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N8n Self Hosting

Romuald CzlonkowskiCommunityCreated by Romuald Czlonkowski

  • Skill
  • Workflow
  • Automation and integrations
  • MIT
  • Low risk
  • Has scripts
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From the author

Deploy a production self-hosted n8n end-to-end to a fresh Linux VM over SSH, using Docker Compose behind a Caddy reverse proxy with automatic HTTPS. Use whenever the user wants to self-host, install, provision, or deploy n8n on their own server/VPS (Hetzner, DigitalOcean, AWS EC2, bare metal) — single/regular mode or queue mode with workers — or to update, back up, restore, or harden such an instance, or make Python Code nodes run on it (task runners). For SELF-HOSTED n8n (Docker), not n8n Cloud and not building workflows. The skill makes the agent ask single-vs-queue first, collect domain/SSH/timezone inputs, generate fresh secrets on the box, and bring the stack up with TLS. Trigger on "deploy n8n", "self-host n8n", "n8n docker compose", "n8n queue mode / workers", "n8n reverse proxy / SSL", "back up / update my n8n", "Python runner unavailable" / "n8nio/runners sidecar", or "we don't want to give every user the OAuth client secret" / "enable Sign in with Google" (credential overwrites).
— the description by Romuald Czlonkowski

AutoGineer summary

Written by AutoGineer from the skill’s own files, not by the author

This skill provides a structured procedure for deploying n8n on a fresh Linux VM via SSH. It automates the setup of Docker, Caddy for automatic HTTPS, and the necessary Docker Compose configuration. The skill supports two deployment architectures: a single-instance mode for simpler setups and a queue-based mode for horizontal scaling. It includes guidance on secret management, firewall configuration, and the integration of external task runners for Python Code nodes, ensuring a secure and functional self-hosted environment.

What it does

  • Deploys n8n using Docker Compose and a Caddy reverse proxy.
  • Configures automatic HTTPS via Let's Encrypt.
  • Supports both single-instance and queue-based deployment modes.
  • Manages fresh secret generation and environment variable security.
  • Integrates external task runners for Python Code node execution.
  • Provides procedures for updates, backups, and instance hardening.

When to use it

  • When you need to install n8n on your own infrastructure or VPS.
  • When you require a specific deployment mode like queue mode for scaling.
  • When you need to enable Python Code nodes using external task runners.
  • When you need to update, back up, or restore an existing self-hosted n8n instance.

Advantages

  • Ensures consistent deployment through standardized templates.
  • Automates complex tasks like TLS certificate management.
  • Promotes secure practices by enforcing fresh secret generation.
  • Provides clear paths for scaling from single to queue-based architectures.

Usage examples

“Deploy n8n on my new Ubuntu server.”
The agent will initiate the preflight check, ask for your deployment mode preference, and guide you through the installation of Docker and the n8n stack.
“I need to set up n8n in queue mode with workers.”
The agent will collect the necessary domain and SSH details, then configure the stack with Redis and Postgres to support horizontal scaling.
“How do I enable Python Code nodes on my self-hosted n8n?”
The agent will guide you through adding the n8nio/runners sidecar to your existing Docker Compose configuration.
“Help me back up my self-hosted n8n instance.”
The agent will provide the steps to safely export your encryption key, database, and volume data.

Install

  1. Download the skill as a ZIP:

    https://autogineer.com/agent-skills/czlonkowski/n8n-self-hosting/download

  2. Unzip it into the cross-client skills folder of your project:

    mkdir -p .agents/skills && unzip n8n-self-hosting.zip -d .agents/skills

Documentation by Romuald Czlonkowski

Deploying self-hosted n8n

This skill takes a fresh Linux VM (Ubuntu/Debian, root or sudo SSH) to a running, HTTPS, production n8n via Docker Compose behind Caddy (automatic Let's Encrypt TLS). It is for self-hosted n8n on Docker — not n8n Cloud, and not for building workflows (that's the rest of this pack).

Two deployment modes. The architectures differ, so pick the mode before doing anything.

