Security Audit
CloudflareOfficialPublished by Cloudflare
- Skill
- Review and audit
- Security
- MIT
- Low risk
- Has scripts
AutoGineer summary
Written by AutoGineer from the skill’s own files, not by the author
This skill provides a rigorous, defensive workflow for conducting security audits and vulnerability research. It operates in two modes: a guidance mode for focused investigations and a full audit mode for comprehensive, end-to-end reviews. The framework emphasizes sandboxed, local-only execution, requiring concrete evidence of a trust boundary violation to confirm a finding. It includes strict protocols for write isolation, budget management, and independent verification to ensure audit integrity and reproducibility.
What it does
- Performs structured security audits on codebases, APIs, and services.
- Validates vulnerabilities using sandboxed, local-only execution environments.
- Generates comprehensive audit reports including findings, evidence, and remediation guidance.
- Manages audit coverage through a deterministic ledger system.
- Enforces strict write isolation to protect target source and audit artifacts.
- Provides methodology for triage and investigation of specific security findings.
When to use it
- When performing a comprehensive, end-to-end security review of a codebase.
- When conducting vulnerability research on specific libraries or daemons.
- When seeking expert guidance on security methodology or triage.
- When a formal, documented security audit report is required.
- When investigating potential trust boundary violations in source code.
Advantages
- Ensures high-integrity results through independent verification phases.
- Minimizes risk by enforcing strict, sandboxed execution boundaries.
- Provides clear, evidence-based findings rather than generic hardening advice.
- Supports reproducible audits with structured metadata and coverage tracking.
- Prevents false positives by requiring concrete, observable boundary violations.
Usage examples
- “Perform a full security audit of this repository.”
- The agent initiates the six-phase audit workflow, starting with reconnaissance and ledger setup, followed by hunting waves and independent validation to produce a final security report.
- “I have a question about the authentication flow in this API; can you help me investigate?”
- The agent enters guidance mode, focusing on the specific authentication logic without triggering the full audit workflow or creating formal report artifacts.
Install
Download the skill as a ZIP:
https://autogineer.com/agent-skills/cloudflare/security-audit/downloadUnzip it into the cross-client skills folder of your project:
mkdir -p .agents/skills && unzip security-audit.zip -d .agents/skills
Documentation by Cloudflare
Security Audit
Find vulnerabilities that violate a real trust boundary, then give owners the source evidence, safe reproduction, priority, and smallest effective fix. This is a defensive, source-first workflow. A candidate without a concrete affected principal, resource, or security outcome is not a confirmed finding.
Operating modes
This skill is guidance by default. Loading it does not authorize the complete audit workflow or file creation.
Guidance mode: For security questions, focused reviews, methodology, triage, or investigation of specific findings, use only the relevant parts of this skill. Do not automatically run all six phases, create an output directory, or write audit artifacts. You may launch focused agents when useful; they return results to the current task.
Full audit mode: Use the complete workflow when the user explicitly asks to audit or pen-test a codebase, asks for a full, comprehensive, or end-to-end security review, or requests report artifacts. Run all six phases and write the files defined below.
If the request could mean either mode, ask one focused question before creating files or starting the complete workflow.
Platform terminology
This skill is agent-neutral:
Parent is the agent that coordinates the run and owns shared state.
Task tool is the platform's delegation or sub-agent mechanism.
researchagent is a delegated agent for focused source exploration and factual verification.generalagent is a delegated agent for broad investigation and bounded local execution.subagent_type:in a heading names which of these two delegated agent roles runs that work.
Use equivalent platform capabilities while preserving role, write-isolation, prompt, and independence boundaries.
Universal execution safety
These rules apply in both operating modes. Source inspection is read-only. Run target-controlled builds, tests, processes, browsers, emulators, fuzzers, and fixture processing only inside an OS-enforced sandbox that provides all of these controls:
no external network; use only an isolated loopback namespace when the check needs local client/server traffic;
an empty environment populated from an explicit allowlist with safe values, with scratch-local
HOME, temporary directories, and caches;a read-only target and toolchain, with the target-controlled process able to write only inside its assigned
scratch/directory; andexplicit low CPU, memory, process, file-size, disk, and wall-clock limits.
