Cairo Vulnerability Scanner

Cairo/StarkNet Vulnerability Scanner

1. Purpose

Systematically scan Cairo smart contracts on StarkNet for platform-specific security vulnerabilities related to arithmetic, cross-layer messaging, and cryptographic operations. This skill encodes 6 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Cairo/StarkNet ecosystem.

2. When to Use This Skill

• Auditing StarkNet smart contracts (Cairo)

• Reviewing L1-L2 bridge implementations

• Pre-launch security assessment of StarkNet applications

• Validating cross-layer message handling

• Reviewing signature verification logic

• Assessing L1 handler functions

3. Platform Detection

File Extensions & Indicators

• Cairo files: .cairo

Language/Framework Markers

// Cairo contract indicators
#[contract]
mod MyContract {
    use starknet::ContractAddress;

    #[storage]
    struct Storage {
        balance: LegacyMap<ContractAddress, felt252>,
    }

    #[external(v0)]
    fn transfer(ref self: ContractState, to: ContractAddress, amount: felt252) {
        // Contract logic
    }

    #[l1_handler]
    fn handle_deposit(ref self: ContractState, from_address: felt252, amount: u256) {
        // L1 message handler
    }
}

// Common patterns
felt252, u128, u256
ContractAddress, EthAddress
#[external(v0)], #[l1_handler], #[constructor]
get_caller_address(), get_contract_address()
send_message_to_l1_syscall

Project Structure

• src/contract.cairo - Main contract implementation

• src/lib.cairo - Library modules

• tests/ - Contract tests

• Scarb.toml - Cairo project configuration

Tool Support

• Caracal: Trail of Bits static analyzer for Cairo

• Installation: cargo install --git https://github.com/crytic/caracal --profile release --force (a Rust tool — not on PyPI)

• Usage: caracal detect src/

• cairo-test: Built-in testing framework

• Starknet Foundry: Testing and development toolkit

4. How This Skill Works

When invoked, I will:

1. Search your codebase for Cairo files

2. Analyze each contract for the 6 vulnerability patterns

3. Report findings with file references and severity, above them a coverage table carrying a verdict for every pattern

4. Provide fixes for each identified issue

5. Check L1-L2 interactions for messaging vulnerabilities

5. Example Output

When vulnerabilities are found, you'll get a report like this:

=== CAIRO/STARKNET VULNERABILITY SCAN RESULTS ===

6. Vulnerability Patterns (6 Patterns)

I check for 6 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Cairo/Starknet. For detailed detection patterns, code examples, mitigations, and testing strategies, see VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md.

Pattern Summary:

1. Felt252 Arithmetic Overflow/Underflow ⚠️ HIGH - felt252 wraps silently; use u128/u256

2. L1 to L2 Address Conversion ⚠️ HIGH - L1 address not validated against STARKNET_FIELD_PRIME

3. L1 to L2 Message Failure ⚠️ HIGH - No cancellation path when a message cannot be consumed

4. Overconstrained L1 <-> L2 Interaction ⚠️ MEDIUM - Coupling that can strand funds or block progress

5. Signature Replay Protection ⚠️ HIGH - No nonce, or a domain separator missing chain/contract

6. Unchecked from_address in L1 Handler ⚠️ CRITICAL - Any L1 contract can drive the handler

For complete vulnerability patterns with code examples, see VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md.

7. Scanning Workflow

Step 1: Platform Identification

1. Verify Cairo language and StarkNet framework

2. Check Cairo version (Cairo 1.0+ vs legacy Cairo 0)

3. Locate contract files (src/*.cairo)

4. Identify L1-L2 bridge contracts (if applicable)

Step 2: Arithmetic Safety Sweep

# Find felt252 usage in arithmetic
rg "felt252" src/ | rg "[-+*/]"

# Find balance/amount storage using felt252
rg "felt252" src/ | rg "balance|amount|total|supply"

# Should prefer u128, u256 instead

Step 3: L1 Handler Analysis

For each #[l1_handler] function:

• [ ] Validates from_address parameter

• [ ] Checks address != zero

• [ ] Has proper access control

• [ ] Emits events for monitoring

Step 4: Signature Verification Review

For signature-based functions:

• [ ] Includes nonce tracking

• [ ] Nonce incremented after use

• [ ] Domain separator includes chain ID and contract address

• [ ] Cannot replay signatures

Step 5: L1-L2 Bridge Audit

If contract includes bridge functionality:

• [ ] L1 validates address < STARKNET_FIELD_PRIME

• [ ] L1 implements message cancellation

• [ ] L2 validates from_address in handlers

• [ ] Symmetric access controls L1 ↔ L2

• [ ] Test full roundtrip flows

Step 6: Static Analysis with Caracal

# Run Caracal detectors
caracal detect src/

# Specific detectors
caracal detect src/ --detectors unchecked-felt252-arithmetic
caracal detect src/ --detectors unchecked-l1-handler-from
caracal detect src/ --detectors missing-nonce-validation

8. Reporting Format

Coverage Table

Report on every pattern in §6, whether or not it turned anything up. Emit this table above the findings, with all 6 rows present:

Each verdict is one of:

• found — cite file:line and write the finding up in full below.

• clear — the pattern applies to this contract and the contract handles it. Name the function, trait, or check you searched for, so a reader can repeat the search.

• n/a — the pattern cannot apply here. Give the reason in one clause ("no L1 handlers in this contract"). Not having looked is not n/a.

A table with fewer than 6 rows is an incomplete scan and must be reported as one. A row whose Verdict cell is empty is incomplete in the same way: row 1 above is filled in to show the shape, and every row is filled in the same way before the report is done. Six clear verdicts is a result a reader can act on. A report that covers two patterns and says nothing about the other four reads exactly like a clean contract, and that is the failure this table exists to prevent.

Finding Template

## [CRITICAL] Unchecked from_address in L1 Handler

**Location**: `src/bridge.cairo:145-155` (handle_deposit function)

**Description**:
The `handle_deposit` L1 handler function does not validate the `from_address` parameter. Any L1 contract can send messages to this function and mint tokens for arbitrary users, bypassing the intended L1 bridge access controls.

**Vulnerable Code**:
```rust
// bridge.cairo, line 145
#[l1_handler]
fn handle_deposit(
    ref self: ContractState,
    from_address: felt252,  // Not validated!
    user: ContractAddress,
    amount: u256
) {
    let current_balance = self.balances.read(user);
    self.balances.write(user, current_balance + amount);
}
```

**Attack Scenario**:
1. Attacker deploys malicious L1 contract
2. Malicious contract calls `starknetCore.sendMessageToL2(l2Contract, selector, [attacker_address, 1000000])`
3. L2 handler processes message without checking sender
4. Attacker receives 1,000,000 tokens without depositing any funds
5. Protocol suffers infinite mint vulnerability

**Recommendation**:
Validate `from_address` against authorized L1 bridge:
```rust
#[l1_handler]
fn handle_deposit(
    ref self: ContractState,
    from_address: felt252,
    user: ContractAddress,
    amount: u256
) {
    // Validate L1 sender
    let authorized_l1_bridge = self.l1_bridge_address.read();
    assert(from_address == authorized_l1_bridge, 'Unauthorized L1 sender');

    let current_balance = self.balances.read(user);
    self.balances.write(user, current_balance + amount);
}
```

**References**:
- building-secure-contracts/not-so-smart-contracts/cairo/unchecked_l1_handler_from
- Caracal detector: `unchecked-l1-handler-from`

9. Priority Guidelines

Critical (Immediate Fix Required)

• Unchecked from_address in L1 handlers (infinite mint)

• L1-L2 address conversion issues (funds to zero address)

High (Fix Before Deployment)

• Felt252 arithmetic overflow/underflow (balance manipulation)

• Missing signature replay protection (replay attacks)