You drive this end-to-end over SSH: preflight → install Docker → lay down the project → generate secrets → launch → verify TLS → hand off. The template files live in assets/; the per-mode and security depth live in the reference files named below.

Rule 0 — choose the mode (ask the user)

Do not guess. Ask, then commit to one:

Single / regularQueue
Processesone n8nmain + N workers
Extra servicesnone (SQLite)Redis (queue) + Postgres (DB)
Executes workflowsin the main processon workers, in parallel
Good for1 user, light/moderate load, simplest opshigh volume, heavy/long executions, horizontal scale
Composeassets/docker-compose.single.ymlassets/docker-compose.queue.yml
Deep diveSINGLE_MODE.mdQUEUE_MODE.md

If unsure, start single — it's the simplest correct thing and covers most needs. Moving to queue later means swapping the compose file and migrating SQLite→Postgres, so if the user already expects real volume, start queue.

Rule 1 — secret hygiene (non-negotiable)

A misstep here leaks client credentials. Be diligent:

  1. Generate every secret fresh, on the target box. Never copy an encryption key, DB password, or .env from another n8n instance into this one. See SECURITY.md for the openssl commands.

  2. Secrets live only in .env (mode 600), referenced by the compose as ${VAR}. Never inline a secret into docker-compose.yml, the Caddyfile, or anything you commit.

  3. The N8N_ENCRYPTION_KEY is sacred. It encrypts every stored credential. If it's lost or changes, all saved credentials become undecryptable. Set it explicitly, and tell the user to back it up off the box. Don't echo it into long-lived logs or chat history beyond what's needed to hand it over.

  4. Never expose internal services. Only Caddy (80/443) is public. n8n (5678), Postgres (5432), Redis (6379) stay on the private Docker network — the templates already omit their host port mappings. Don't add them.

  5. .env and Caddy's caddy_data volume (the issued certs + ACME account key) are not artifacts to share. If you're working inside a git repo, confirm .env is git-ignored before any commit.

Inputs to collect up front

  • SSH target — user@host and how you authenticate (key path or the user confirms the agent already has access). Root or a sudo user.

  • Domain — the full hostname n8n will live at, e.g. n8n.example.com (→ SUBDOMAIN=n8n, DOMAIN_NAME=example.com). The user must control its DNS.

  • TLS email — for Let's Encrypt (SSL_EMAIL).

  • Timezone — IANA name for Schedule/Cron nodes (e.g. Europe/Warsaw), else Etc/UTC.

  • Mode — single or queue (Rule 0). Queue → confirm the box has enough RAM (rough floor ~4 GB; each worker wants ~1–2 GB).

  • Optional modules — some features (currently Agents) are backend modules that stay off unless listed in N8N_ENABLED_MODULES. Ask only if the user brings one up; if they do, read the modules section of QUEUE_MODE.md before enabling it, because in queue mode it has to reach the workers as well.

  • Python Code nodes / who edits workflows — ask "Will workflows use Python Code nodes, or will anyone besides you edit workflows?" A yes to either means task runners in external mode: a n8nio/runners sidecar (one per worker in queue mode). The stock n8nio/n8n image has no Python 3, so in the default internal mode every Python Code node fails with Python runner unavailable: Python 3 is missing from this system. Read TASK_RUNNERS.md before step 3.

The deploy flow

Work through these in order. SINGLE_MODE.md / QUEUE_MODE.md give the mode-specific command detail; SECURITY.md covers secret generation and hardening; DAY2.md covers update/backup/restore.

1. Preflight (the cheapest failure is the one you catch here)

  • SSH in; confirm the OS is Debian/Ubuntu-like (. /etc/os-release).

  • DNS must already point at the box. Compare the box's public IP (curl -s ifconfig.me) with dig +short <fqdn> (run it from the box AND ideally your laptop). If they don't match, stop — Caddy's ACME challenge will fail. Have the user create the A record, wait for it to propagate, then continue.

  • Ports 80 and 443 must be reachable from the internet. Check the host firewall AND any cloud security group / network firewall (Hetzner Cloud, AWS SG, etc.) — these are outside the box and a common silent blocker.

