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This skill provides guidance on integrating Amazon Cognito user pools and identity pools into web and mobile applications. It covers the full lifecycle of authentication, including sign-up/sign-in flows, managed login, MFA, OAuth 2.0/OIDC standards, and token management. It also details how to secure API Gateway or ALB routes using Cognito authorizers and how to vend temporary AWS credentials to clients via identity pools. The skill emphasizes secure practices, such as using PKCE for public clients and avoiding common pitfalls like client secret exposure or improper identity pool role configuration.
What it does
- Configures Amazon Cognito user pools for user directory and authentication management.
- Implements OAuth 2.0 and OIDC flows, including authorization code grant with PKCE.
- Secures API Gateway and ALB routes using Cognito/JWT authorizers.
- Manages identity pools to provide temporary AWS credentials to authenticated clients.
- Handles token lifecycle, including rotation, revocation, and secure storage.
- Integrates social and SAML federation for external identity providers.
When to use it
- When adding sign-up or login functionality to a web or mobile application.
- When you need to gate API endpoints to ensure only authenticated users can access them.
- When your client application requires direct access to AWS services like S3 or DynamoDB.
- When configuring MFA, password policies, or custom authentication challenges.
- When troubleshooting authentication errors like redirect mismatches, CORS issues, or token validation failures.
Advantages
- Provides clear distinctions between user pools and identity pools to prevent common architectural errors.
- Highlights critical security practices like avoiding client secrets in public clients.
- Includes specific guidance on avoiding destructive 'full replace' API calls.
- Offers a structured approach to troubleshooting common authentication and federation issues.
- Aligns with industry-standard security patterns for token handling and API protection.
Usage examples
- “How do I set up a user pool for a React app with hosted UI?”
- The agent provides steps to create a user pool, configure a public app client, enable the hosted UI with authorization code grant and PKCE, and wire the Amplify client library.
- “My API Gateway is returning 401 errors for valid tokens, what should I check?”
- The agent guides you to verify the token type, check the issuer and audience configuration in the JWT authorizer, and ensure the correct token is being sent in the Authorization header.
- “How do I allow my mobile app users to upload files directly to S3?”
- The agent explains how to set up an identity pool that trusts your user pool, maps authenticated users to an IAM role with S3 permissions, and vends temporary credentials.
- “How do I add Google login to my Cognito user pool?”
- The agent outlines the process of registering Google as an IdP in the user pool, mapping attributes, and updating the app client to include the provider.
Install
Download the skill as a ZIP:
https://autogineer.com/agent-skills/aws/aws-auth/downloadUnzip it into the cross-client skills folder of your project:
mkdir -p .agents/skills && unzip aws-auth.zip -d .agents/skills
Documentation by AWS
AWS Auth (Amazon Cognito)
Application-level user authentication and authorization with Amazon Cognito and the Amplify client auth libraries. Verify specific limits, quotas, and exact API shapes against official AWS documentation when precision matters; trust the docs over memory when they conflict.
Recommended: The AWS MCP server provides streamlined access to the AWS APIs used in this skill (Cognito user pool/app client/identity pool setup, API Gateway authorizers). If it is unavailable, the AWS CLI commands shown throughout work directly — the skill has no hard dependency on MCP.
When NOT to use: Amplify Gen2 backend code (defineAuth, amplify/auth.ts, npx ampx); IAM
policy/role/trust-policy authoring, STS, or IAM Identity Center console SSO; API Gateway
route/integration setup or Lambda function implementation (this skill covers only the Cognito/JWT
authorizer configuration and the purpose of Cognito Lambda triggers).
User Pool vs Identity Pool — pick first
These are different services that are frequently confused. Most apps need a user pool; add an identity pool only if the client must call AWS services directly.
| You need... | Use | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Sign-up / sign-in, user directory, issue JWTs | User pool | It authenticates users and is an OIDC IdP |
| The signed-in client to call S3/DynamoDB/etc. directly with AWS credentials | Identity pool | It exchanges a token for temporary AWS credentials via STS |
| Both (sign in, then hit AWS resources from the browser/app) | User pool → identity pool | Identity pool trusts the user pool as its IdP |
If your app only calls your own backend/API, you do not need an identity pool — send the user pool token to your API. See identity-pools.md.
