CSP when the framework supports it. Track TanStack Start CSP nonce support.

5. Security headers on redirects matter. A 302 Found response still needs X-Content-Type-Options and Strict-Transport-Security. Apply applySecurityHeaders() to all responses, not just 200s.

Web audit

When to Load

After building any website, before running higgsfield website deploy. Run alongside the SEO audit (references/seo.md#audit) as the security half of the pre-deploy quality gate. This audit applies to every site -- brochure, website, dashboard -- because even static sites can have XSS or misconfiguration.

Precedent Rules

Internalize these before auditing. They prevent false positives that waste time and erode trust in the audit.

1. React JSX auto-escapes by default. <p>{userInput}</p> is safe. Do NOT flag normal JSX text interpolation {variable} as XSS. React escapes all string values rendered in JSX.

2. dangerouslySetInnerHTML IS a real risk. Flag it unless the content is a hardcoded string literal or sanitized through DOMPurify / a known sanitizer. "It comes from our CMS" is not a defense without sanitization.

3. Environment variables are trusted input. Do not flag process.env.X or env.VARIABLE as tainted user input. These are set at build/deploy time by the platform.

4. UUIDs are unguessable. Do not flag UUID-based resource access (/api/items/550e8400-e29b-...) as IDOR. UUIDs have 122 bits of entropy -- brute force is infeasible.

5. Test files are excluded. Skip *.test.ts, *.test.tsx, __tests__/, *.spec.ts, *.spec.tsx. Test code does not ship to production.

6. Example/template files are excluded. Skip .example, .sample, .template files. They are not deployed.

7. Dev-only config is excluded. Skip Dockerfile, docker-compose.yml, .devcontainer/, and local development config that does not deploy to Workers.

8. Missing HTTPS is not a finding. Cloudflare enforces HTTPS at the edge for all *.higgsfield.app domains. Do not flag HTTP links to the website's own domain.

OWASP Top 10 Checklist

A01: Broken Access Control

Check every createServerFn that reads or writes user data. It must verify authentication before accessing data.

// FAIL -- no auth check
const getUserNotes = createServerFn({ method: 'GET' })
  .handler(async ({ data }) => {
    return db.prepare('SELECT * FROM notes WHERE user_id = ?').bind(data.userId).all();
  });

// PASS -- auth check before data access
const getUserNotes = createServerFn({ method: 'GET' })
  .handler(async ({ data, request }) => {
    const session = await getSession(request);
    if (!session?.userId) throw new Error('Unauthorized');
    return db.prepare('SELECT * FROM notes WHERE user_id = ?').bind(session.userId).all();
  });

Also check: API routes under app/src/routes/api/ must verify auth. Page loaders returning private data must check session. Never rely on client-side route guards alone.

A02: Cryptographic Failures

• No hardcoded secrets in source (grep for sk-, ghp_, Bearer , long base64 strings)

• No Math.random() for security-relevant values (IDs, tokens, nonces)

• No sensitive data (passwords, tokens, PII) in the client bundle -- check props passed from loaders to components

• Cross-reference with the "Worker hardening" section above, rules 2, 3, 4

A03: Injection

SQL Injection (D1): Every D1 query must use parameterized binding.

// FAIL -- string concatenation
db.prepare(`SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '${name}'`).all();

// PASS -- parameterized
db.prepare('SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ?').bind(name).all();

XSS: Flag dangerouslySetInnerHTML with non-static content. Flag href={userInput} without protocol validation (see React-Specific Checks below).

Command Injection: Flag any use of eval(), new Function(), or template literal construction of executable code in server functions.

A04: Insecure Design

Check for fail-open defaults on security-critical paths:

• || 'default' fallback on secrets or auth tokens -- should crash, not fall back

• Missing rate limiting on public-facing API routes (POST endpoints, form submissions)

• Admin functionality accessible without role checks

• Password/auth flows without brute-force protection

If the website has no auth or sensitive operations, mark as N/A.