2. Install Docker (if absent)

  • Check docker --version and docker compose version. If missing, install Docker Engine + the Compose plugin (Docker's official get.docker.com script on Ubuntu/Debian is fine). Re-check docker compose version before proceeding.

3. Lay down the project

  • Pick DATA_FOLDER — an absolute path, e.g. /opt/n8n. The DATA_FOLDER value in .env must equal this exact directory (the compose mounts ${DATA_FOLDER}/caddy_config/Caddyfile, and init-data.sh is mounted via a relative ./ path), so always run docker compose from here. Create it, plus caddy_config/ and local_files/ inside.

  • Get the template files onto the box. They live in this skill's assets/ on your machine, not on the server — transfer each one. Either scp them up, or (no local copy needed) write each file's contents over SSH, e.g. ssh <target> 'cat > <DATA_FOLDER>/docker-compose.yml' < assets/docker-compose.single.yml. Land them with these exact names:

    • the chosen compose → <DATA_FOLDER>/docker-compose.yml (rename it to exactly this)

    • Caddyfile → <DATA_FOLDER>/caddy_config/Caddyfile

    • queue only: init-data.sh → <DATA_FOLDER>/init-data.sh, then chmod +x it

    • the matching .env.*.example → <DATA_FOLDER>/.env

  • External task runners (Python): add the runner env vars and the task-runners sidecar to the compose now (TASK_RUNNERS.md has the snippet for each mode). Generate N8N_RUNNERS_AUTH_TOKEN in step 4 with the other secrets.

4. Fill .env + generate secrets

  • Set DATA_FOLDER, DOMAIN_NAME, SUBDOMAIN, SSL_EMAIL, GENERIC_TIMEZONE.

  • Generate each secret on the box with openssl (SECURITY.md has the commands) and write it into .env, replacing the matching REPLACE_WITH_… placeholder: N8N_ENCRYPTION_KEY; queue also POSTGRES_PASSWORD + POSTGRES_NON_ROOT_PASSWORD.

  • Before launching, confirm none are left unset: grep REPLACE_WITH_ .env must return nothing — a leftover placeholder becomes the literal password and Postgres/n8n fail to connect.

  • chmod 600 .env. Record the encryption key so the user can back it up off-box.

5. Firewall

  • ufw: allow OpenSSH + 80 + 443, then enable. Do not open 5678/5432/6379.

6. Launch

  • cd <DATA_FOLDER> && docker compose up -d.

  • Queue mode brings up Redis + Postgres + main + workers (workers via replicas). To add capacity: docker compose up -d --scale n8n-worker=N.

7. Verify (don't declare success without this)

  • docker compose ps — every service Up/healthy (queue: postgres & redis healthy first).

  • n8n itself up (internal): docker compose exec n8n wget -qO- http://localhost:5678/healthz → {"status":"ok"}. This separates "n8n is running" from "TLS isn't ready yet."

  • Cert issued: docker compose logs caddy | grep -i 'certificate obtained'. First-boot ACME can take a minute or two; until it finishes, a public https:// request fails TLS — that means the cert is still pending, not that n8n is down.

  • Public reachability (with retry): curl -fsS --retry 5 --retry-delay 10 https://<fqdn>/healthz → {"status":"ok"}. (/healthz only proves the process is reachable; /healthz/readiness additionally confirms the DB is connected and migrated — use it when debugging a boot loop.)

  • Queue mode — main and workers must agree. Diff their environments: diff <(docker compose exec -T n8n env | sort) <(docker compose exec -T --index 1 n8n-worker env | sort). Only the public-URL/proxy vars should differ. Anything else means a behavioural setting reached the main but not the workers — and workers are what execute workflows, so it fails at runtime in one node rather than at boot. QUEUE_MODE.md explains the rule.

  • External task runners: docker compose logs n8n | grep 'Registered runner' must show both launcher-javascript and launcher-python (queue: check every worker). Then smoke-test a Python Code node (TASK_RUNNERS.md → Verify).