Critical Warnings
update-user-pool-client and set-identity-pool-roles are FULL REPLACE, not partial updates: Any field you omit is reset to its default — calling update-user-pool-client with only the fields you want to change silently wipes ExplicitAuthFlows, token validity, EnableTokenRevocation, refresh-token rotation, and read/write attributes; set-identity-pool-roles likewise replaces the whole roles + RoleMappings structure. Always read-modify-write: describe-user-pool-client (or get-identity-pool-roles) first, then re-send every existing field plus your change. In an agent context the wipe is invisible — the call succeeds and only breaks later when a user hits the missing flow. See managed-login-oauth.md and identity-pools.md.
Don't use the implicit grant for new apps: The implicit grant (response_type=token) is legacy and returns tokens in the URL fragment. Use the authorization code grant with PKCE (response_type=code + code_challenge) for SPAs and mobile — public clients, no client secret. See managed-login-oauth.md.
Don't store refresh tokens in localStorage for high-value apps: localStorage is readable by any injected script (XSS). The Amplify client library defaults to localStorage; switch to cookieStorage, keep refresh-token lifetime short, and enable refresh token rotation + token revocation on the app client. See tokens-and-sessions.md.
Access-token claim customization needs a paid feature plan: The pre token generation trigger customizes the ID token on the entry-level plan (V1), but customizing the access token (V2/V3) requires a paid feature plan — check the Cognito feature plans documentation for which plan currently includes this, as plan names and inclusions can change. Don't assume access-token claims work on the entry-level plan. See lambda-triggers.md.
App client secret + SPA = broken auth: A public client (browser/mobile) must have no client secret. If a secret is set, token calls fail unless a SECRET_HASH is sent, which a browser cannot protect. Generate a secret only for confidential (server-side) clients.
Don't bulk admin-confirm-sign-up UNCONFIRMED users: When users are stuck UNCONFIRMED, prefer resend-confirmation-code so each user re-verifies via confirm-sign-up and proves email ownership (the code likely expired or went to spam). admin-confirm-sign-up flips the status instantly but confirms the account without verifying the email — the attribute stays unverified, which is dangerous when email drives password reset or account linking. Reserve it for trusted/migrated accounts. See troubleshooting.md.
Quick Navigation
| You want to... | Go to |
|---|---|
| Create a user pool, sign-up/sign-in, MFA, password policy, app clients | user-pools.md |
| Add hosted UI / managed login, OAuth flows, social or SAML login, callback URLs, custom domain (ACM in us-east-1) | managed-login-oauth.md |
| Handle ID/access/refresh tokens, rotation, revocation, session termination (global sign-out vs revoke vs disable) | tokens-and-sessions.md |
| Give the client temporary AWS credentials, guest access, role mapping | identity-pools.md |
| Protect an API Gateway API with Cognito tokens (and enforce custom claims in the backend) | api-authorization.md |
Add Cognito login in front of an Application Load Balancer (ALB authenticate-cognito) | api-authorization.md |
| Machine-to-machine (client credentials) auth, resource servers, custom scopes | managed-login-oauth.md |
Create user pool groups and add users to them (cognito:groups, Precedence) | user-pools.md |
| Customize claims, custom auth challenge flows, migrate users, validate sign-up | lambda-triggers.md |
Add passkey / WebAuthn sign-in (USER_AUTH flow, AllowedFirstAuthFactors, WebAuthn enrollment) | passkeys.md |
| Configure threat protection — compromised-credentials block, adaptive auth (risk-based MFA), log delivery to CloudWatch | threat-protection.md |
| Something is broken (redirect, token, MFA, CORS, social login) | troubleshooting.md |
Common Workflows
"Add sign-up and login to my React app" → Create a user pool + a public app client (no secret), enable the hosted UI / managed login with the authorization code grant with PKCE, wire the Amplify client library. See user-pools.md and managed-login-oauth.md.
"Add Google / social login" → Register the social IdP on the user pool, map attributes, add the provider to the app client and hosted UI. See managed-login-oauth.md.
"Only authenticated users should call my API" → HTTP API → JWT authorizer; REST API → Cognito user pools authorizer. See api-authorization.md.
"Let the browser upload to S3 after login" → User pool for sign-in, then an identity pool to vend scoped temporary credentials. See identity-pools.md.