A05: Security Misconfiguration

• Missing security headers -- check for applySecurityHeaders() or equivalent in server.ts (cross-ref worker-hardening rule 8)

• Overly permissive CORS (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *)

• Debug info in production responses (stack, trace, internal paths in error bodies)

• Source maps served in production (*.map files accessible)

• Default credentials or placeholder secrets in committed config

A06: Vulnerable Components

# Run in the app directory
bun audit 2>/dev/null || npm audit 2>/dev/null || echo "No audit tool available"

Check package.json for:

• Dependencies with known CVEs

• Unmaintained packages (no updates in 2+ years for security-relevant deps)

• Unnecessary dependencies that expand attack surface

If no audit tool is available, manually check critical deps (auth libraries, crypto, parsers) against known vulnerability databases.

A07: Authentication Failures

Skip if site has no auth. If auth is present, check:

• Session fixation: session ID must rotate after login

• CSRF: state-changing server functions (POST/PUT/DELETE) must verify origin or use CSRF tokens. TanStack Start server functions include origin checking by default -- verify it's not disabled.

• Session expiry: sessions must have a Max-Age or Expires. Infinite sessions are a finding.

• Password storage: if the website stores passwords, they must be hashed (bcrypt, scrypt, argon2). Never stored in plain text in D1.

A08: Data Integrity Failures

Skip if site has no file uploads or external data processing. If present, check:

• File upload MIME type validation (don't trust Content-Type header alone; check magic bytes for critical uploads)

• File size limits enforced server-side (Workers have 100 MB request body limit but the website should enforce lower)

• Filename sanitization for R2 keys (strip path traversal: ../, null bytes, control characters)

• External data (webhooks, API responses) validated before storage

A09: Logging Failures

Flag console.log / console.error that prints:

• Passwords or password hashes

• API keys, tokens, secrets

• Full request bodies on auth endpoints

• Full database rows containing PII

Check that error responses to clients do not contain:

• Stack traces (at Object.<anonymous>, file paths)

• Internal hostnames or IP addresses

• Database error messages with schema details

A10: SSRF

Skip if no server functions make outbound HTTP requests. If present, check:

// FAIL -- fetches arbitrary user-supplied URL
const proxyFetch = createServerFn({ method: 'POST' })
  .handler(async ({ data }) => {
    const res = await fetch(data.url); // user controls destination
    return res.json();
  });

// PASS -- allowlisted domains
const ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['api.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'];
const proxyFetch = createServerFn({ method: 'POST' })
  .handler(async ({ data }) => {
    const url = new URL(data.url);
    if (!ALLOWED_HOSTS.includes(url.hostname)) throw new Error('Blocked');
    const res = await fetch(url.toString());
    return res.json();
  });

Also check for: internal network access (localhost, 127.0.0.1, 10.*, 192.168.*, 169.254.169.254 -- the metadata endpoint).

Insecure Defaults Check

Scan the codebase for these fail-open patterns:

Fail-Open Patterns

// BAD -- falls back to a default secret instead of crashing
const secret = env.SECRET_KEY || 'default-secret-key';
const jwtSecret = process.env.JWT_SECRET ?? 'changeme';

// BAD -- verification defaults to disabled
const verifySignature = options.verify ?? true; // should be ?? false or mandatory

// BAD -- empty catch swallows auth/crypto errors
try { await verifyToken(token); } catch {} // attacker wins on any error

Dangerous Zero/Null/Empty Defaults

• timeout: 0 -- may mean "no timeout" (infinite wait, DoS vector)

• maxRetries: Infinity -- retry storm

• Empty string accepted as password or API key

• Missing validation on optional fields that have security implications (e.g., role field defaults to 'admin' if missing)

The 5 Rationalizations to Reject

When reviewing code, reject these justifications for insecure defaults:

1. "It's just for dev" -- dev config ships to production more often than anyone admits.