  • Open https://<fqdn> → the owner setup screen. Whoever completes that signup form first claims the instance — an exposed un-owned instance is a race, so create the owner account immediately, before sharing the URL. Enable 2FA. (Automated deploys can pre-provision the owner via env vars instead — see the owner row in SECURITY.md.)

8. Hand off

  • Give the user: the URL, where the project lives, the encryption key to store safely, and the Day-2 basics (update / backup / restore) from DAY2.md.

What NOT to do

  • Don't skip the DNS/ports preflight. A wrong A record or a closed cloud firewall is the #1 reason Caddy can't get a cert and n8n looks "broken."

  • Don't publish 5678/5432/6379 to the host. Caddy reaches n8n over the private network.

  • Don't reuse another instance's encryption key or .env. Fresh secrets per box.

  • Don't run queue mode on SQLite. Queue requires Postgres (the template already wires it).

  • Don't put secrets in docker-compose.yml or the Caddyfile. .env only.

  • Don't add a behavioural env var to the main only (queue mode). Modules, DB, queue, binary-data and encryption settings belong in the shared x-n8n-env anchor so workers get them too; only the public-URL/proxy vars are main-only. See QUEUE_MODE.md.

  • Don't use :latest blindly. Pin N8N_IMAGE_TAG; update deliberately (DAY2.md).

  • Don't promise Python Code nodes on the stock image in internal mode. They need the n8nio/runners sidecar, on exactly the n8n version, with imports allowlisted in the launcher config. By default even import json is rejected. See TASK_RUNNERS.md.

  • Don't --scale queue workers once runners are external. A sidecar serves exactly one worker. Add worker + runner pairs instead (TASK_RUNNERS.md).

Reference files

  • SINGLE_MODE.md — single-instance specifics, SQLite vs Postgres, when to graduate to queue.

  • QUEUE_MODE.md — queue architecture, workers/concurrency/scaling, shared encryption key, the main-vs-worker env-parity rule, optional backend modules (N8N_ENABLED_MODULES, e.g. Agents), binary data (database mode — filesystem is unsupported in queue mode; S3/Azure = Enterprise), webhook processors, multi-main licensing.

  • SECURITY.md — generating secrets, the encryption-key rules, the full hardening checklist (telemetry off, env-access block, public API, firewall, secure cookies).

  • CREDENTIAL_OVERWRITES.md — managed OAuth: register one OAuth app instance-wide so users never see a client ID/secret ("Sign in with Google" on self-hosted). The endpoint-vs-env choice, the mandatory endpoint auth token, parent-type inheritance, persistence and worker reload.

  • TASK_RUNNERS.md — task runners in external mode: why Python Code nodes need the n8nio/runners sidecar, the compose snippet for single mode and the one-sidecar-per-worker pattern for queue mode, allowlisting Python/JS modules via /etc/n8n-task-runners.json, the builtin deny list, verification, failure signatures, and upgrading n8n and the runners together.

  • DAY2.md — changing a setting (env var) safely, updating the image, backing up (encryption key + volume + Postgres), and restoring.

  • assets/ — the templates: docker-compose.single.yml, docker-compose.queue.yml, Caddyfile, .env.single.example, .env.queue.example, init-data.sh.

Authoritative upstream reference: the official hosting docs live at https://docs.n8n.io/deploy/host-n8n (restructured mid-2026 from the old /hosting/ paths — prefer these URLs). The env-var reference index is at https://docs.n8n.io/deploy/host-n8n/configure-n8n/basic-configuration/use-environment-variables. When this skill and the live docs disagree, trust the docs and tell the user.

Files

CREDENTIAL_OVERWRITES.md

Managed OAuth: credential overwrites

On n8n Cloud, connecting Google or Slack is one click — Cloud owns the OAuth app, so users never see a client secret. Self-hosted has no OAuth app of its own, so by default every user must paste a Client ID and Client Secret into every OAuth credential they create.

That is the problem this feature solves. Credential overwrites let you register one OAuth app per credential type at instance level. n8n then hides those fields in the UI and users get the plain "Sign in with …" button. Each user still authorises their own account and gets their own tokens — only the app identity is shared.