Troubleshooting
| Error/Symptom | Likely Cause | Quick Fix |
|---|---|---|
redirect_mismatch / redirect to wrong URL after login | Callback URL not registered, or scheme/trailing-slash/case differs | Add the exact callback URL (incl. scheme and path) to the app client's Allowed callback URLs |
| Token calls fail with "unable to verify secret hash" | Client secret set on a public (SPA/mobile) client | Recreate the app client with no secret, or send SECRET_HASH from a confidential client |
| Users get 401 from API Gateway with a valid token | Wrong token type or audience/issuer mismatch | HTTP JWT authorizer: issuer https://cognito-idp.{region}.amazonaws.com/{userPoolId}, audience = app client id; send the token the authorizer expects |
| CORS errors calling the hosted UI / token endpoint | Browser calling /oauth2/token cross-origin, or missing CORS on your API | Do the code exchange with PKCE; don't proxy the token endpoint from the browser |
| Social login user "already exists" / attribute conflict | Same email across providers creates separate users | Enable attribute mapping + account linking; treat email as non-unique across IdPs |
Full tables in troubleshooting.md.
Security Considerations
Public clients (SPA/mobile): no client secret, authorization code grant with PKCE, request least-privilege scopes.
Enable MFA (TOTP or SMS), a strong password policy, and advanced security / threat protection where available.
Short access-token lifetime; enable refresh token rotation and token revocation; prefer
cookieStorageoverlocalStorage.Identity pools: scope the authenticated IAM role tightly; disable unauthenticated (guest) access unless required.
Validate JWTs against the user pool JWKS (
iss,aud/client_id,token_use,exp) on every protected request. Use a maintained library such asaws-jwt-verifyrather than hand-rolling verification.Set security headers on the app's web pages:
Content-Security-Policy(restrict script sources to mitigate token-stealing XSS),Strict-Transport-Security(HSTS),X-Frame-Options/frame-ancestors(clickjacking on login pages), andX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff.Enable logging and monitoring: CloudTrail for Cognito API events (sign-up/sign-in/admin), user pool threat protection (adaptive auth + event logging), CloudWatch alarms on failed/throttled auth, and API Gateway access logging for authorizer decisions.
All Cognito and API endpoints are HTTPS/TLS only; enable encryption at rest with a customer-managed KMS key (and restricted key access) on CloudWatch Log groups, SNS topics used for MFA/notifications, and any identity-pool-fronted upload buckets.
If using SNS for MFA/notification delivery, enable server-side encryption (KMS) on the topic, and keep SMS/email message content limited to what the recipient needs — don't include more PII than the message requires.
References: Amazon Cognito security features (user pools), Amazon Cognito security (top-level, incl. identity pools), and IAM/STS best practices.
Where to Look When This Skill Is Silent
When you need depth beyond this skill — exact parameter shapes, current limits, edge behaviors — fall back to the authoritative AWS sources rather than guessing. Pointers age much slower than content, so this map stays useful without the skill having to grow.
API reference (exact params, defaults, errors): Cognito User Pools API and Cognito Identity API
Developer Guide (concepts, workflows): Amazon Cognito Developer Guide
Quotas, rate limits, session-cookie lifetime: Cognito quotas
Feature plans / tier gating: Cognito feature plans
Pricing: Amazon Cognito pricing
CLI reference: aws cognito-idp and aws cognito-identity
Not Covered By This Skill
Amplify Gen2 backend (
defineAuth,amplify/auth.ts,npx ampx sandbox).IAM policy/role/trust-policy authoring, STS, IAM Identity Center console SSO.
API Gateway route/integration setup and Lambda function implementation (this skill covers only the Cognito/JWT authorizer configuration and the purpose of Cognito Lambda triggers).
Files
- ATTRIBUTION.mdAdded by AutoGineer881 B
- LICENSELicence file added by AutoGineer9.9 KiB
- NOTICELicence file added by AutoGineer67 B
- SKILL.md13.5 KiB
- references/api-authorization.md5.0 KiB
- references/identity-pools.md5.8 KiB
- references/lambda-triggers.md9.9 KiB
- references/managed-login-oauth.md15.4 KiB
- references/passkeys.md4.9 KiB
- references/threat-protection.md5.9 KiB
- references/tokens-and-sessions.md11.2 KiB
- references/troubleshooting.md4.6 KiB
- references/user-pools.md8.5 KiB
references/lambda-triggers.md
Cognito Lambda Triggers
Overview
Lambda triggers let you inject custom logic into user pool operations (sign-up, sign-in, token
issuance, migration, messaging). This reference covers which trigger to use for what and the
key gotchas. Implementing the Lambda function itself belongs to the aws-serverless skill.