The agent, outside the target-controlled process, may make a disposable source copy in an assigned scratch/ directory when a build must write beside source. In guidance mode, do not retain target-controlled files. In full audit mode, only trusted parent-side code may promote the minimum non-secret result to retained artifacts/ using the procedure under Write isolation. Never expose a retained output directory (other than the agent's own assigned scratch/), another agent's directory, the host home directory, credentials, sockets, or shared services to target code. Do not install dependencies or let builds fetch them. Use only tools and dependencies already available locally. If every control cannot be enforced, do not execute target code: report the missing sandbox capability as a needs-validation blocker and give a safe validation plan.
Use dummy principals, fixtures, and secrets. Do not probe deployed endpoints, external services, shared infrastructure, production identities, other users' data, or live control planes. Do not test availability against a live or shared process, publish artifacts, alter releases, spend paid API quota, or continue beyond the minimum local effect needed to establish a defect. If the decisive fact is outside source or the sandboxed fixture, report it as needing validation.
Full audit setup
In full audit mode, resolve these values before reconnaissance:
Skill directory: the absolute directory containing this
SKILL.md.Target: the absolute repository root under review.
Repo name: a stable repository identifier from the directory or local Git remote.
Output directory: a new writable directory outside the target, defaulting to
~/security-audit-skill/<repo-name>/run-<N>, where<N>is the next unused integer. Use a directory inside the target only when the user explicitly selects it and the parent verifies that version control ignores the whole directory. Otherwise stop and request an external path.Source ref: the reviewed commit and whether the worktree is dirty. Do not treat unreviewed generated or modified files as another revision.
Write isolation
The parent creates and is the only writer of shared run files:
run-metadata.jsonarchitecture.mdcoverage-ledger.jsonfindings.jsonREPORT.mdFINDINGS-DETAIL.mdNEEDS-VALIDATION.md
Each hunter or verifier receives a unique root under <output-dir>/agents/<agent-id>/, with separate scratch/ and artifacts/ directories. Canonical agent IDs match ^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$ and must not equal a Windows device name such as con, prn, aux, nul, com1 through com9, or lpt1 through lpt9. Lowercase IDs prevent case-fold collisions. The agent and every target-controlled process may write only to scratch/; retained artifacts/ is parent-owned, is never exposed to the sandbox, and is writable only by trusted parent-side promotion code. Agents may not change shared files, target source, retained artifacts, or another agent's directory. Do not use /tmp or the host home directory as a writable fallback.
Before execution, the parent opens and retains trusted, non-inheritable directory descriptors for the agent's scratch/ and artifacts/ roots, and records an allowlist of expected scratch-relative artifact files plus explicit per-file and cumulative byte limits. Never pass those descriptors to the agent or sandbox. After the sandbox and all its processes terminate, trusted parent-side code promotes each allowlisted file separately:
Validate the declared relative path: reject absolute, empty,
.,.., or symlinked components.Walk each parent component from the retained scratch-root descriptor with no-follow directory-relative operations; never reopen by path.
Open the leaf no-follow and nonblocking.
Verify with
fstatthat it is a regular file with link count exactly one and within the recorded per-file and cumulative byte limits.Enforce those limits again while reading from that descriptor.
Copy exactly the verified size, repeat
fstat, and reject a changed identity, type, link count, or size.For the destination, walk every parent component from the retained artifacts-root descriptor with no-follow directory-relative operations; require each existing component to be a real directory, and create any missing directory exclusively before reopening and verifying it no-follow.
Create the leaf exclusively without following links, verify that the opened destination is a regular file with link count exactly one, and copy from the verified source descriptor without reopening either path.
Use equivalent race-safe APIs on non-POSIX systems.
Never recursively copy or glob scratch, extract an archive into artifacts, or open or promote a symlink, FIFO, socket, device, directory, hard-linked file, changing file, or file that exceeds its bound.
If any check is unavailable, cannot be enforced, or fails, discard the scratch entry; if it is decisive evidence, retain
needs_validationwith the exact promotion blocker.
HUNTING.md and VALIDATION-AND-REPORTING.md carry this procedure as one identical fenced block for hunter and verifier prompts; it states the same rules in the same order as this list.