2. "Prod config overrides it" -- if it doesn't, the fallback is the live value.

3. "We'll fix it later" -- later never comes; the default becomes the permanent value.

4. "It's documented" -- nobody reads documentation; the default is the behavior.

5. "Nobody would do that" -- attackers do exactly that.

React-Specific Checks

dangerouslySetInnerHTML

// FAIL -- unsanitized user content
<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: userComment }} />

// PASS -- hardcoded content
<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: '<strong>Welcome</strong>' }} />

// PASS -- sanitized
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: DOMPurify.sanitize(userComment) }} />

href with User Input

// FAIL -- javascript: protocol injection
<a href={userUrl}>Click</a>

// PASS -- protocol validation
function safeHref(url: string): string {
  if (url.startsWith('/') || url.startsWith('#') || url.startsWith('https://')) return url;
  return '#';
}
<a href={safeHref(userUrl)}>Click</a>

<iframe> with User Input

// FAIL -- no sandbox
<iframe src={userUrl} />

// PASS -- sandboxed
<iframe src={userUrl} sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin" />

Client-Side State

• Never store tokens, secrets, or API keys in localStorage, sessionStorage, or React state

• Auth tokens belong in HttpOnly cookies, not JavaScript-accessible storage

• If the website uses zustand, jotai, or React context for auth state, verify the token source is a server function, not client storage

eval() / new Function()

Flag any occurrence in application code. Acceptable only in build tooling (vite.config.ts, bundler plugins) which does not execute at runtime.

Output Format

Present audit results as a table. One row per check. Same format as the SEO audit (references/seo.md#audit).

## Security Audit Results

| # | Check | Status | Details |
|---|-------|--------|---------|
| 1 | A01 Broken Access Control | PASS | All 4 server functions verify session |
| 2 | A02 Cryptographic Failures | PASS | No hardcoded secrets found |
| 3 | A03 Injection | WARN | `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` in BlogPost.tsx -- verify content is sanitized |
| 4 | A04 Insecure Design | N/A | No auth or sensitive operations |
| 5 | A05 Security Misconfiguration | FAIL | Missing security headers in server.ts |
| 6 | A06 Vulnerable Components | PASS | `bun audit` reports 0 vulnerabilities |
| 7 | A07 Authentication Failures | N/A | No auth |
| 8 | A08 Data Integrity Failures | N/A | No file uploads |
| 9 | A09 Logging Failures | PASS | No sensitive data in console output |
| 10 | A10 SSRF | N/A | No outbound fetches from server functions |
| 11 | Insecure Defaults | PASS | No fail-open patterns found |
| 12 | React-Specific | WARN | 1 `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` usage |

**Summary: 5 PASS, 2 WARN, 1 FAIL, 4 N/A**

Status values:

• PASS -- check passed, no issues

• FAIL -- security issue found, must fix before deploy

• WARN -- potential issue, needs manual review

• N/A -- check does not apply to this site

Any FAIL blocks deploy. WARN items are noted in the deploy message for the user to review.

Pitfalls

1. Don't flag React JSX interpolation as XSS. {variable} in JSX is auto-escaped. Only dangerouslySetInnerHTML and href/src attributes with user input are real XSS vectors in React.

2. Don't flag fetch() in server functions as SSRF unless the URL comes from user input. Server functions that fetch hardcoded API endpoints (e.g., fetch('https://api.stripe.com/...')) are not SSRF.

3. Don't audit node_modules/. Dependency code is checked by bun audit / npm audit, not by manual code review. Focus on application code in app/src/.

4. Don't confuse build-time env vars with runtime secrets. VITE_* env vars are intentionally public (bundled into client code). Only flag non-VITE_ env vars that appear in client-reachable code.

5. Don't flag missing rate limiting on static/SSR pages. Rate limiting is relevant for API routes and form-handling server functions, not for page loads. Cloudflare's DDoS protection handles volumetric attacks at the edge.