Trigger catalog
| Trigger | Fires when | Use for |
|---|---|---|
| Pre sign-up | A user/admin creates an account | Allow/deny sign-up; auto-confirm for trusted flows (see caveat below) |
| Post confirmation | Account confirmed or password reset | Post-signup provisioning (add to a group, write to a DB, welcome email) |
| Pre authentication | Before sign-in | Block sign-in based on custom rules |
| Post authentication | After successful sign-in | Audit / analytics on login |
| Migrate user | Sign-in or forgot-password for an unknown user | Lazily import users from a legacy directory/DB |
| Pre token generation | Before tokens are issued | Add/modify/suppress token claims (see feature-plan note) |
| Custom message | Cognito sends a verification/MFA message | Customize email/SMS content |
| Define / Create / Verify auth challenge | Custom authentication flow | CAPTCHA, security questions, or a multi-step challenge sequence your app defines. Do NOT use for email/SMS OTP passwordless — Cognito supports those natively as first-auth factors (see passkeys.md for EMAIL_OTP / SMS_OTP in AllowedFirstAuthFactors) |
Pre sign-up — auto-confirm vs auto-verify are different decisions. Auto-confirming an account
(letting the user skip the confirmation code) is fine for trusted flows. Auto-verifying the email
or phone attribute (autoVerifyEmail/autoVerifyPhone) marks that contact as proven-owned, so only
do it when ownership was established out-of-band — e.g. a federated IdP that already verified it.
Never auto-verify based solely on the domain of a self-asserted email, or an attacker can get a
verified attribute they don't own (which then drives password reset / account linking).
Migrate user — lazy import from a legacy directory
The migrate-user trigger fires when Cognito encounters an unknown username during sign-in or forgot-password, letting you validate the credentials against a legacy system and import the user on the fly. Wire this if you're moving 10K+ users off an existing auth database without forcing everyone to reset their password.
Wire BOTH trigger sources for a real lazy-migration setup:
UserMigration_Authentication— fires onInitiateAuth/AdminInitiateAuthfor an unknown user. Receivesevent.request.password(plaintext, so the Lambda can verify against the legacy hash) andevent.request.userAttributes. Must return the user's attributes.UserMigration_ForgotPassword— fires onForgotPasswordfor an unknown user. Does NOT receive the password. Return the user's attributes withemail_verified: "true"so Cognito can send the reset code.
App client must use USER_PASSWORD_AUTH (or ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH) — SRP
CANNOT WORK for migration. SRP obscures the plaintext password from Cognito (and
therefore from your Lambda), so the trigger has nothing to verify against the
legacy database. Set ExplicitAuthFlows to include ALLOW_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH on
the app client. Use TLS end-to-end; the plaintext password appears in the raw
Lambda event, so log-sanitize aggressively.
Response contract:
userAttributes— map of Cognito user attributes. Setemail_verified: "true"(orphone_number_verified: "true") to skip re-verification.finalUserStatus— usually"CONFIRMED"so the user can sign in immediately. The default is"RESET_REQUIRED", which forces a password reset on next sign-in.messageAction—"SUPPRESS"to skip the default welcome message.
The pool's own password policy is NOT enforced during migration — the legacy hash was created under its own rules. Consider forcing a rotate-on-next-login for users whose legacy hash doesn't meet your current policy.
Pre token generation — feature plan matters
V1 (
V1_0): customizes the ID token only. Available on the entry-level plan.V2 (
V2_0): customizes the access token (and ID token). Requires a paid feature plan — check the Cognito feature plans documentation for which plan currently includes this.V3 (
V3_0): like V2, and also applies to machine-to-machine (client-credentials) access tokens. Requires a paid feature plan — same caveat, verify against current docs.
Verify the feature-plan requirement against the AWS documentation — plan names and inclusions can change. Do not assume access-token claim customization works on the entry-level plan; choose the trigger version to match the fields your function expects.
Custom authentication challenge flow
Wire the three challenge triggers only when you need a custom challenge sequence your app defines: CAPTCHA on high-risk sign-in, security-question fallback, hardware-token wrap, or a multi-step approval flow. It runs as three triggers in sequence:
Define auth challenge — the state machine: decides the next challenge or issues tokens.
Create auth challenge — generates and delivers the challenge.
Verify auth challenge response — checks the user's answer, sets
answerCorrect.
Drive it from the client with initiate-auth --auth-flow CUSTOM_AUTH then
respond-to-auth-challenge.