For a reproduced check, record the command, exact test input, sandbox limits, and only the allowlisted environment variable names plus safe non-secret values needed to reproduce it. Never capture or copy the ambient environment, inherited variables, credential values, authentication state, or unrelated host paths. Launch from an empty environment rather than trying to redact one after execution.
Before delegation, the parent writes run-metadata.json with at least run_id, repo, target, source_ref, profile, scope_paths, budget (null if unset), execution_policy: "sandboxed-source-and-local-only", selected companion files, prior-run paths, shared-file owners, and run_status: "in_progress". Update metadata only when those facts change; candidate state belongs in the coverage ledger and findings.json.
Full audit planning
The coverage, prior-run, profile, and budget requirements in this section apply only in full audit mode.
Coverage and prior runs
No one pass is complete. Build a deterministic coverage plan before hunting and update it after every agent result. RECONNAISSANCE.md defines the stable coverage units and HUNTING.md defines coverage-critic waves. The parent alone updates the ledger.
If prior runs exist, read every compatible coverage-ledger.json and findings.json before planning the current run:
Compare the relevant current source with each prior record and unit. A prior source ref alone is not evidence that a path is unchanged.
Carry a prior
confirmedrecord into the current candidate set only when its relevant source and conditions are unchanged and its evidence still meets the current contract. Link it to a current ledger unit seededplanned, preserve its fingerprint, exclude only that carried root cause from hunters, and send the carried record through the current final verification path; the Phase 3 verifier that re-checks it becomes that unit's assignment owner and moves it tocandidate.When relevant source for a prior
confirmedrecord changed, create a current planned revalidation unit. Do not put that record on the hunter exclusion list. It remains confirmed only if current independent validation establishes the current path and result.Make prior
needs_validation,deferred,blocked,out_of_scope, and any changed-source unit current work. A still-externalneeds_validationrecord may be carried only after the current source trace is checked and linked by fingerprint to a currentplannedunit whose verifier re-check supplies its owner and evidence; the record keeps the unresolved blocker. These prior states never suppress a current unit.A prior same-source covered unit may inform priority, but it remains visible in the current ledger. A prior
rejectedrecord suppresses only the unchanged failed claim, not coverage of its unit; changed evidence creates current work.Read the prior profile and scope. A prior
quickor scoped ledger contributes only its recorded evidence and gaps, never an implied "rest is fine."
If no prior ledger exists, say so in the final coverage statement. Never imply that one run exhausts the target.
Run profiles and scope
During full audit setup, pick a profile from the user's request or propose one from the target's size and stakes. Record it in run-metadata.json (profile, scope_paths) and state it in the report. The default is standard.
quick— a bounded pass for small targets, re-runs, or a fast first look. Coarsen ledger units to surface × boundary × attack class (subsystem uses the fixed canonicalprofile/quick/all-in-scope-subsystemsidentifier), run exactly one hunter wave followed by exactly one final coverage-critic pass, and use one fresh verifier per candidate for both candidate validation and final record verification. Do not launch a follow-up hunter wave: record the critic's accepted discoveries and reassignments asdeferred.standard— the workflow as written.deep— for high-stakes or large targets. Split ledger units per subsystem and lifecycle mode, run critic waves to a clean pass, keep candidate validation and final record verification as separate fresh agents, and giveprior_covered_same_sourceunits an independent second pass.
A scoped run audits a subset: named paths, one subsystem, one companion domain, or the diff between two source refs. Seed ledger units only for in-scope surfaces and record everything else as out_of_scope — never as covered. A scoped or quick run must present itself as partial coverage.
Profiles change breadth and redundancy, never the evidence bar. Do not scale away the candidate gate, the source/local execution boundary, needs_validation discipline, schema validation, or independent verification of confirmed records.
Cost budget
The ledger makes spend countable: one unit is roughly one hunter assignment, and one surviving candidate is one or two verifier assignments depending on profile. When the user sets a budget — or the parent proposes one for a large target — record budget in run-metadata.json as a maximum number of agent invocations across all phases.