Docs: https://docs.n8n.io/administer/manage-credentials/credential-overwrites

Use this when the user says any of: "we don't want to hand the client secret to everyone", "can we get the Sign in with Google button", "every new hire has to set up OAuth again", "how does Cloud do one-click Google".

Two ways to set it, and only one you should use

CREDENTIALS_OVERWRITE_DATAEndpoint
HowJSON blob in an env varone authenticated POST after boot
Secret lands incompose/.env, container env, docker inspectrequest body only
n8n's own docs"isn't recommended""the recommended approach"
Use itnever on a shared boxalways

The docs are blunt about the env route: "Environment variables aren't protected in n8n, so the data can leak to users." Take that literally and use the endpoint.

Setup

Three vars. In queue mode put them in the shared x-n8n-env anchor (see QUEUE_MODE.md on env parity), except that only the main actually serves the endpoint.

- CREDENTIALS_OVERWRITE_ENDPOINT=${CREDS_OVERWRITE_PATH}       # random, not "credentials"
- CREDENTIALS_OVERWRITE_ENDPOINT_AUTH_TOKEN=${CREDS_OVERWRITE_TOKEN}
- CREDENTIALS_OVERWRITE_PERSISTENCE=true

Generate both values on the box, into .env (600), like every other secret:

printf "\nCREDS_OVERWRITE_PATH=creds-overwrite-%s\nCREDS_OVERWRITE_TOKEN=%s\n" "$(openssl rand -hex 6)" "$(openssl rand -hex 32)" >> .env

Recreate n8n, then push the OAuth app once. The endpoint is mounted at the root of the n8n host, not under /rest:

curl -sS -X POST "https://n8n.example.com/${CREDS_OVERWRITE_PATH}" -H "Authorization: Bearer ${CREDS_OVERWRITE_TOKEN}" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"googleOAuth2Api":{"clientId":"...","clientSecret":"..."}}'

Content-Type: application/json is enforced — anything else returns an error, not a silent no-op. Success is HTTP 200 with success: true.

The auth token is not optional

Leave CREDENTIALS_OVERWRITE_ENDPOINT_AUTH_TOKEN empty and the endpoint stands open. n8n only installs the auth middleware when the token is set; without it, the route still exists and accepts the first POST it receives from anyone, then latches (a one-shot presetCredentialsLoaded flag). Whoever gets there first registers the OAuth app that your users will consent to.

So: always set the token, and make the path unguessable. With the token set, the one-shot latch is bypassed and you can re-POST to rotate the app later.

Reverse proxies pass arbitrary paths through to n8n, so nothing in Caddy needs changing — which also means nothing in Caddy is protecting this route for you.

Set it on the parent credential type, not the leaf

Overwrites resolve along the credential inheritance chain. GoogleBigQueryOAuth2Api declares extends: ['googleOAuth2Api'], and n8n merges every ancestor's overwrite before the leaf's.

One entry on googleOAuth2Api therefore covers Sheets, Drive, Gmail, Calendar, Docs, BigQuery, Chat, Cloud Storage and the rest in one go. Registering each leaf type separately works but is pointless duplication.

Before assuming a family shares a parent, check that credential's extends — not every vendor's credentials are structured this way, and a leaf with no parent only gets its own entry.

It will not break existing credentials

The overwrite fills a field only when the stored value is null, undefined or empty. Every credential already holding its own Client ID and Secret keeps working untouched. The overwrite applies to newly created credentials, and to any field a user left blank.

Escape hatch for users who insist on their own OAuth app:

N8N_SKIP_CREDENTIAL_OVERWRITE=googleOAuth2Api,slackOAuth2Api

For a listed type, if the credential has any overwritten field set to a value of its own, n8n skips the overwrite entirely for that credential and uses what the user entered.

N8N_MANAGED_OAUTH_SHOW_SCOPES (comma-separated types) makes the UI display the scopes being requested — worth enabling if users need to see what they are consenting to.