• L1-L2 message failure without cancellation (locked funds)

Medium (Address in Audit)

• Overconstrained L1-L2 interactions (trapped funds)

10. Testing Recommendations

Unit Tests

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn test_felt252_overflow() {
        // Test arithmetic edge cases
    }

    #[test]
    #[should_panic]
    fn test_unauthorized_l1_handler() {
        // Wrong from_address should fail
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_signature_replay_protection() {
        // Same signature twice should fail
    }
}

Integration Tests (with L1)

// Test full L1-L2 flow
#[test]
fn test_deposit_withdraw_roundtrip() {
    // 1. Deposit on L1
    // 2. Wait for L2 processing
    // 3. Verify L2 balance
    // 4. Withdraw to L1
    // 5. Verify L1 balance restored
}

Caracal CI Integration

# .github/workflows/security.yml
- name: Run Caracal
  run: |
    # Rebuilds from source each run; cache ~/.cargo or pin a release binary instead.
    cargo install --git https://github.com/crytic/caracal --profile release --force
    caracal detect src/ --fail-on high,critical

11. Additional Resources

• Building Secure Contracts: building-secure-contracts/not-so-smart-contracts/cairo/

• Caracal: https://github.com/crytic/caracal

• Cairo Documentation: https://book.cairo-lang.org/

• StarkNet Documentation: https://docs.starknet.io/

• OpenZeppelin Cairo Contracts: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/cairo-contracts

12. Quick Reference Checklist

Before completing Cairo/StarkNet audit:

Arithmetic Safety (HIGH):

• [ ] No felt252 used for balances/amounts (use u128/u256)

• [ ] OR felt252 arithmetic has explicit bounds checking

• [ ] Overflow/underflow scenarios tested

L1 Handler Security (CRITICAL):

• [ ] ALL #[l1_handler] functions validate from_address

• [ ] from_address compared against stored L1 contract address

• [ ] Cannot bypass by deploying alternate L1 contract

L1-L2 Messaging (HIGH):

• [ ] L1 bridge validates addresses < STARKNET_FIELD_PRIME

• [ ] L1 bridge implements message cancellation

• [ ] L2 handlers check from_address

• [ ] Symmetric validation rules L1 ↔ L2

• [ ] Full roundtrip flows tested

Signature Security (HIGH):

• [ ] Signatures include nonce tracking

• [ ] Nonce incremented after each use

• [ ] Domain separator includes chain ID and contract address

• [ ] Signature replay tested and prevented

• [ ] Cross-chain replay prevented

Tool Usage:

• [ ] Caracal scan completed with no critical findings

• [ ] Unit tests cover all vulnerability scenarios

• [ ] Integration tests verify L1-L2 flows

• [ ] Testnet deployment tested before mainnet

• [ ] Coverage table emitted with all 6 rows, each carrying a verdict of found, clear or n/a with a reason

13. Rationalizations to Reject

• "The contract is small, so most patterns obviously don't apply." Obvious to whom? An n/a costs one clause and makes the judgment reviewable. Silence records nothing, and a reader cannot tell it apart from not having checked.

• "Caracal reported nothing, so the contract is clean." Caracal covers a subset of these 6 patterns and does not reach the logic-level ones at all. A clean tool run is one row of evidence, not a verdict on the patterns it never examined. Say which patterns it covered.

• "I checked the patterns that matter for this contract." Deciding which patterns matter is the scan, not a precondition for starting it. Rank by severity after the table is complete, not by leaving rows out.

• "No findings, so there is nothing to report." A zero-finding scan still emits the full coverage table. That table is the deliverable: it is what distinguishes a contract that was examined from one that was glanced at.

• "Cairo 1 has native overflow checks, so arithmetic is safe." Name the types. felt252 does not behave like the sized integer types, and the boundary between them is where pattern 4 lives.

• "The L1 side validates that." Then cite the L1 contract. A check you believe exists across the bridge is an assumption until you have read it, and unverified from_address is the canonical StarkNet bridge bug.