Apply the strict budget gate before launching any reconnaissance agent. Reserve the four baseline reconnaissance calls, one final post-wave critic for quick or one post-wave plus one distinct final-clean critic for standard/deep, and at least one verifier call. Add focused reconnaissance only after repeating this gate for each extra call. If the requested budget cannot fund that minimum, launch no agent: ask for a larger budget, narrower scope, or different profile. If the request remains unchanged, set run_status: "incomplete" with incomplete_reason: "budget_cannot_fund_reconnaissance_and_reserves" and report that no audit pass ran.
Spend it in this order:
Count reconnaissance, every post-wave critic, and the separate final-clean critic as agent invocations.
Reserve critics and validation before hunting. For
quick, reserve its one post-wave final critic. Before everystandardordeephunter wave, reserve one immediate post-wave critic plus one distinct final-clean critic. Also reserve verifier cost from the profile (about 1 or 2 agents per expected candidate; when in doubt reserve 30% of the balance after critic reservation). Never assign hunters into either reserve.Assign hunters to units in priority order until the hunting allowance is spent. Spend the reserved post-wave critic immediately after that wave; keep the final-clean and validation reserves intact.
Before a later wave, reserve its new post-wave critic again. If the remaining budget cannot cover the required critic calls and validation reserve, launch no hunters from that wave, mark its planned units
deferredwith reasonbudget_cannot_reserve_critics_and_validation, and use the retained final-clean critic to record the resulting gap.
Before wave 1, update the pre-recon estimate with seeded units, implied hunter count, mandatory critic calls, validation reserve, and whether the remaining budget covers the plan. If it clearly cannot, say so and propose either a tighter scope or a coarser profile instead of silently thinning evidence. If later facts consume the required final-critic reserve, launch no hunters, mark all planned work deferred, set the run incomplete with reason critic_budget_exhausted, and make no complete-coverage claim.
A strict total-agent budget can still be exceeded by an unexpectedly large candidate set or by a material Phase 5 replacement that needs another independent verifier. If the remaining budget cannot validate every candidate, stop hunting, validate candidates in fingerprint order while the budget permits, and set run_status: "incomplete" plus incomplete_reason: "validation_budget_exhausted". Keep each unvalidated fingerprint linked to a candidate ledger unit with that unresolved reason. Do not put an unvalidated candidate in findings.json, relabel it needs_validation, or report the run as complete. Phase 6 may produce a partial report only if its first section states that candidate validation is incomplete and lists the affected fingerprints and units. Never exceed a user-set strict budget silently.
Core principles
Require a boundary and result
For every candidate, name the lower-trust principal, accepted input or action, intended control, crossed boundary, affected principal or resource, and concrete observed or owner-observable result. Do not elevate a missing best practice, guessed deployment behavior, generic parser crash, or self-impact into a security finding.
Use bounded local evidence
Static analysis establishes the source path. Sandboxed local tests resolve behavior when all execution controls are available: a minimal function harness, existing unit test, small parser fixture, dummy-tenant integration test, locally rendered configuration, or bounded isolated-loopback client. Stop at a wrong return value, unauthorized dummy record, sanitizer finding, policy difference, or other minimum effect. Do not extend the local check beyond the minimum boundary result or produce persistence, post-fault, or concealment material.
Respect source visibility
Deployment controls, proxy behavior, provider settings, browser headers, identity policy, broker ACLs, packaging, and topology are real controls. If they are required and absent from the repository, do not assume either presence or absence. Use needs_validation with the exact missing fact and a safe owner-observed or local plan.
Separate priority from certainty
Only confirmed records receive severity. Likelihood and impact must reflect the demonstrated conditions and result; overall severity cannot exceed demonstrated impact. needs_validation means a specific source-grounded boundary hypothesis is blocked, not a low-confidence confirmed vulnerability, and it has no severity.
Calibrate overall severity with these anchors:
critical — an unauthenticated actor gains code execution, full data-store access, or takeover of arbitrary accounts.
high — an actor fully defeats an explicit security control with real consequences: authentication bypass, cross-tenant read or write, stored script execution affecting other users, authenticated code execution, or an unauthenticated remote stop of a shared service.
medium — a real boundary violation with limited blast radius, uncommon preconditions, or consequences confined to a narrow resource set.
low — disclosure of non-secret internals, or an effect requiring sustained effort for minimal gain.
informational — a confirmed but minimal-impact observation, useful mainly as a prerequisite inside a larger finding.