Persistence, restarts and workers

With CREDENTIALS_OVERWRITE_PERSISTENCE=true, a POST is stored in the settings table under key credentialsOverwrite, encrypted with N8N_ENCRYPTION_KEY — so it is covered by your normal DB backup, and it is unreadable without the key you already had to protect.

Two consequences worth knowing:

  • Workers pick it up live. Saving broadcasts a reload-overwrite-credentials pubsub command; every worker reloads from the DB immediately, no restart and no redeploy. The PERSISTENCE flag on a worker only matters at cold start, when it decides whether the worker reads the row on boot. Set it on workers anyway — otherwise a worker that restarts quietly loses the overwrite and its executions start failing on credentials that work fine in the editor.

  • Without persistence the data is in-memory only. It disappears on restart and you must POST again, which is exactly the kind of thing nobody remembers at 3am.

If you set both CREDENTIALS_OVERWRITE_DATA and persistence, the DB copy is loaded second and wins. Don't run both; pick one source of truth.

Google-specific prerequisites

The overwrite only supplies the app identity. The OAuth app itself still has to be correct:

  • Redirect URI on the OAuth client must be exactly https://<your-n8n-host>/rest/oauth2-credential/callback. Get WEBHOOK_URL / N8N_EDITOR_BASE_URL wrong and n8n will generate a localhost callback that never matches.

  • Consent screen publishing status. An External app left in Testing issues refresh tokens that expire after 7 days. On a per-user client that is one person's annoyance; behind a shared client it logs out the whole company at once, weekly. Publish the app, or use Internal if the org is on Google Workspace.

  • Enable the APIs you intend to use in that Google Cloud project. The overwrite cannot fix a disabled API.

Verify

docker compose exec -T postgres sh -lc 'psql -U $POSTGRES_USER -d $POSTGRES_DB -A -t -c "select key, length(value) from settings where key = '"'"'credentialsOverwrite'"'"'"'

One row. The value is ciphertext, so length is all you should see — never decrypt it to "check".

Then in the UI, create a new credential of that type: the Client ID and Client Secret fields should be gone, leaving only the sign-in button. That is the real acceptance test.

What NOT to do

  • Don't leave the auth token empty. See above — that is a takeover, not a rough edge.

  • Don't use CREDENTIALS_OVERWRITE_DATA on a multi-user instance. Anything in the container env is one Code node or one docker inspect away from a user.

  • Don't paste the client secret into a shell one-liner on a shared box — it lands in shell history. Read it from .env or a file, or type it into a heredoc.

  • Don't expect this to fix a broken credential. Overwrites set the app's ID and secret. A credential that fails because its refresh token was revoked, expired, or belonged to someone who left the company needs re-authorisation and an ownership change — a different job.

  • Don't skip the worker flag in queue mode. It only bites after a worker restart, which is the worst time to discover it.

Requirements and compatibility

Works with: Claude Code, Claude apps, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Kiro, OpenCode, Goose, Amp, Roo Code, JetBrains Junie, Factory Droid, Devin (ex-Windsurf), Mistral Vibe, OpenHands, Letta

“Works with” means the tool reads the open Agent Skills format; a skill written for one tool may use features others lack.

Needs: Needs network access, Needs Python, Needs Node.js

Security

What our scanner noticed· Low risk

  • Instructions that use the network
  • Scripts that your agent may run

This skill includes scripts that your agent may run. Read them before you use it.

A static scan is not a guarantee. Skills are third-party content: review a skill before you let an agent use it.

Attribution and licence

Created by
Romuald Czlonkowski
Publisher
Romuald Czlonkowski (Community)
Source
czlonkowski/n8n-skills · skills/n8n-self-hosting · commit e037563
Licence
MIT License (redistribution allowed)
  • LICENSE (added by AutoGineer from LICENSE)
  • ATTRIBUTION.md (written by AutoGineer)
Synced

AutoGineer is not affiliated with or endorsed by Romuald Czlonkowski or Romuald Czlonkowski.

Download ZIP

The ZIP holds the skill’s files, its licence files and an ATTRIBUTION.md. Download n8n-self-hosting.zip