Do NOT use this flow for email/SMS OTP passwordless. Cognito offers native email/SMS
OTP as first-auth factors on supported feature plans, without any custom triggers — set
EMAIL_OTP or SMS_OTP in the pool's SignInPolicy.AllowedFirstAuthFactors and use the
USER_AUTH flow. Custom-auth adds three Lambdas, three invoke-permission grants, and a
bespoke state machine to maintain — the native path is a single update-user-pool call.
See passkeys.md for the USER_AUTH flow and AllowedFirstAuthFactors mechanics
(the same wiring covers passkeys, email OTP, and SMS OTP).
Notification recipients (custom message / MFA)
Send verification codes and MFA messages only to attributes that are already verified, or are being verified in this same flow (e.g. the address the user just entered at sign-up, before it's confirmed) — never to an unverified, caller-supplied address that was set for another purpose (e.g. an attribute updated outside the verification flow). Otherwise a caller-controlled email/phone value could be used to redirect a code meant for the account owner to an address the caller chose.
Gotchas
A trigger that returns an error halts the originating Cognito API call and returns an error to the user. Fail closed for triggers that make an authentication or authorization decision (pre sign-up, pre authentication, verify auth challenge, pre token generation, migrate user): return an error rather than allowing the operation to proceed on an unexpected condition or a failed dependency call. Fail-open is acceptable only for non-authoritative side-effect triggers such as post-authentication analytics or custom messaging, where an error should not block the user's sign-in. Example deny path (pre sign-up, Node.js):
if (isBlockedDomain(event.request.userAttributes.email)) { throw new Error("Sign-up not permitted for this domain."); // halts sign-up; do not return normally }Triggers must return the event with the expected response fields populated, or Cognito rejects the response.
Keep triggers fast; they run inline on the auth path and add latency to every affected request.
Grant Cognito permission to invoke the function (
lambda:InvokeFunctionforcognito-idp.amazonaws.comwith the pool as source). The console and CDK wire this automatically — the CDKUserPoolconstruct adds theAWS::Lambda::Permissionwhen you setlambdaTriggersor calladdTrigger(note it setsaws:SourceArnbut notaws:SourceAccount). Only the raw CLI / API / CloudFormation paths need a manuallambda add-permission/AWS::Lambda::Permission. When you add it yourself, include bothaws:SourceArn(the user pool ARN) andaws:SourceAccount(your account id) on the Lambda resource policy to prevent confused-deputy attacks. Via the CLI,--source-arnalone is not enough — you must also pass--source-account, and you must runadd-permissiononce per Lambda you wire (each trigger function needs its own grant):aws lambda add-permission \ --function-name <trigger-fn-name-or-arn> \ --statement-id cognito-<trigger>-invoke \ --action lambda:InvokeFunction \ --principal cognito-idp.amazonaws.com \ --source-arn arn:aws:cognito-idp:<region>:<account>:userpool/<pool-id> \ --source-account <account> # REQUIRED alongside --source-arn; omitting it leaves a confused-deputy gapThe resulting resource-policy statement carries both conditions:
"Condition": { "ArnLike": { "aws:SourceArn": "arn:aws:cognito-idp:<region>:<account>:userpool/<pool-id>" }, "StringEquals": { "aws:SourceAccount": "<account>" } }Trigger functions receive user PII (email, phone, custom attributes). Avoid logging full event payloads, and encrypt the function's CloudWatch Logs group with a KMS key.
Related
tokens-and-sessions.md for what the claims feed into.
aws-serverlessskill for authoring and deploying the Lambda functions.
Authoritative sources
Requirements and compatibility
Works with: Claude Code, Claude apps, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Kiro, OpenCode, Goose, Amp, Roo Code, JetBrains Junie, Factory Droid, Devin (ex-Windsurf), Mistral Vibe, OpenHands, Letta
“Works with” means the tool reads the open Agent Skills format; a skill written for one tool may use features others lack.
Needs: Needs an MCP server, Needs Node.js
Security
No issues found by our static scan· No issues found
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Attribution and licence
- Published by
- AWS
- Publisher
- AWS (Official)
- Source
- aws/agent-toolkit-for-aws · skills/core-skills/aws-auth · commit 0a218f8
- Licence
- Apache License 2.0 (redistribution allowed)
- LICENSE (added by AutoGineer from LICENSE)
- NOTICE (added by AutoGineer from NOTICE)
- ATTRIBUTION.md (written by AutoGineer)
- Synced
- Also distributed in
- aws/agent-toolkit-for-aws
AutoGineer is not affiliated with or endorsed by AWS or AWS.
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