The high/medium discriminator: does the demonstrated result fully defeat an explicit control for an action with real consequences, or only weaken it? If you cannot state the concrete damage, the severity is lower than it feels.
Recommend the smallest effective source fix
For each confirmed finding, identify the invariant the code must enforce and the narrowest source change that enforces it at the last trusted decision point. Prefer specific repository-relative changes and regression tests over generic hardening advice. The audit describes fixes; it does not modify target source.
Full audit workflow
In full audit mode, follow all six phases in order:
Reconnaissance — map the source, trust boundaries, local build paths, companion selections, prior evidence, and initial deterministic coverage ledger with RECONNAISSANCE.md.
Coverage-led hunting waves — assign isolated hunters from the ledger and collect structured candidate results with HUNTING.md, ATTACK-CLASSES.md, and the selected domain companions.
Candidate validation — consolidate fingerprints and give every candidate to a fresh source verifier as defined in VALIDATION-AND-REPORTING.md.
Structured output — write all final
confirmed,needs_validation, andrejectedrecords tofindings.json; validate it withreport-schema.jsonandvalidate-findings.cjs, and validate the coverage claim withvalidate-coverage-ledger.cjs.Independent record verification — use fresh agents to verify final source claims and reconcile corrections or state changes.
Target-neutral report — derive
REPORT.md,FINDINGS-DETAIL.md, andNEEDS-VALIDATION.mdfrom the final records, with no live-probe instructions.
Do not end the run before one of exactly two terminal states: (a) all Phase 6 artifacts are written and both validators pass, or (b) run_status: "incomplete" is recorded with its exact reason and the gap is disclosed in the report. Never stop mid-phase.
Anti-patterns
Checklist deviations presented as vulnerabilities.
Defense-in-depth advice with no reachable boundary violation.
Live or shared-environment testing where bounded local evidence is insufficient.
Guessing provider, proxy, browser, identity, or deployment behavior not present in source.
Treating intended same-principal authority or self-impact as a cross-boundary result.
Reporting a parser or runtime effect stronger than the observed effect.
Emitting prose-only hunter results that cannot be deduplicated or verified.
Re-reporting carried same-source prior confirmed records or using them as exemplars that anchor the hunt.
Assigning severity to
needs_validationrecords.Writing the report before independent verification or letting prose and JSON disagree.
Files
- AI-AND-LLM.md10.4 KiB
- ATTACK-CLASSES.md15.3 KiB
- ATTRIBUTION.mdAdded by AutoGineer885 B
- CLIENT-SIDE.md8.4 KiB
- CLOUD-AND-DEPLOYMENT.md8.1 KiB
- DATA-ISOLATION-AND-LIFECYCLE.md7.6 KiB
- DESKTOP-MOBILE-AND-LOCAL-IPC.md8.5 KiB
- HUNTING.md21.9 KiB
- LICENSELicence file added by AutoGineer1.1 KiB
- MEMORY-SAFETY-AND-BINARY.md10.3 KiB
- PROTOCOLS-RPC-AND-MESSAGING.md7.3 KiB
- RECONNAISSANCE.md15.5 KiB
- RESOURCE-EXHAUSTION-AND-AVAILABILITY.md7.3 KiB
- SKILL.md21.5 KiB
- SUPPLY-CHAIN-AND-RELEASE.md7.1 KiB
- VALIDATION-AND-REPORTING.md17.4 KiB
- WEB-PROTOCOL-AND-AUTH.md12.0 KiB
- report-schema.json14.2 KiB
- validate-coverage-ledger.cjsScript32.7 KiB
- validate-coverage-ledger.test.cjsScript27.8 KiB
- validate-findings.cjsScript28.1 KiB
- validate-findings.test.cjsScript25.8 KiB
AI-AND-LLM.md
AI, LLM, and Agent Hunting
When to use this file
Reach for this file when a language model participates in a trust-sensitive decision: chatbots and assistants, RAG pipelines, persistent agent memory, agent/tool-calling loops, MCP servers and clients, code that builds prompts from untrusted input, or code that consumes model output and acts on it. The important data flow is untrusted content → model or memory → capability, authority, or sink.
Use this alongside ATTACK-CLASSES.md, not instead of it. Transport, access control, query construction, filesystem use, and output rendering remain ordinary trust boundaries. This file covers the model-specific delegation layer. Split large targets by retrieval, memory, tool dispatch, MCP, and output handling.
Core discipline (include in every agent prompt for this domain)
- Prompt injection alone is not a finding. Require a code-level boundary failure: content reaches another principal's context, invokes authority the requester lacks, discloses data they cannot read, or drives a sink they cannot reach directly.
- Model output, memory, tool descriptions, and MCP responses are untrusted inputs. Point to the code that grants authority, trusts output, writes durable state, or feeds a sink.
- A guardrail prompt is not a security boundary. Count only deterministic checks, resource-scoped authorization, isolation, binding, and constrained credentials.
- State the attacker, affected principal, effective execution identity, resource, exact action, authority used, and observable impact. An intentional direct request to use the requester's existing authority is not a delegation defect merely because a model executes it.
- Authorization and action binding are separate controls. Attacker-controlled content that causes an action under an affected principal's valid authority is an action-binding failure when that principal did not intentionally request or approve the exact action.
- Classify every candidate as `confirmed` only after source evidence and bounded local validation establish the boundary and result. Use `needs_validation` when a required provider, deployment, model, renderer, or identity behavior is not observable locally.Context, retrieval, and memory attack classes (subagent_type: general)
Indirect injection through retrieved or ingested content An attacker can write a RAG document, indexed page, file, email, issue body, tool response, or metadata that enters a different principal's model context. Trace who can write each source, how retrieval scopes it, whose session consumes it, and what capability is enabled there. Check isolation, resource authorization, and binding to the consuming principal's intent separately. The defect is a missing deterministic control, not persuasive text by itself.
Cross-session or cross-tenant context bleed Conversation history, embeddings, retrieval results, or prompt caches are keyed too broadly. Verify tenant and ACL filters in the query itself and every cache key. A tenant field stored on an object is not enforcement if an alternate query, shared cache, or batch path omits it.
Persistent memory poisoning Attacker-controlled content or model summaries are written into memory that later shapes another task, user, or privileged session. Review who may create, update, merge, and delete memory; its provenance and tenant scope; whether low-trust observations become durable instructions or facts; and whether retrieval distinguishes user preferences from tool policy. Memory intentionally saved by a user and used only for that user's intentional, allowed requests is not a cross-boundary finding.
Prompt role and provenance confusion Prompt assembly lets untrusted text impersonate a system message, prior turn, tool result, policy, or memory record. Look for string concatenation, untyped history, caller-controlled role fields, and serialization round trips that lose source labels. Confirm that the forged provenance changes a deterministic trust decision or reaches a meaningful capability.
Tool and action attack classes (subagent_type: general)
Tool-argument injection into a downstream sink Model-produced arguments reach SQL, shell, file, URL-fetch, or privileged APIs without handler-side validation. Treat the tool schema as input parsing, then follow each field from decoded call to sink. Structured output narrows shape; it does not establish authorization, safe paths, safe URLs, or query semantics.
Excessive agency and confused-deputy authority The agent uses a service identity or broad credential, while the tool handler does not re-check the requesting principal's permission on the named resource. Verify both the effective identity and whether the caller could perform that exact operation through the normal product interface. A shared credential with enforced per-user query scope is not a defect.
Action-confirmation and approval binding A user approves one described action but execution can use changed arguments, a different resource, a different principal, or a later model turn. An action-binding defect also exists when attacker-controlled content causes a side effect under a victim's valid authority without the victim's intentional request or approval, even if generic authorization permits the victim to perform it. Review whether intent or confirmation binds the normalized tool name, complete argument object, requester, target, amount, expiry, and batch membership. Check retries and resumed sessions: an approval must not authorize a mutated or duplicate side effect.
Tool-schema and dispatcher disagreement The schema accepts aliases, extra fields, duplicate keys, coercions, nested free-form objects, or out-of-range values that the dispatcher or handler interprets differently. Compare schema validation, canonicalization, generated bindings, and handler defaults. Validate again where values become resource selectors or security-relevant options.
Unbounded delegated action loops A bounded request can enqueue repeated spend, send, mutation, or external API work without a per-request budget, per-action authorization, cancellation, or idempotency control. Confirm impact on shared cost, quotas, other users, or durable state. Do not test by exhausting a service; use code-level accounting and a locally bounded loop.
MCP and sub-agent trust classes (subagent_type: general)
Sub-agent and MCP trust inheritance A delegated task receives the full session, credentials, memory, or capabilities rather than the least authority required. Check the principal and tenant carried into each call, capability narrowing, credential audience, and whether delegated results are treated as untrusted on return.
MCP server and tool identity confusion Calls or results are routed by attacker-influenceable server names, tool names, request IDs, resource URIs, or model-selected aliases rather than the authenticated connection and outstanding request. Check whether two servers can claim the same tool or resource identity, whether reconnect changes the binding, and whether a response from one server can satisfy another server's pending call.
MCP metadata and schema as policy Tool descriptions, resource metadata, prompts, completion hints, or schemas supplied by an MCP peer are trusted as policy or authorization. These fields can guide the model but cannot grant capability. Find the deterministic allowlist, server identity check, and handler authorization that remain authoritative when metadata conflicts.
Output and disclosure attack classes (subagent_type: general)
Insecure output rendering
Model output reaches an executing HTML, Markdown, template, URL, or command sink without the sink's required encoding and policy. For browser rendering, verify auto-loaded resources and CSP or sanitization in CLIENT-SIDE.md; renderer behavior outside the repository makes the candidate needs_validation.
Sensitive context extraction The assembled context contains credentials, another user's data, private source, or policy values that themselves grant access, and user-influenced output exposes them. Read prompt assembly and data-fetch code. Disclosure of generic instructions or behavior that does not cross a data boundary is not a finding.
Universal moves (apply across the above)
Draw four maps first: each execution identity, each capability, every writable context or memory source, and each output destination. Then connect the principal at the start to the authority at the end.
Start at side-effecting tools and work backward through dispatcher, schema, confirmation, model context, retrieval, and ingestion. Start at durable memory reads and trace every writer.
Compare direct, queued, retry, resume, batch, and delegated paths for the same action. The strongest gate must apply after arguments are final and before every side effect.
Validation rules (apply before reporting ANY finding here)
Name the crossed boundary and observable result: attacker, affected principal or shared resource, execution identity, target, and unauthorized or unrequested action or disclosure.
For confused-deputy authority claims, prove the tool lacks requester-and-resource authorization and that the attacker cannot perform the same action normally. For action-binding claims, instead prove attacker-controlled content caused an action under the affected principal's authority that the principal did not intentionally request or approve. Valid generic authorization does not establish that intent.
For memory or retrieval claims, cite both the attacker-controlled write and the later cross-principal read or privileged decision. A shared record without a reachable consumer is not enough.
For action binding, establish the intentional request or normalized approved object, if any, and compare it with the object the handler uses. Confirm a locally observable unrequested action, mutation, duplicate, or authority change without extending the test into harmful execution. For schema disagreement, compare the normalized validated object with the handler's object.
For MCP identity claims, verify the authenticated connection, request correlation, tool namespace, and effective credential. Mark
needs_validationif external server identity or deployment routing is required.Return
confirmedfindings only with a complete source trace and meaningful result. Returnneeds_validationfor a specific unresolved boundary fact and state the bounded local or owner-observed check needed to resolve it.
Requirements and compatibility
Written for: Claude Code
Works with: Claude Code, Claude apps, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Kiro, OpenCode, Goose, Amp, Roo Code, JetBrains Junie, Factory Droid, Devin (ex-Windsurf), Mistral Vibe, OpenHands, Letta
“Works with” means the tool reads the open Agent Skills format; a skill written for one tool may use features others lack.
Needs: Names Claude Code tools, Needs Node.js
Security
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Attribution and licence
- Published by
- Cloudflare
- Publisher
- Cloudflare (Official)
- Source
- cloudflare/security-audit-skill · skills/security-audit · commit c1c8a8c
- Licence
- MIT License (redistribution allowed)
- LICENSE (added by AutoGineer from LICENSE)
- ATTRIBUTION.md (written by AutoGineer)
- Synced
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